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Student v. Braintree Public Schools & Quincy Public Schools & Norwood Public Schools BSEA# 25-03859

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

Student v. Braintree Public Schools  & Quincy Public Schools & Norwood Public Schools                                     

BSEA# 25-03859

Ruling on Braintree Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment

Relevant Procedural History

Parent filed a Request for Hearing on September 26, 2024.  On October 7, 2024 Braintree Public Schools (“Braintree”) filed a Motion to Dismiss. Norwood Public Schools (“Norwood”) filed an opposition to Braintree’s Motion on October 14, 2024.  On October 24, 2024 Braintree filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Norwood Public Schools (“Norwood”) filed an Opposition to the Motion on October 31, 2024.

Relevant Facts[1]

Student is nineteen years old and receives special education services through an IEP under the primary disability category of Emotional, with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia.  

Student’s aunt (“Guardian”) became his  sole legal guardian beginning on or around November 22, 2022.  Guardian has lived in Norwood at all relevant times.  On March 23, 2023, Guardian and Braintree entered into a mediated agreement to resolve a BSEA Hearing Request filed by Parent on March 21, 2022.  The agreement included the following relevant provisions.  “The District will fund placement and fund and provide transportation to/from home for the Chamberlain placement if the Student is accepted and for as long as the District is programmatically and fiscally responsible for his services.”  “The Guardian fully accepts the proposed IEP (9/16/22 -9/15/23) and the amendment dated 3/23/23.”  “This Mediated Agreement is entered into in full settlement of any and all claims which the Parents have or might have asserted against the District, and which the Student might have on his own behalf, before the BSEA or any other forum through the date of this Mediated Agreement.”

Student has attended Chamberlain International School (“Chamberlain”) since on or after June 29, 2023. (See Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment Exh. D, Exh. H.)  Prior to his placement at Chamberlain, Student attended the Ivy Street School.  (Affidavit of Petra Platt.)  

Student has resided at a group home in Quincy funded by the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”) since on or around July 7, 2023.  (Norwood Exh. B)  Student’s mother (“Mother”) and his aunt (“Guardian”) have been his co-guardians since on or around August 23, 2023.  (Norwood Exh. B)

On April 27, 2023 the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (“DESE”) issued an Assignment of School District Responsibility and Application of the Move-In Law.  (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. F; Norwood’s Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exh. A)  DESE assigned programmatic responsibility to Norwood and financial responsibility was to remain with Braintree through June 30, 2023 and to transfer to Norwood on July 1, 2023.

On or around July 1, 2023, Student’s mother became homeless and lacked a residence until April 20, 2024, when she moved to Plymouth.

On June 27, 2024, DESE issued an Updated and Corrected Assignment of School District Responsibility.  The assignment letter stated that prior to Student’s residency at the group home in Quincy, programmatic and financial responsibility were assigned to Braintree.  Upon Student’s placement in the group home (6/13/23), programmatic responsibility was assigned to Quincy and financial responsibility for the non-budgeted costs of Student’s special education program transferred to Norwood, the residence of his legal guardian.  Pursuant to the “Move-in-Law” Braintree remained responsible for the budgeted costs of Student’s private day special education placement and transportation for the remainder of the 2022-2023 school year and for the entire 2023-2024 school year.  On July 1, 2024, the Norwood Public Schools would assume financial responsibility for Student’s special education placement during the 2024-2025 school year.  When Parent obtained permanent housing in Plymouth, on April 20, 2024, programmatic responsibility remained with Quincy and the financial responsibility for the costs not already budgeted by Norwood was to be shared jointly by Norwood and Plymouth.  Braintree was to remain financially responsible for the cost of Student’s private day special education placement for the 2023-2024 school year.  For the 2024-2025 school year, financial responsibility for the budgeted costs of Student’s private day special education placement, including transportation, was assigned to Norwood.  Norwood and Plymouth would assume joint responsibility for Student’s private day special education placement for the 2025-2026 school year.  (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B)

On July 16, 2024, DESE issued another Updated and Corrected Assignment of School District Responsibility.  The letter reiterated its determination that Braintree had been programmatically and financially responsible for Student prior to his move to the group home in Quincy.  It re-stated its determination that on June 13, 2023, programmatic responsibility was assigned to Quincy and financial responsibility for the non-budgeted costs of Student’s special education program transferred to Norwood.  It reaffirmed its finding that Braintree was responsible for the budgeted costs of Student’s private day school and transportation for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years and that Norwood assumed financial responsibility for Student’s placement during the 2024-2025 school year.  It re-asserted the assignment of financial responsibility to Norwood for the 2024-2025 school year for budgeted costs and to Norwood and Plymouth jointly for unbudgeted costs and noted that Norwood and Plymouth would assume joint responsibility for Student’s private day special education placement for the 2025-2026 school year.  (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B)

Braintree’s Position

Braintree argues it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to claims made against it for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school year, as it was relieved of programmatic responsibility for Student in June 2023.  Further, Parent’s claims for compensatory services from Braintree for the 2022-2023 school year are precluded by a Mediated Agreement between Guardian and Braintree, executed on March 24, 2023.

