In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools BSEA# 26-05261

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools

BSEA# 26-05261

RULING ON GUARDIAN AD LITEM’S MULTIPLE MOTIONS

AND  ON

PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

On November 12, 2025, Student’s court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) requested an Expedited Hearing with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) in the above-referenced matter. [1] The Hearing Request asserted  that Springfield Public Schools (Springfield or the District) unilaterally changed Student’s “educational placement from the substantially separate in-district program specified in his active IEP to a public day therapeutic program—without convening an IEP Team meeting, without prior written notice, and without the consent of [the Department for Children and Families (DCF)] or the GAL.”  GAL sought “immediate restoration of the last agreed-upon placement, an order convening a lawful Team meeting with full participation of the GAL and DCF, compensatory services, and a declaration that Springfield’s ‘Student of Concern’ (SOC) process may not supersede IDEA.”   Since the issues asserted did not appear to meet the criteria for expedited status pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a Notice of Hearing following the standard track applicable in parent/student-initiated hearing requests was issued, scheduling the matter for hearing on December 17, 2025 and assigning it to Hearing Officer Rosa Figueroa.

On November 17, 2025, GAL filed a Motion for Expedited Status, Reassignment of the Hearing Officer and Immediate Interim Tutoring for Student.  On November 21, 2025,  Hearing Officer Figueroa issued a Ruling On Student’s Motion For Expedited Status; Reassignment of the Hearing Officer; and Immediate Order for Tutoring Services (November 21, 2025 Ruling), determining that the matter did not meet the standard for expedited status, and recusing herself from the matter, thus declining to issue a ruling on the request for tutoring (hereinafter, Motion for Tutoring).

On November 24, 2025, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer.

Also on November 24, 2025, via email, the GAL asserted that Springfield’s Response to the Hearing Request was overdue. She requested “[i]mmediate scheduling of a motion hearing,” “[i]mmediate interim tutoring order (2 hours/day minimum),” “[t]hat the District’s failure to respond be treated as non-opposition,” and “[e]nforcement action regarding the overdue Resolution Meeting” (hereinafter, Motion Relative to Untimely Response and Failure to Convene a Resolution Meeting).

Subsequently, on November 24, 2025, Springfield filed its Response To The Hearing Request and Opposition to All Pending Motions Served at the BSEA, denying all procedural and substantive claims and asserting that its Response and Opposition were timely. In addition, the District argued that GAL’s claims are premature and unfounded as Springfield had only just enrolled Student on November 6, 2025, had assigned him to Springfield High on November 10, 2025, and had scheduled a Team meeting for November 19, which GAL did not attend. Student has yet to attend a school day in Springfield, and no actions by Springfield to date could constitute a denial of FAPE. The District argued that GAL sought to overturn Springfield’s general education school-assignment decision, but the BSEA lacked jurisdiction over administrative and general education school-assignment policies. The District further contended that no facts supported the need for emergency tutoring. 

In response, on November 24, 2025, GAL submitted, via email titled Clarification of Legal Timelines / District Missed Deadline, that the “expedited-resolution timeline uses calendar days, not business or school days. Neither IDEA nor the BSEA excludes Sundays from the calculation.” She again requested the “[i]mmediate scheduling of a motion hearing within the next 24–48 hours,” the “[i]ssuance of an interim tutoring order requiring daily 1:1 tutoring (minimum 2 hours/day) to begin immediately,” that “the District’s failure to respond be treated as non-opposition consistent with administrative due-process practice when a party fails to submit a required response,” and “[e]nforcement of all required procedural steps including the overdue Resolution Meeting.” GAL also submitted a letter requesting a ruling on all motions.[2]

On November  26, 2025, Springfield filed a Motion for Summary Decision,[3] challenging the BSEA subject matter jurisdiction over all issues in the Hearing Request.  The District asserts “that there is no genuine issue of material fact that could plausibly lead to any relief sought in the pending hearing request. The IEP in question has been completely rejected so there is no Service Delivery Grid, the District has assigned [Student] to a school that can provide a comparable program to his last accepted placement, and the GAL has refused to participate in team meetings.”

Also on November 26, 2025, GAL filed Motion to Compel Production of Student Of Concern (SOC) Records, Enrollment Communications, and Special Education Placement Materials, asking the Hearing Officer to compel the District to produce the various documents relating to the SOC process.[4] According to GAL, she had “already made three separate written requests for these records. The District has ignored each request.”

