COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District
BSEA # 25-09385
RULING ON ACTON-BOXBOROUGH REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION RELATIVE TO ISSUES FOR HEARING AND ACTON-BOXBOROUGH REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on two motions filed by Acton-Boxborough Regional School District (ABRSD or the District). Prior to the start of the evidentiary Hearing on April 29, 2029, the District made an oral motion objecting to the statement of the issues by the Hearing Officer in her April 28, 2025 Ruling on Acton-Boxborough Regional School District’s Motion to Dismiss (Motion Objecting to Issue Relative to IEP Dated 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024). Specifically, in this Ruling, I identified the issues for hearings as “whether the Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) for the periods 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024 and/or 9/9/2024 to 9/8/2025 were/are reasonably calculated to provide Student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE)? If the answer is no, then what is the proper remedy?”
In its Motion Objecting to Issue Relative to IEP Dated 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024, the District asserted that Parents are precluded from asserting that the IEP for the period 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024 was not reasonably calculated to offer Student a FAPE as Parents had accepted this IEP in full by executing a Mediation Agreement on November 14, 2023.[1] ABRSD’s Motion Objecting to Issue Relative to IEP Dated 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024 was orally allowed the same day on the record, and the reasons for such allowance are expanded in this Ruling.
At the close of Parents’ case in the above-noted matter on April 29, 2025, ABRSD also made a Motion for Directed Verdict. Said Motion was denied orally the same day on the record, and the reasons for such denial are expanded in this Ruling.
For the reasons set forth below, ABRSD’s Motion Objecting to Issue Relative to IEP For the periods 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024 is ALLOWED. The District’s Motion for Directed Verdict is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The factual and procedural history of this case is reviewed in detail in my prior Rulings in the matter and need not be repeated here. Following approximately 5 hours of hearing on April 29, 2025, the District moved for a directed verdict on Parents’ claims.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION
- Motion Objecting to Issue Relative to IEP Dated 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024
- Legal Standards Relative to BSEA Jurisdiction Over Mediation Agreements
The statutory provision relevant to the Parties’ dispute appears at 20 U.S.C. §1415 (e)(2)(F):
“Written Agreement. In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the complaint through the Mediation process, the parties shall execute a legally binding Agreement that sets forth such resolution and that–
(i) states that all discussions that occurred during the Mediation process shall be confidential and may not be used as evidence
(ii) is signed by both the parent and a representative of the agency who has the authority to bind such agency; and
(iii) is enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.”[2]
As both the IDEA and its implementing regulations state that a written, signed Mediation Agreement is “enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States,” the majority of BSEA decisions have found that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over claims addressing “enforcement” of Mediation Agreements.[3] However, “it is well settled that a BSEA Mediation Agreement, signed by all parties and fully implemented, precludes a subsequent BSEA hearing on the issues resolved by the Agreement. To conclude otherwise would undermine the relevant provisions of federal and state special education law as well as the underlying legislative purpose and public policy favoring informal, voluntary resolution of special education disputes.”[4]
In contrast to a court’s jurisdiction that includes enforcement of a Mediation or a settlement Agreement regarding a dispute under the IDEA,
“the BSEA Hearing Officer’s jurisdiction may not extend to enforcement because a hearing officer has no mechanism to enforce an Agreement (for example, through powers of contempt), just as he/she has no mechanism to enforce an IEP or to enforce a decision of a BSEA Hearing Officer. However, similar to a federal court’s jurisdiction in an IDEA dispute, a Hearing Officer’s jurisdiction may include consideration of the legal implications of an Agreement with respect to parents’ special education rights, and the Hearing Officer may issue orders stating what a school district must do in order to comply with these rights.”[5]
Hence, a BSEA Hearing Officer has the authority and responsibility to consider a Mediation Agreement and determine whether and to what extent the Agreement may alter the rights and responsibilities of the parties with regard to a student’s special education services and related procedural protections.[6]
- Analysis
Although the BSEA generally does not exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising from contract law,[7] Hearing Officers often “consider” mediation agreements and “their legal implications” in disputes before the BSEA.[8] In “considering” the Mediation Agreement, here, I find that the plain language of the Agreement states that Parents “fully accept[] the Student’s 9/8/2023 through 9/7/2024 IEP,” and the “District [agrees to] fully implement the Student’s IEP, program, and placement until the Student graduates from public education, anticipated to be July 22, 2025.” As such, Parents cannot argue that the fully accepted IEP failed to offer Student a FAPE. They may, however, challenge the implementation of said IEP.[9] Since Parents also accepted, on March 7, 2025, the psychological services proposed as part of the IEP for the period 9/9/2024 to 9/8/2025, they may also pursue an implementation claim relative to that portion of said IEP.
