COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student & Ashland Public Schools & DCF & DMH
BSEA# 26-01972
RULING ON THE DISTRICT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY DECISION
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the portion of the Ashland Public School District’s (District) August 21, 2025 Motion to Dismiss and/or in the Alternative Motion to Stay (MTD), pertaining specifically to the request for dismissal, and its September 8, 2025 Motion for Summary Decision (MSD) (collectively Motions)[1]. At the core of the Motions is the District’s argument regarding the preclusive effect of a Settlement Agreement the District entered into with Parent in or about May 2024 addressing Student’s special education services and placement through the summer of 2026 (Settlement Agreement). On August 28, 2025, Parent filed her Response to Ashland Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss (Response to MTD), in part, opposing dismissal[2]. On September 12, 2025, Parent filed her Response to [the District’s] Motion for Summary Decision (Response to MSD) (collectively Responses), contending that genuine issues of material fact exist thus a hearing on the merits must be held[3].
No hearing was requested on the Motions. As neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing pursuant to Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules)Rule VII(D). For the reasons articulated below, both Motions are DENIED with prejudice.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
The instant matter consists of a re-filing of a prior Hearing Request filed by Parent on February 10, 2025 against the District, DMH and DCF (BSEA No. 2508203) (Prior Matter). That Request was ultimately withdrawn without prejudice on May 30, 2025, for reasons unrelated to the pending Motions. Prior to being withdrawn, the District requested dismissal of the Prior Matter for many of the same reasons set forth in the instant MTD. This request was denied via an April 11, 2025 Ruling on Motions to Dismiss (Prior Matter Ruling)[4].
On August 11, 2025, Parent filed the current Hearing Request against the District, raising many of the same substantive allegations as in the Prior Matter, and seeking the same relief, namely an order finding that Student requires a residential educational program to receive a free, appropriate, public education (FAPE). Among other changes, the Hearing Request filed in the instant matter, included a new section on procedural history. It indicated, in relevant part, that the District’s request for dismissal of the Prior Matter based upon the Settlement Agreement had been denied as had a subsequently filed request for reconsideration (filed on May 2, 2025), and that the Ruling denying reconsideration had noted that the District’s request “amounts wholly to an attempt to ‘relitigate and/or rehash’ the issues pertaining to the preclusive effect of the Settlement Agreement that was already fully addressed in the [Prior Matter Ruling]” (Reconsideration Ruling). Further, of relevance to the underlying Ruling, both Hearing Requests contained the following allegations,
“Over the years, [Student] has secured a variety of educational services and accommodations through a combination of IEPs and out-of-district placements (culminating with his current day placement at Perkins), as well as support from the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”) and the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). Unfortunately, these supports have been frustrated by repeated and sporadic hospitalizations resulting from [Student’s] dysregulation – both at home and in group home settings – that have increased dramatically and significantly in both frequency and severity over the past year[5]. As a result of these hospitalizations, [Student] has suffered extended absences from school, which have severely impeded his academic development. In addition, [Student’s] frequent transitions between school, home, group homes, and hospitalizations have created an increasingly unstable environment, which, in turn, is exacerbating [Student’s] dysregulation. Accordingly, this situation and the nature of [Student’s] disability have evolved such that he needs a full-time residential placement to access FAPE and ensure the health and safety of himself and his mother.”
On August 21, 2025, the District filed the MTD, seeking dismissal based on the District’s contention that the Settlement Agreement precludes Parent from seeking the relief she requests, or alternatively, a stay.
Parent opposed dismissal on August 28, 2025, contending the BSEA has already addressed and denied the District’s arguments in the Prior Matter Ruling and the Reconsideration Ruling and the District does not make any meaningful changes to its argument in the MTD, nor is there anything substantially different in the Hearing Request in the instant matter that has a substantive impact on the District’s argument for dismissal. Parent submits that the South Kingstown[6] holding relied upon in the Prior Matter Ruling continues to apply, and the two new cases now cited by the District (but not previously raised in the Prior Matter) do not change its application.