On the same date, GAL filed her Opposition to Springfield Public Schools’ Motion for Summary Decision, asserting that material facts remain in dispute, including that Student was initially assigned to Commerce High School (Commerce), was then subjected to a closed SOC meeting, and was subsequently placed in a second program without notice to GAL or DCF, without any opportunity for their input, and without receiving SOC documentation. GAL contended that these circumstances raised clear disputes regarding predetermination, exclusion of legally authorized decision-makers, discrimination, and stay-put.

At the same time, GAL also filed a Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment[5], asserting that the District’s own filings confirmed undisputed facts establishing denial of FAPE, stay-put violations, exclusion of required participants, discriminatory use of SOC, failure to provide comparable services, the absence of a Resolution Meeting, and Student’s receipt of no education since enrollment, facts that, GAL argued, required judgment in Student’s favor. According to GAL, the District conceded that Student “has not attended school,” has received no services, and was provided no comparable services; that the SOC meeting occurred without GAL or DCF, constituting an improper unilateral change in placement; that the District missed the Resolution Meeting deadline, a procedural violation warranting compensatory relief; and that SOC was improperly applied to Student, despite being limited to students with felony charges or convictions, which Student does not have. GAL further asserted that the District’s failure to provide comparable services violates IDEA.[6]

On December 2, 2025, Springfield filed Opposition To GAL’s Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment asserting that the District has challenged subject matter jurisdiction of this matter, and “it objects to this matter proceeding forward without a Ruling on

jurisdiction.” In addition, according to Springfield, it has not provided Student with services because GAL has not made Student available to the District due to her dissatisfaction with a school’s proposed education programming. In addition, Springfield was not required to convene a Team meeting when assigning Student to a brick-and-mortar school, and “it [was] not a violation of [Student’s] right to a FAPE so long as that brick-and-mortar school building is staffed to be able to provide comparable programming for [Student].” Springfield High School is not a “separate day school” and is appropriately staffed to provide comparable programming for Student until further agreement by the Team and clarification on what services Student requires on the Service Delivery Grid.  The District also maintained that it “has never received any formal discovery requests for documents named in the Motion to Compel, so a Ruling on a Motion to Compel is premature.” Furthermore, a resolution meeting is unnecessary because the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over GAL’s objection to Springfield’s school assignment, making the issue moot. Springfield argues that a Team meeting, not a resolution meeting, is appropriate, and that even if Springfield waived a resolution meeting, this would not constitute a procedural violation but merely allow the Parent/GAL to proceed to hearing without delay. Regarding comparable services, Springfield asserted that no accepted services currently exist for  Student, making comparability difficult to determine and justifying the District’s decision to convene a Team meeting. The District maintained that assigning Student to Springfield High School is comparable to the support he previously received in South Hadley, pending the upcoming Team meeting.

On December 3[7], 2025, GAL filed Opposition To District’s Opposition To GAL’s Cross-Motion For Summary Decision, reiterating that material factual disputes preclude summary judgment. These include: whether an SOC occurred; the identity of SOC meeting participants; the reason Ms. []’s SOC email recipients were removed; the applicability of the foster care policy; whether placement was predetermined; whether Dr. [] misrepresented her involvement; whether the District disregarded IDEA participation rights; whether Student could receive comparable services; whether Springfield High constitutes a comparable placement; and whether the District provided Student with any education. Each represents a core material dispute that must be resolved at hearing. GAL requested that the Hearing Officer deny the District’s Opposition and Motion for Summary Decision, and grant GAL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Decision or, at minimum, schedule a full evidentiary hearing. GAL further sought an order compelling production of all unredacted SOC communications and the identities of all participants, as well as an adverse inference based on the District’s concealment of evidence. In addition, GAL requested orders requiring “corrected affidavits from Dr. [] and Ms. []” and a finding that the District engaged in impermissible predetermination. Finally, GAL again asked that the Hearing Officer order the immediate provision of comparable services, tutoring, and access to education for Student pending the outcome of the hearing.

On December 5, 2025, GAL filed Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions With Prior Sworn Testimony, And Misuse Of SOC Process[8], requesting that the Hearing Officer (1) admit impeachment evidence, (2) strike or disregard affidavits submitted by Dr. [] and [Ms. []], (3) deny the District’s Motion for Summary Decision due to disputed material facts and credibility issues, and (4) compel production of all documents related to SOC. The Motion asserts that newly disclosed SOC emails contradict statements in the District’s affidavits, its summary decision motion, representations made during the December 2, 2025 Team meeting, the District’s Assignment Policy, and prior sworn testimony given by Springfield officials in a 2020 BSEA matter (Ollie II).