In addition, during Parents’ Opening Statement, Parents asserted claims of retaliation and denial of meaningful participation. The District argued that Parents’ Hearing Request raised neither the issues of denial of meaningful participation or retaliation. Bearing in mind that Parents in the instant matter are appearing pro se, I relied on the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ directive that complaints filed by pro se parties should be construed liberally.[10] Even utilizing such standard, I found that Parents made no claims as to retaliation in the Hearing Request. However, the Request alleges that that their “requests were ignored.” As such, I orally ruled that Parents could proceed on their claim as to meaningful participation but not on their claim of retaliation, as the latter was not raised in the Hearing Request.[11]
ABRSD also requested clarification regarding the issue of relief that could be ordered in the instant matter, reiterating, the argument set forth in its April 25, 2025 Motion to Dismiss. The District asserted that Parents in this matter are seeking a “placement [in a] family-driven program and redirecting the corresponding school district funds to it,” and the BSEA does not have the authority to award such relief, because the family-driven program is not approved by the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE). Compensation for home-based educational expenses may be recovered under the IDEA pursuant to the general authority to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”[12] The Supreme Court has held that parents may recover reimbursement under the IDEA for private special education expenses if (1) the school board fails to provide a FAPE and (2) the parental placement is appropriate.[13] Because Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) “is phrased permissively, stating only that courts ‘may require’ reimbursement in those circumstances, it does not foreclose reimbursement awards in other circumstances.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2493 (2009). The subsection and its neighboring clauses are “best read as elucidative rather than exhaustive.” Id. They do not limit the more general authority to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate” pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). See id. at 2496. In other words, Section 1412(a)(10)(C) does not foreclose reimbursement just because a parental placement is not within a “private elementary school or secondary school.” R.L. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 757 F.3d 1173, 1185–87 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the IDEA authorizes a District Court to award reimbursement for one-on-one instructional services outside the school setting). In some cases, reimbursement for one-on-one home instructional programs will be “appropriate,” and parents may seek reimbursement for a unilateral placement in a home-based program. Here, however, Parents do not seek reimbursement for a home program but rather prospective funding for same. I clarified at the Hearing, as I did in my April 28, 2025 Ruling on Acton-Boxborough Regional School District’s Motion to Dismiss, that this distinction is determinative, and such outcome is not within the Hearing Officer’s authority to allow.[14]
Therefore, the issues for Hearing are clarified as follows:
- Whether the IEP for the period 9/8/2023 through 9/7/2024 and the psychological services proposed by the District in the IEP for the period /9/2024 to 9/8/2025 and accepted by Parents on March 7, 2025 were implemented?
- Whether the IEP for the period 9/9/2024 to 9/8/2025 was reasonably calculated to offer Student a FAPE in the LRE?
- Whether Parents were denied meaningful participation in the IEP process?
- If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, what is the proper remedy?
- Motion For Directed Verdict
To determine whether Parents’ claims survive the District’s Motion for Directed Verdict, I apply the directed verdict standard to the relevant substantive law.
- Legal Standards Relative to Motion for Directed Verdict
801 C.M.R. §1.01(7)(g)(1), applicable to Bureau of Special Education (BSEA) proceedings, permits a Respondent to move to dismiss a case, upon completion of the presentation of the Petitioner’s evidence, on the ground that upon the evidence, or the law, or both, the Petitioner has not established her case. Although BSEA Hearing Officers are not bound by the Rules of Civil Procedure, such Rules are often consulted for guidance. Mass. R. Civ. P. 50(a) provides that “[a] party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent.” The language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) has been updated from “directed verdict” to “judgment as a matter of law,” and it permits entry of judgment against a party that has been fully heard on an issue if the finder of fact “would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”
A motion for a directed verdict may be granted “only where, construing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, it is still insufficient to support a verdict in his favor.”[15] In evaluating the evidence, the finder of fact must also consider reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. The standard, as articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Raunela v. Hertz Corporation, is whether “anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.”[16] For inferences to be considered reasonable, they must be based on “probabilities rather than possibilities,” and not the result of “mere speculation and conjecture.”[17]
In the context of a case before the BSEA, which requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard is “whether, at the conclusion of Parent’s case, the evidence, construed most favorably to Parent, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the preponderance of the evidence favored Parent’s position.”[18] To determine whether to enter a directed verdict as to any of Parents’ claims here, I must consider the substantive and procedural law governing this matter.