On September 8, 2025, the District filed its MSD seeking summary decision based upon its contention that there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts pertaining to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The District again contends that the Settlement Agreement terms (particularly the clause relating to “unanticipated catastrophic illness or injury”) govern all claims by Parent as to what warrants a change in conditions since execution of the Settlement Agreement. Further, the District argues that to the extent the terms of the Settlement Agreement are not found to govern in the instant matter, there is also no genuine dispute as to the material facts relating to whether there was in fact a change in conditions for Student after execution of the Settlement Agreement and thus, as a matter of law (based on the South Kingstown holding) Student is not entitled to any educational services or placement beyond what is called for in the Settlement Agreement through the end of its term.
Parent opposed summary decision on September 12, 2025, contending that the District’s lack of reliance on any facts as to Student’s condition “at the time” when the Settlement Agreement was executed in May 2024, is not only contrary to the proper analysis of a “change in conditions” (which focuses on the conditions existing at the time the parties executed the Settlement Agreement), but is also inappropriately and concerningly based on a misguided presumption that Student’s “horrifying past disqualifies him from a brighter future … [or that] his diagnoses are his permanent ‘condition’ regardless of progress.” According to Parent, since there is a dispute as to Student’s condition in May 2024, which is a factual dispute material to the issue of whether there has been a change in conditions for Student since execution of that Settlement Agreement, summary decision is not warranted[7].
LEGAL STANDARDS[8]
- Motions to Dismiss
Rule XVI(B)(1) and (4) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), allows for dismissal of a hearing request if the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over a claim or if a party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[9]. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief…”[10]. The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor”[11]. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level… [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the [hearing request] (even if doubtful in fact) ….”[12].
- Motions for Summary Decision
801 CMR 1.01(7)(h) allows summary decision to be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”[13]. A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if it involves a dispute of a fact that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit” and “a reasonable [factfinder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party”[14].
The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment[15]. To successfully challenge a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”[16]. The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation[17].”
- Jurisdiction of BSEA Generally and Over Settlement Agreements
20 USC §1415(b)(6) grants parties the right to file timely complaints with the designated state educational agency “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child”[18]. However, every alleged wrong imposed on an IDEA or 504-eligible student is not necessarily actionable at the BSEA[19]. As discussed below, the BSEA’s jurisdiction over disputes in which the Parties have previously executed a binding settlement agreement is one such area of limitation.
Pursuant to20 USC 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) and (f)(1)(B)(iii)(II), settlement agreements reached as a result of mediations or resolution sessions are “enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States”. While settlement agreements reached outside these two procedures are not explicitly addressed in the IDEA, the BSEA has consistently analyzed and treated all settlement agreements in the same way, regardless of the process by which they were created[20]. Although BSEA Hearing Officers have the “authority and responsibility to consider [a settlement] agreement and determine whether and to what extent the [settlement] agreement alters the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to [a s]tudent’s special education services and related procedural protections[21], the BSEA has also historically declined to take jurisdiction over issues of interpretation or enforcement of settlement agreement terms, as it lacks “subject matter jurisdiction over contract law disputes, cannot grant relief under contract law claims, and has no particular expertise in interpreting and applying contract law”[22]. Further, despite the First Circuit’s recognition and clear acknowledgment of the potential preclusive effect of settlement agreements on subsequently filed disputes between parties to such agreements, no Massachusetts federal or state Court has addressed whether, or to what extent, administrative hearing officers, rather than the Courts have jurisdiction to interpret them[23].