On December 8, 2025, Springfield filed an Opposition To Gal’s Motion Filed December 5, 2025, reiterating that “there is no genuine issue of material fact that could plausibly lead to any relief sought by the Education GAL in this matter and this matter should be disposed of by Summary Decision.” According to Springfield, it assigned Student to Springfield High School in accordance with its lawful discretion and School Committee policies, and GAL has offered no facts showing that this assignment violates Student’s right to FAPE, particularly given that his IEP is fully rejected. Springfield contends that it has presented uncontested evidence that Student previously received services in a small, therapeutic setting in South Hadley following disciplinary removals and a manifestation determination. Springfield further demonstrated that Springfield High can provide a comparable small, therapeutic environment and has twice invited the GAL to discuss the rejected IEP and placement.  Because GAL identifies no facts showing that Springfield’s assignment violates stay-put, no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and summary decision in Springfield’s favor is warranted.

RELEVANT FACTS:[9]

1. Student is a 15-year-old student enrolled in the District. He is currently in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF). To date, Student has not attended Springfield Public Schools. (S-13)

2. On January 22, 2025, while Student was attending South Hadley Public Schools (South Hadley) and participating in an initial evaluation for special education eligibility, South Hadley held a manifestation determination review (MDR) for Student following the following infractions: impeding/lying during investigation, profane language, false report, defiant behavior. The MDR Team found these behaviors to be a manifestation of Student’s suspected disabilities of Communication and Health (Executive Functioning)  (S-4)

3. On January 31, 2025, the Team proposed, and the Foster Parent accepted, an extended evaluation from February 7 to April 10, 2025, in the therapeutic transition classroom (TTC) entailing  a functional behavioral assessment and psychological evaluation. The N1 explained that although the Foster Parent had already consented to a third-party District funded bilingual speech/language evaluation and a clinical psychology evaluation, those contracted assessments might not be completed within the 45-day timeline. Therefore, South Hadley intended to conduct its own psychoeducational evaluation using rating scales to determine eligibility while awaiting the contracted testing. (S-4, S-5, S-6, S-13)

4. The TTC classroom at South Hadley serves students whose primary needs are social, emotional, and/or behavioral. The program is designed for students whose needs require a smaller, structured therapeutic setting for all or part of the day. A higher staff-to-student ratio is maintained with individualized programming to meet students’ needs. The ultimate goal is for students to learn and practice appropriate social and/or coping skills for emotion regulation while working towards partial or complete inclusion in general education classes. (S-12)

5. On February 7, 2025, South Hadley held an initial Team meeting for Student. At that time, Student was participating in the “extended evaluation while being placed in the TTC program to implement behavioral interventions and provide extra supports.” The Team determined that Student was eligible for special education under the Disability Category of Emotional. With the intention of developing the Individualized Education Program (IEP) in full once a full psychological assessment was completed, a partial IEP for the period 2/7/2025 to 2/6/2026 was developed, with goals in the areas of executive functioning and social/emotional, and proposing the following services: C Grid: Executive Support (6 x 40 minutes per cycle), Executive Functioning (6 x 15 minutes per cycle), and Counseling (30 minutes per cycle). (S-2, S-7) Placement was proposed in a substantially separate classroom at South Hadley High School[10] (hereinafter, February 2025 IEP or South Hadley IEP). (S-2)

6. On June 12, 2025, the Trial Court of Massachusetts (Juvenile Court Division) appointed GAL as Student’s Education Surrogate.[11]

7. On August 14, 2025, Student’s DCF social worker notified Springfield Public Schools that Student would be relocating to Springfield on October 23, 2025, and DCF expected to enroll Student in the District. (S-9, S-13)

8. On September 12, 2025, following a disciplinary hearing relative to an incident which took place on September 10, Student was emergency removed from school for one day, but, in lieu of any additional suspension, Student was assigned a detention and restorative conversation. (S-3)  Moreover, on September 11, 2025, South Hadley proposed, and GAL accepted, additional assessments to be conducted as part of the extended evaluation. (S-8)