a. FAPE
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education” (FAPE).[19] To provide a student with a FAPE, a school district must follow identification, evaluation, program design, and implementation practices that ensure that each student with a disability receives an Individualized Education Program (IEP) that is: custom tailored to the student’s unique learning needs; “reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit”; and ensures access to and participation in the general education setting and curriculum as appropriate for that student so as “to enable the student to progress effectively in the content areas of the general curriculum.”[20] FAPE is delivered through an educational program, including secondary transition services, that offers the student the chance to meet challenging objectives and, in light of the student’s circumstances, is appropriately ambitious and reasonably calculated to enable a student to make progress.[21] A student’s IEP must be individually tailored.[22] When developing the IEP, the Team must consider parental concerns; the student’s strengths, disabilities, recent evaluations and present level of achievement; the academic, developmental and functional needs of the child; and the child’s potential for growth.[23] Evaluating an IEP requires viewing it as a “a snapshot, not a retrospective. In striving for ‘appropriateness,’ an IEP must take into account what was . . . objectively reasonable . . . at the time the IEP was promulgated.”[24]
FAPE does not require a school district to provide special education and related services that will maximize a student’s educational potential.[25] In Endrew F., the Supreme Court explained that appropriate progress will look different depending on the student.[26] An individual analysis of a student’s progress in his/her areas of need is key.[27] The educational services provided to a student, therefore, need not be, “the only appropriate choice, or the choice of certain selected experts, or the child’s parents’ first choice, or even the best choice.”[28]
- Procedural Violations and Meaningful Participation
FAPE also requires compliance with the procedural protections embedded in IDEA. Procedural errors may amount to a deprivation of a FAPE if “the procedural inadequacies – (I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”[29] These procedural protections serve a dual purpose; they provide for meaningful parental participation and they ensure each eligible child receives a FAPE.[30]
Under state and federal special education law, a school district has an obligation to provide the services that comprise FAPE in the “least restrictive environment.”[31] This means that to the maximum extent appropriate, a student must be educated with other students who do not have disabilities, and that “removal . . . from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services, cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”[32] “The goal, then, is to find the least restrictive educational environment that will accommodate the child’s legitimate needs.”[33] In addition, IDEA recognizes the need to educate some children in more restrictive settings, such as “in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings.”[34]
Although parental participation in the planning, developing, delivery, and monitoring of special education services is central in IDEA, MGL c. 71B, and corresponding regulations,[35] school districts are obligated to propose what they believe to be FAPE in the LRE, “whether or not the parents are in agreement.”[36]
- Implementation Failures
Courts have found FAPE violations with respect to alleged implementation failures where (1) the “failure” to implement was “complete”; (2) the variance from the special education and related services specified in the IEP deprived the student of a FAPE; and (3) the provision of special education and related services failed to enable the student to make “progress” toward the achievement of the goals stated in the IEP.[37]
- Analysis
To decide whether each of the challenged claims survives the District’s Motion, I must determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, construed in the light most favorable to Parents, is sufficient to support a decision in their favor by a preponderance of the evidence on each required element of that claim.
In analyzing Parents’ claims, I again bear in mind that Parents in the instant matter are appearing pro se, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that complaints filed by pro se parties should be construed liberally.[38] “The policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.[39] This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system [, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law.[40] Although the instant Motion was made after the close of Parents’ evidence rather than on their initial pleadings, in keeping with this principle I exercise particular caution before dismissing Parents’ claims prior to adjudication.
In their Hearing Request, Parents assert that IEP proposed in September 2023 and accepted in full by Parents when executing the November 2023 Mediation Agreement, was not implemented. Parents also contend that the IEP proposed for Student in September 2024 for the 2024-2025 school year was not reasonably calculated to provide her with a FAPE and that Parents were denied meaningful participation in the Team process. In its Motion, ABRSD argues that Parents have produced no evidence to demonstrate any of their claims.