According to the First Circuit’s holding in South Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S., settlement agreements will “… release any right to additional [services] that [a student] may have had, except when [the] request … arises from a change in the conditions that prevailed at the time [the parties] signed the [a]greement”[24]. S. Kingstown involved requests for ten new evaluations made less than six months after the District’s performance of four evaluations agreed to pursuant to a settlement agreement that contained a release of claims that were known or should have been known through the date of that agreement[25]. Reasoning that “consent would be meaningless if [the parent] could nonetheless turn around the next day and demand the foregone [terms] anew”, the Court acknowledged that “[w]e cannot accept [this] reading of the [settlement a]greement, as we find it difficult to suppose the parties intended such a meaningless outcome of their negotiations” [26]. Adopting a “change in conditions” standard, explained the Court, “reflects both the role settlements may play in resolving IDEA disputes and the legitimate concern with allowing IDEA settlements to bargain away—potentially for all time and without regard to the change in conditions that may arise in the course of a child’s development—the statutory right to a [FAPE]”[27].
ANALYSIS
As I previously advised in the Prior Matter May 2025 Ruling,
“considering Parent’s claims in the light most favorable to her, and drawing all inferences therefrom in her favor, as I am obligated to do in the context of a motion to dismiss, …. Parent’s Hearing Request seeks a determination as to what currently constitutes a FAPE for Student[28]; a question that is wholly within the jurisdiction of the BSEA. It sets forth sufficient allegations that, if taken as true, with all inferences drawn in Parent’s favor, indicates a “change in conditions” regarding Student since Parent executed the Settlement Agreement[29]. Like S. Kingstown, the release language in the Settlement Agreement addressed all claims, known and unknown, through the date of its execution[30]. While Parent would not have been able to challenge Student’s placement based upon conditions pre-dating the May 2024 execution of the Settlement Agreement, her allegations of Student’s “change in conditions” involve conditions after that date, beginning in or around the fall of 2024[31]. These allegations are sufficient, at this stage, to allow the matter to proceed[32], and, at the very least, require further development at a hearing to understand the extent, if any, of Student’s ‘change in conditions’ [33]”.
Further, as I also advised in the Reconsideration Ruling, in addressing the District’s argument made then and now, that the “unanticipated catastrophic illness or injury” clause of the Settlement Agreement was the agreed-upon “specific test of a change in circumstances that constitute[d] a ‘material change in conditions’” in the Settlement Agreement, I note that the phrase “change in conditions” does not appear in this clause[34]. Thus, drawing all inferences in Parent’s favor, this clause of the Settlement Agreement does not justify dismissing this matter without holding a hearing[35].
With regard to the District’s MSD Parent correctly contends that the analysis must focus on Student’s conditions “at the time” the Settlement Agreement was executed, not years prior to that time. Student was twelve when the Settlement Agreement was executed, but the MSD focuses almost exclusivelyon incidents that occurred when Student was ages 7 through 11, as well as incidents starting approximately 4 months after execution of the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the MSD does not contain anyinformation as to occurrences between September 2023 (after Student attended a summer residential program) and May 2024 (when the Settlement Agreement was executed) with regard to Student’s status, conditions, behavioral needs or incidents during that time[36]. As such when viewing the facts most favorably to Parent, a genuine dispute, particularly as it relates to this timeframe, exists that cannot be resolved without a hearing on the merits[37] and that is “material” to the “change in conditions” analysis. Thus, summary decision must be denied[38].
For these reasons, the District’s Motions are DENIED with prejudice. The Hearing on the merits will proceed as scheduled commencing on September 17, 2025.
By the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Marguerite M. Mitchell
Marguerite M. Mitchell
Date: September 16, 2025
[1] During a Conference Call on September 2, 2025, the District requested that a rulingon its request for dismissal be issued separately from the request for a stay (with the request for a stay to be addressed first so it could pursue a request for a stay in federal or superior courts. Given that the Hearing in this matter is currently scheduled for September 17, 19 and 22, 2025, I thus agreed to separate my analysis of the stay request from the dismissal request. A Ruling on the request for a stay was issued on September 3, 2025. However, during the subsequent September 8, 2025 Conference Call the District advised it no longer intended to pursue a stay in Superior Court. This Ruling pertains only to the request for dismissal and the subsequently filed MSD.