Parent’s Request for Hearing includes claims against three school districts, Braintree Public Schools (“Braintree”), Quincy Public Schools (“Quincy”), and Norwood Public Schools (“Norwood”).  Parent asserts six claims against Braintree:  (1) prospective relief for Braintree to provide reading services to Student, (2) equitable relief for compensatory reading services allegedly not provided since December 2022, (3) prospective relief for Braintree to make referrals for in home services, (4) prospective relief for Braintree to fund an adaptive driving assessment, (5) equitable relief for compensatory occupational therapy services allegedly not provided during Student’s enrollment at Chamberlain, and (6) equitable relief for compensatory vocational services that Chamberlain was not able to provide.  (Braintree Exh A)

Braintree was relieved of programmatic and financial responsibility for Student on June 13, 2023 when he moved to the group home in Quincy and Quincy became programmatically responsible.  Student had not yet begun attending Chamberlain at that time, thus precluding Parent’s claims against Braintree arising from Student’s time at Chamberlain.  Pursuant to the “Move-in Law” Braintree continued to be responsible for budgeted costs of Student’s private day placement and transportation until June 30, 2024 while Norwood assumed all “non-budgeted costs” until June 30, 2024 at which time Norwood assumed total fiscal responsibility.

Braintree asserts that Student was not a student of Braintree’s during the 2023-2024 school year and it was therefore not programmatically or financially responsible for providing Student with FAPE other than funding his private day school tuition and transportation in accordance with the “Move-in-Law”. 

Norwood’s Position

Norwood states that summary judgment is not appropriate in this matter as there is a genuine issue of fact as to Parent’s claim for compensatory services.  Norwood argues that the June 27, 2024 Updated and Corrected Assignment of School District Responsibility letter assigned fiscal responsibility for the budgeted costs of Student’s private day school special education placement, including transportation, to Braintree, not Norwood.  The July 16, 2024 assignment letter stated that Braintree remained financially responsible for the budgeted costs of the Student’s private day special education placement, including necessary transportation for the remainder of the 2022-2023 school year and the entire 2023-2024 school year.  Parent’s Hearing Request identifies the 2023-2024 school year as a period of time at issue in this matter.  Specifically, Parent has requested compensatory services in the areas of reading, occupational therapy, and vocational services for services allegedly not provided to Student during the 2023-2024 school year when Braintree was financially responsible for Student.  Braintree’s argument that it is not obligated to provide any compensatory services because it was relieved of programmatic responsibility fails because it ignores the fact that Braintree was determined to be fiscally responsible for Student for the remainder of the 2022-2023 school year and the entire 2023-2024 school year.  Braintree’s argument that Norwood would be responsible for any corrective action and associated costs if Chamberlain did not implement Student’s IEP or failed to provide Student with FAPE is without merit.  Parent has alleged failure of Chamberlain to provide IEP services during the relevant period.  Braintree, as the financially responsible LEA during the relevant period, is responsible for funding of those IEP services included in the cost of the Student’s tuition, not Norwood.

Parent’s Position

Parent does not believe that summary judgment should be granted in Braintree’s favor.  She requests that Braintree provide monetary compensation for reading services for the time period after June 21, 2023 and for the 2023-2024 school year and “both programmatic and monetary compensatory services from December 2023-June 2023” [sic].  She notes that neither she nor Student signed the mediated agreement or withdrew the previously filed hearing request.  The services she has requested, including direct reading services, in-home support from an occupational therapist, and transitional services are essential for Student to access FAPE.

Summary Judgment

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[2]  BSEA hearing officers are guided by the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure,  Rule 56, which provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[3]

The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate, with the support of its documents (pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence), that there is no genuine issue of fact relating to the claim or defense. The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[4] In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[5] An issue is genuine if it “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”[6]  A fact is “material” if it could affect the case outcome.[7]  To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” in her favor that the fact finder could decide for her.[8] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.”[9] The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”[10]