At the time ABRSD made its oral Motion for Directed Verdict, the testimony of Parents’ four witnesses [41]had been heard. In addition, a significant amount of documentary evidence from both parties had been admitted into evidence. Although the testimony provided prior to the Motion alone may be insufficient to meet their burden on Parents’ FAPE claims, written documents admitted into evidence may demonstrate that Student’s accepted IEP for the period 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024and the psychological services proposed by ABRSD on September 9, 2024 and accepted by Parents on March 7, 2025,were not properly implemented, that the IEP for the period 9/9/2024 to 9/8/2025 did not properly address Student’s transition-related needs, and/or that Parents were denied meaningful participation in the IEP process. Therefore, I cannot say with certainty that at the time ABRSD made its Motion, the evidence and inferences that might be drawn therefrom, construed liberally in the light most favorable to Parents, would be insufficient to support a decision in Parents’ favor on their FAPE claims.
For the reasons above, I find that it would be premature to dismiss Parents’ claims without careful consideration of the totality of the evidence, which requires a detailed review.
III. ORDER
ABRSD’s Motion Objecting to Issue Relative to IEP Dated 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024 is ALLOWED. The District’s Motion for Directed Verdict is DENIED.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Date: April 30, 2025
[1] The District submitted Exhibit M-1 in support of the Motion. The Mediation Agreement states, in relevant part, that “[t]hrough this Mediated Agreement, the Parent fully accepts the Student’s 9/8/2023 through
9/7/2024 IEP. The District will fully implement the Student’s IEP, program, and placement until
the Student graduates from public education, anticipated to be July 22, 2025.” In addition, it states that “This Mediated Agreement is entered into in settlement of any and all claims which the Parents
and/or Students have or might have asserted against Acton Boxborough Public School District
[] before the BSEA or any other forum from the date the Student was enrolled in
Acton Boxborough until today’s date.” Said claims included an allegation that the IEP for the period 9/8/2023 to 9/7/2024 was not reasonably calculated to offer Student a FAPE in the least restrictive environment.
[2] See 34 CFR.300.506(7) (“A written, signed Mediation Agreement under this paragraph is enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States”).
[3] See, e.g., Student v. Worcester Public Schools, BSEA # 1302473 (Putney-Yaceshyn 2013) (finding that “the BSEA does not have authority to interpret or enforce the Parties’ settlement Agreements”); Student R. v. Lincoln Sudbury Regional School District, BSEA # 11-2546 (Figueroa 2010); In Re: Israel and the Monson Public Schools, BSEA #10-5064 (Byrne 2010). But see Longmeadow Public Schools, BSEA # 08-0673 (Crane 2010).
[4] See In Re: Revere Public Schools, BSEA #15-07485 (Berman 2015) (citing 20 USC Sec. 1415(e)(2)(F), 34 CFR Sec. 300.506, and In re: Jake and Masconomet Regional School District, BSEA# 11-2194 (Oliver 2010)).
[5] Joseph v. Boston Public Schools, BSEA # 06-3836 (Crane 2006) (citing to decisions and rulings with respect to a Hearing Officer’s jurisdiction regarding Agreements) (emphasis added).
[6] In re: Jake and Masconomet Regional School District, BSEA# 11-2194 (Oliver 2010); see In Re: Ipswich Public Schools and David, BSEA # 08-0055 (Crane 2007) (hearing officer considered “whether there was an Agreement, either through an accepted IEP or a Mediation Agreement, for additional or different summer services”); Longmeadow Public School District, BSEA # 07-2866 (Crane 2008) (“Because the parties’ settlement Agreement relates to rights and responsibilities that fall within the purview of the BSEA (which are defined within the IDEA as the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child, a BSEA Hearing Officer has the authority and responsibility to consider the Agreement and determine whether and to what extent the Agreement alters the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to Student’s special education services and related procedural protections”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
[7] See In Re: Student v. Worcester Public Schools, BSEA # 1302473 (Putney-Yaceshyn, 2013) (“the BSEA does not have authority to interpret or enforce the terms of private settlement agreements” but, at the same time, may rely on the existence of a settlement agreement and its terms).
[8] See Peabody Public Schools, BSEA # 09-6506 (Crane, 2009) (a Hearing Officer “may (or must) consider the agreement and determine whether and to what extent the agreement alters the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to a student’s special education services and related procedural protections”) (citing relevant caselaw).
[9] See, for example, In re: Nelson v. Quincy Public Schools, BSEA # 2002950 (Reichbach, 2020) (“Where, as here, Parents challenge a fully accepted, expired IEP, the proper inquiry is not whether the IEP provides a FAPE, but whether the District implemented that IEP”).