[2] The Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Department of Mental Health (DMH) did not file any reply to the MTD; however, they were not joined as Parties until September 2, 2025. During a September 2, 2025, Conference Call, neither agency expressed any position on the MTD, either.
[3] DCF and DMH did not file any reply to the MSD. During a September 8, 2025 Conference Call that DCF attended, but DMH declined to attend, DCF did not express any position on the MSD, either.
[4] The citation for the published Prior Matter Ruling is In Re: Ashland PS & [DMH] & [DCF],31 MSER 92 (Michell, 2025). Many of the arguments presented in that matter are repeated in the instant Motions and Responses. I thus rely on my analysis in the Prior Matter Ruling, which is incorporated herein as appropriate.
[5] The Hearing Request in the Prior Matter used “few months” in place of “year” in this sentence. This is the only difference in these allegations between the two Hearing Requests.
[6] S. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S., 773 F.3d 344, 354-55 (1st Cir. 2014).
[7] Although not officially requesting a cross-motion for summary decision Parent’s Response to MSD also included an argument that “[t]he District’s motion – its most favorable presentation of the facts in this case- itself commands entry of summary decision in favor of Parent on the issue of changed conditions”.
[8] No changes to the law pertaining to the legal standard for a motion to dismiss or the BSEA’s jurisdiction over settlement agreements has occurred since the Prior Matter Ruling, therefore, the statements of law contained therein about these standards are repeated here.
[9] As these rules/regulations are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP and MRCP, respectively), hearing officers are generally guided by federal court decisions in deciding such motions.
[10] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
[11] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[12] Iannocchino 451 Mass. at 636 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
[13] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h). As with motions to dismiss, hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the FRCP and MRCP in deciding motions for summary judgment which provide that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”.
[14] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
[15] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 252 (1986) (“At the summary judgment stage the [hearing officer’s] function is not [her]self to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial”).
[16] Id. at 250 (quoting FRCP 56(e)). The adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” that could be found in its favor that would allow the fact finder to decide for it at a hearing on the merits. Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989) quoting Anderson, 477 US at 249-50 (to be “sufficient”, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial”).
[17] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
[18] See M.G.L. c. 71B §2A (establishing the BSEA and authorizing it to hear disputes over “…(i) any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, education program or educational placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a free and appropriate public education to the child arising under [state or federal special education laws and regulations]; or (ii) a student’s rights under Section 504 …, and its regulations”); 34 CFR 300.507(a)(1); 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[19] Fry v. Napoleon, 580 US 154, 167-68 (2017) (holding that in situations where a dispute does not involve the IDEA’s FAPE requirement “even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends … the hearing officer cannot provide the requested relief. [The hearing officer’s] role, under the IDEA, is to enforce the child’s ‘substantive right’ to a FAPE…. And that is all.” (internal citations omitted). The BSEA does not, for instance, have jurisdiction over class claims, In Re: Holyoke Pub. Sch. and Jay, BSEA #1800619, 24 MSER 20 (Ruling, Oliver, 2018); see In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA #2203555, 28 MSER 111 (Ruling, Berman, 2022) citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm., 421 Mass. 570, 586 (1996); In Re: Student & Quincy Pub. Sch. and Dept. of Elementary and Secondary Education, BSEA #2408249, 30 MSER 176 (Ruling, Mitchell, 2024); or to address violations that pertain to a right that is available to all students regardless of their disability status or eligibility under the IDEA, In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., et. al., BSEA #2309351, 29 MSER 154 (Ruling, Mitchell, 2023).
[20] See In Re: Student R. and Lincoln-Sudbury Pub. Sch., BSEA #11-2546, 16 MSER 424 (Ruling, Figueroa, 2010) (noting that “[e]ven if Parties agree between themselves that the BSEA will have authority to ‘enforce’ agreements, such language is insufficient to bind the BSEA where it otherwise lacks statutory authority, and enforcement of agreements is not one of the powers specifically granted to BSEA Hearing Officers…”).