Analysis

Braintree seeks an entry of summary judgment for claims filed by Parent for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years.  With respect to the 2022-2023 school year, Parent alleges that Student is entitled to compensatory and ongoing reading services because the reading specialist at Ivy Street School quit in December 2022 and Student has not been provided with reading services since then.  Braintree argues that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether it is responsible for providing compensatory reading services to Student.  First it points to the mediated agreement signed by Braintree and Guardian on March 24, 2023 and March 23, 2024, respectively. (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh C) The mediated agreement does not contain any provision for compensatory reading services.  Paragraph 12 of the agreement states, “This Mediated Agreement is entered into in full settlement of any and all claims which the Parents have or might have asserted against the District, and which the Student might have on his own behalf, before the SEA or any other forum through the date of this Mediated Agreement.”  Paragraph 14 of the Mediated Agreement states “There is no agreement on any issues beyond what is directly stated in the Mediated Agreement.  Except as otherwise stated here, the Guardian and Parent and District are not waiving any of their rights afforded to them under State and Federal Special Education and 504 Accommodation laws and regulations.”  Parent states that neither she nor Student were signatories to the Mediated Agreement.  I note, however, that at the time the agreement was signed, Guardian was Student’s sole guardian, and the only person with legal authority to sign the agreement.  

The mediated agreement did not include any provision for compensatory reading services and included a waiver of all claims that could have been brought against the district, including any claim for compensatory reading services, for the period through and including March 24, 2023. Braintree is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether it owes Student compensatory reading services for the 2022-2023 school through and including March 24, 2023.  Braintree is not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Parent’s claim for compensatory reading services for the time period from March 25, 2023 through June 13, 2023, the time during which Braintree was programmatically and financially responsible for Student and to which the Mediated Agreement did not apply.

There is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Braintree’s obligation to Student while he has attended Chamberlain.  The uncontested facts show that Braintree was relieved of programmatic responsibility when Student was placed at the group home on June 13, 2023.  (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B)  Student had not yet enrolled at Chamberlain at that time.  (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. D) Quincy had programmatic responsibility, and Norwood was assigned financial responsibility for the non-budgeted costs of Student’s special education program.  Pursuant to the “Move-in-Law” Braintree remained responsible for the budgeted costs of Student’s private day special education placement, including transportation, for the reminder of the 2022-2023 school year and the entire 2023-2024 school year ending on June 30, 2024.  (Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B)  Norwood argues that Braintree remained fiscally responsible for Student during the remainder of the 2022-2023 and for the entire 2023-204 school years.  It further argues that there remain genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Student received the required services or whether he is entitled to receive compensatory services.  Norwood’s argument ignores the fact that Braintree was assigned financial responsibility for only the budgeted costs of Student’s private day placement and transportation.  Norwood was assigned financial responsibility for all non-budgeted costs.  Regardless of whether the Parent is able to prove that Student is entitled to compensatory services for any of the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years, Braintree could only be liable for the budgeted costs of the private day placement and transportation as articulated in the Assignment of School District Responsibility letters, except for the time period from March 24, 2023 through June 13, 2023 as explained above.  Thus, Braintree is correct that there is no dispute that Braintree is not responsible to provide Student with any prospective services.

Similarly, Braintree was absolved of both programmatic and financial responsibility (other than the budgeted costs of Student’s private day school placement and transportation) on June 13, 2023, when Student moved to the group home in Quincy.  Therefore, even if Parent can prove that Chamberlain failed to provide all services to which Student was entitled, Braintree was not responsible or authorized to provide programmatic oversight nor was it obligated to provide funding other than the budgeted costs associated with Student’s placement and transportation. Parent and Norwood have failed to show that there is “sufficient evidence”  that the fact finder could decide in their favor with respect to Braintree’s responsibility for Student’s services during the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years, except for the period from March 24 through June 13, 2023, as discussed above.

ORDERS

Braintree’s Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED in part.  Summary judgment is allowed with respect to Parent’s claims against Braintree for compensatory reading services for the period from December 2022 through March 24, 2023 .  Summary judgment is denied for the time period between March 24, 2023 and June 13, 2023.

Braintree’s request for Summary judgment is ALLOWED with respect to Parent’s claims for prospective reading services, home services, and a driving assessment.

Braintree’s request for Summary judgment with respect to Parent’s claims for compensatory education for services allegedly not provided by Chamberlain is ALLOWED.

/s/ Catherine Putn Yaceshyn

Catherine Putn Yaceshyn

Dated:  December 12, 2024

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL

Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment

20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejud

ice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only. 

Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.

Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay.  This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided.  Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must  request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.

Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.” 

Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau.  School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).  Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).

Compliance

A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).

Rights of Appeal

Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts, for review. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).

An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).

Confidentiality

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing

Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.

Record of the Hearing

The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.


[1] The facts are established for purposes of this Ruling only.

[2]  801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).

[3]  Id.

[4] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also In Re: Westwood Pub. Schl., BSEA # 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol Cty Agricultural Sch., BSEA # 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006).

[5]  Anderson, 477 U.Sat 250.

[6] Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).

[7] See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986).

[8] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

[9] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).

[10] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

Updated on December 16, 2024

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