[10] See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 996, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
[11] BSEA Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeal, Rule IB (stating that the party requesting a hearing shall not be allowed to raise issues at the hearing that were not raised in the hearing request unless the other party agrees or the hearing request is amended in accordance with state and federal law).
[12] SeeSumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478, 488 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding home placement as appropriate).
[13] Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985); see also Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
[14] Manchester–Essex Reg’l Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of The Massachusetts Dep’t of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54–55 (D. Mass. 2007) (observing that the School District had explored alternative placements to supplement the current IEP, and it was “not a case in which an IEP was lacking or clearly inappropriate. Rather, [t]here the parent and the School District disagreed about the inclusion of a specific program on the basis that it was unapproved, unaccredited and lacked sufficient assessment by a properly credentialed professional to demonstrate benefit”) (internal citations omitted).
[15] Alholm v. Wareham, 371 Mass. 621, 627 (1976) (quoting DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 514 (1974)).
[16] 361 Mass. 341, 343 (1972)
[17] Alholm, 371 Mass. at 627 (internal citations omitted).
[18] Elizabeth R.L and Worcester Public Schools, BSEA # 062557 (Sherwood 2006); see Student and Worcester Public Schools, BSEA # 094367 (Figueroa 2009) (“decision maker may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law, including directed verdict, only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, points so ‘strongly and overwhelmingly’ in favor of the moving party, that a reasonable person could conclude only in favor of that moving party” (internal citations omitted)); see also Stewart v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District (A motion for a directed verdict may be granted “only where, construing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, it is still insufficient to support a verdict in his favor” (internal citations omitted)).
[19] Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1400 (d)(1)(A).
[20] See 20 USC §1401 (9), (26), (29); 603 CMR 28.05(4)(b); C.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., et al., No. 18-1794, at 4 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743, 748-749 (2017)); Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 84, 84 (1st Cir. 2012); Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Cooperative Sch. Dist., 518 F. 3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008); C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Conty. Sch. Dist., 513 F. 3d 279 (1st Cir. 2008); In Re: Chicopee Public Schools, BSEA # 1307346 (Byrne, 2013).
[21] Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
[22] Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
[23] 34 CFR §300.324(a)(i-v); Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999; D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012); N. Reading Sch. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 479, 489 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The First Circuit has characterized the federal floor, which defines the minimum that must be offered to all handicapped children, as providing a meaningful, beneficial educational opportunity, and that court has stated that a handicapped child’s educational program must be reasonably calculated to provide effective results and demonstrable improvement in the various educational and personal skills identified as special needs”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
[24] Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 992 (1st Cir. 1990).
[25] Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197, n.21 (1982) (“Whatever Congress meant by an “appropriate” education, it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education”); see N. Reading Sch. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 479, 488 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The focus of inquiry under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(i) must recognize the IDEA’s modest goal of an appropriate, rather than an ideal, education”).
[26] Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 992; see also 603 CMR 28.02(17).
[27] Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (“The nature of the IEP process, from the initial consultation through state administrative proceedings, ensures that parents and school representatives will fully air their respective opinions on the degree of progress a child’s IEP should pursue”); see K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795, 809 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the court would not compare the student to her nondisabled peers since the key question was whether the student made gains in her areas of need).
[28] G.D. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942, 948-949 (1st Cir. 1991).
[29] 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 CFR 300.513(a)(2); see Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994.
[30] See Honig v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 592, 298 (1998) (“Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the [IDEA] the importance and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness); see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050 (1982) (“Congress placed every bit as much emphasis on compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation in every stage of the administrative process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard”).
[31] 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 CFR 300.114(a)(2)(i); M.G.L. c. 71 B, §§ 2, 3; 603 CMR 28.06(2)(c).
[32] 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(5)(A); C.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., 924 F. 3d at 631 (internal citations omitted.
[33] C.G. ex rel. A.S., 513 F.3d at 285.
[34] 20 U.S.C. § § 1401(29)(A).
[35] Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208(“Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for parental involvement … in the formulation of the child’s individual educational program”).
[36] In Re: Natick Public Schools, BSEA # 11-3131 (Crane, 2011).
[37] See Ross v. Framingham Sch. Comm., 44 F. Supp. 2d 104, 119 (D. Mass. 1999), aff’d, 229 F.3d 1133 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hampden-Wilbraham Reg’l Sch. Dist., 715 F. Supp. 2d 185, 198 (D. Mass. 2010).
[38] See Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Student’s father and three other witnesses testified prior to the Motion for Directed Verdict.