[21] In Re: Longmeadow Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 07-2866, 14 MSER 249 (Ruling, Crane, 2008) (collecting authorities) (internal citations omitted).
[22] In Re: Milford Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 16-01412, 21 MSER 219 (Ruling, Berman, 2015).
[23] S. Kingstown, 773 F.3d at n.3 (internal citations omitted); Milford, 21 MSER 219 (Berman, 2015); see Alison H. v. Byard, 163 F.3d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding a settlement agreement altered the parties’ IDEA rights and responsibilities by extinguishing the parent’s ability to seek attorney fees under the IDEA that they otherwise held); Michelle K. v. Pentucket Reg’l Sch. Dist., 79 F. Supp. 3d 361, 371 (D. Mass. 2015) (remanding to the BSEA to address an ambiguous settlement term so that “the parties have [a] further opportunity to develop the record including whether [they] should be permitted to advance parole evidence regarding their understanding of the settlement agreement”); In Re: Lexington Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 1701925 22 MSER 204 (Ruling, Figueroa, 2016).
[24] S. Kingstown, 773 F.3d at 354; see D.R. by M.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a settlement agreement is “binding on the parties” unless there has been a change in circumstances”); see Jefferson v. Raimondo, 2018 WL 3873233, at *12 (D.R.I. Aug. 15, 2018).
[25] S. Kingstown, 773 F.3d at 347-48, 354.
[26] Id. at 354 (internal citations omitted)); see Lexington, 22 MSER 204 (Figueroa, 2016).
[27] Id.
[28] Compare In Re: Harvard Pub. Schs. BSEA No. 210881, 27 MSER 386 (Ruling, Kantor Nir 2021) (concluding the terms of a settlement agreement releasing claims prior to its execution but resulting in a student meeting graduation requirements, when there was no dispute as to the student’s receipt of a FAPE during the agreed upon transitional year, precluded further educational obligations by Harvard for the student); Milford 21 MSER 219 (Berman, 2015) (dismissing a claim due to a settlement agreement in a matter where the parents “framed their claims as constituting a breach of contract under the doctrines of impossibility and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” rather than alleging the student’s “IEP is inappropriate or has not been implemented, or that Milford has denied [s]tudent a FAPE”).
[29] S. Kingstown, 773 F.3d at 354.
[30] Compare In Re: Andover Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 200773, 29 MSER 137 (Ruling, Berman, 2020) (concluding that the dispute as to the interpretation of a settlement agreement whose terms prohibited the parents from seeking public funding for private placements in subsequent school years “except in the event of extraordinary circumstances which substantially and materially change the [s]tudent’s disabling condition or educational needs” must be brought to the courts to assess the “circumstances surrounding the negotiations” of that agreement, in a dispute involving Parent’s request for public funding of a placement after the settlement agreement term had expired and where no change in circumstances was at issue); Lexington, 22 MSER 204 (Figueroa, 2016) (deferring dismissal to provide Parents a chance to further develop the record by seeking a hearing on the merits as to their understanding of a settlement agreement in a dispute involving a request for reimbursement for subsequent placements based upon a change in circumstances after expiration of a settlement agreement containing broad waiver language covering future placement claims regardless of any change in circumstances).
[31] Id.
[32] Numerous factual questions exist at this stage, that can only be answered at a hearing including to what extent Student’s behavioral dysregulation in school and at home and if any placement recommendations, differ from what existed at the time the Settlement Agreement was signed. Mr. Catling v. York Sch. Dep’t, 2019 WL 3936386, at Ftnt. 3 (D. Me. Aug. 20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4455986 (D. Me. Sept. 17, 2019) (declining to dismiss the matter at a motion to dismiss stage but acknowledging that after “development of the record” Plaintiffs may not be able to meet their burden to show that their claims “in fact involve changed circumstances to overcome the bar presented by the prior settlement agreement”); see J.G. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 2023 WL 8125847, at Ftnt 3 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2023) (finding Plaintiff did not provide evidence of changed circumstances); Mr. Catling v. York Sch. Dep’t, 2020 WL 6309743, at *6 (D. Me. Oct. 28, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7233351 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 2020) (concluding after “a review of the record and the parties’ arguments” that the alleged “new” information “[did] not constitute changed conditions” until the Team determined additional services were warranted based upon a post-settlement agreement review of a speech and language evaluation).
[33] S. Kingstown, 773 F.3d at 355 (examining on “any changes in [the student]’s behavioral presentations that occurred after the settlement”); see Mr. Catling 2020 WL at *6 (considering evaluation recommendations that the district did not have at the time of the settlement agreement’s execution)….
[34] Specifically, the clause, which is numbered as Section 10, reads: “In the unlikely event that Student suffers an unanticipated and catastrophic illness or injury prior to August 15, 2026, then upon notice by Parent to Ashland, Ashland shall have the right and responsibility to convene a Team meeting to develop an appropriate IEP and to provide him with a free and appropriate public education in accordance with his needs at that time. The parties agree that the stay put placement will be the program proposed by Ashland”.
[35] Additionally, the new court cases cited by the District in the MTD fail to support dismissal, and upon examination are not applicable to the instant matter. Specifically, Conant v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. (255 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) involved a settlement agreement that had terms directly addressing how the parties would interact with respect to future administrative proceedings with the administrative agency whose decision was being reviewed by the Court. Further, the language the District quotes from in In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., (29 F. Supp.3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2014)) pertained to an analysis that Court made with regard to a claim to set aside a settlement agreement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), rather than determining if a settlement agreement precludes a parent from seeking relief under the IDEA or if it is not binding due to a “change in conditions” after its execution, as was the issue in S. Kingstown.
[36] Only 3 of the 23 exhibits submitted by the District with its MTD pertained to this timeframe (but all 3 only provide information through the end of September 2023), to wit:1) a DCF investigation summary from September 29, 2025 about an abuse and neglect report filed against Parent that was unsupported at that time, due in part to DCF concluding that “Mother reports that [Student] is frequently physically assaultive to her, and she is often at odds with the school system about what [Student] needs. Additionally, other providers have significant concerns that [Mother] exaggerates [Student’s] behaviors, and needs, or that her overbearing parenting style may contribute to his functioning at home. The school has stated that he[] does not present with significant issues at school, and prior providers have felt that [Student] did not rise to the level of needing residential treatment, or such frequent hospitalizations”; 2) a publicly funded independent Functional Behavioral Assessment involving parent and teacher interviews in June 2023, two observations of student at his inclusion public elementary school and after school program in June 2023 and one observation of Student at his inclusion public middle school program in September 2023, which did not recommend any educational placement changes, but did recommend wrap around home supports and weekly in-home parent training by a BCBA; and 3) a privately obtained independent neuropsychological evaluation consisting of a record review, and clinical interview via Zoom with Student in June 2023 and an observation of Student in his inclusion public middle school program in September 2023, which also did not recommend any educational placement changes but did recommend after school programming and in home support for his “social-emotional and trauma related struggles at home”. No information was provided by the
District or Parent as to what occurred with Student between October 1, 2023 through execution of the Settlement Agreement over 7 months later.
[37] I also do not agree with Parent’s argument that the District’s motion “commands entry of summary decision” in her favor on the issue of a “change in conditions”. Parent’s contention that “at the time of settlement [Student] was a child with a serious medical history who was doing reasonably well”, cites to no supporting documentation. It is precisely the facts relating to this claim that I must determine at the hearing.
[38] However, as I noted in my Reconsideration Ruling “I agree that the issue of changed conditions is a threshold issue that must be decided prior to the FAPE claims. I will format any Decision after a hearing on the merits accordingly”.