9. On October 29, 2025, GAL rejected the South Hadley IEP in full because the IEP did “not address [Student’s] needs, social emotion is not a cause of executive functioning and academic.” GAL neither accepted nor rejected the placement, stating only, “I am waiting to reconvene.” (S-2)

10. On November 5, 2025, GAL again rejected the South Hadley IEP but consented to the substantially separate classroom placement. (S-2) On the same date, GAL contacted Springfield asking that Student be enrolled immediately. (P-1)

11. On November 6, 2025, Student was enrolled in the District. (S-13) Springfield informed GAL that the “SPS Student of Concern (SOC) team will be reviewing [Student] on [November 10, 2025]… and [he would be] assigned” on that date.” Springfield explained that Student was considered a Student of Concern because he “had a recent emergency removal and suspension for threatening to ‘shoot up the school.’ He also had a suspension for ‘accessing pornography’ and ‘distribution of inappropriate or offensive pictures’ using a school computer. He ha[d] 24 pages of discipline for 2024- 2025.”  In response, GAL requested that Student begin to attend school on November 7, 2025, and requested “immediate written disclosure of the district’s ‘Student of Concern (SOC)’ process, including who participates, how referrals are made, and whether such a review has been applied to [Student].” (P-1)

12. According to Springfield, “Student was assigned to Springfield High School on or throughout November 6, 2025 to November 10, 2025 by way of its internal school assignment procedures.” (S-13) In response to “inconsistencies with Student’s IEP and to determine stay put and placement,” Springfield scheduled a team meeting for November 19, 2025. (S-13)

13. The Springfield Student Assignment Policies Handbook (the Handbook), as adopted by the School Committee in 2017, outlines the parameters and practices that direct student assignments. (S-10, S-13) For special education assignment, the Handbook explains low-incidence, public day schools, and out-of-district assignments.  The Handbook further states that

“Springfield High, Balliet Middle, Liberty Preparatory High, Gateway to College HCC Campus & STCC Campus and Early College High schools are alternative schools that provide at-risk youth the opportunity to matriculate in accordance with the standards and curriculum frameworks established for all [Springfield] students. The programs provide a comprehensive array of services to support a student’s remediation of issues that cause school failure. Students who enroll into [Springfield] from an alternative placement will be assigned directly to an alternative program. Referrals for documented at-risk students currently enrolled in a ‘traditional’ [Springfield] program must be submitted by a student’s current school to the appropriate alternative program administrator for placement consideration.” (S-10)

Furthermore, the Handbook states that students entering or returning to Springfield with a felony charge or conviction will be referred to the appropriate Student Assignment Services Administrator (Students of Concern Assignments, or SOC). A record of information voluntarily disclosed by the student, parent/guardian, and/or agency will be referred to the SOC team for appropriate placement.[12] (S-10) Foster care students are assigned to schools in the same manner and in accordance with the same process used for all students (with the exception of immediate enrollment). (S-14)

14. According to the District, Springfield High Schoolis a small, alternative education option offered within Springfield Public Schools for students in grades 9-12. The school provides every student with a safe and nurturing learning environment to assist all students in reaching academic proficiency. Springfield High School has specially trained staff, including onsite counselors and additional support staff who work effortlessly to meet students’ individual needs and assist in developing positive, productive and confident children to young adults. The school utilizes Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) to manage safe learning environments. The school provides academic, social, and emotional support to both general and special education students with diverse needs. (S-12)

15. On November 12, 2025, GAL filed the instant Hearing Request asserting that Springfield unilaterally changed Student’s “educational placement from the substantially separate in-district program specified in his active IEP to a public day therapeutic program—without convening an IEP Team meeting, without prior written notice, and without the consent of DCF or the GAL” and seeking “immediate restoration of the last agreed-upon placement, an order convening a lawful Team meeting with full participation of the GAL and DCF, compensatory services, and a declaration that Springfield’s ‘Student of Concern’ (SOC) process may not supersede IDEA.”

16. GAL did not attend the November 19, 2025, team meeting scheduled by Springfield, and requested a resolution meeting instead. (S-13)  On November 19, 2025, Springfield issued a meeting invitation for December 2, 2025, with the purpose of “IEP Review – To Discuss Rejected Portions of IEP, Second Attempt.” (S-1)

17. On November 19, 2025, GAL contacted the District via email, stating, in part, that she had been excluded from the decision-making process, and she disagreed with Student’s placement. GAL could not participate in or consider any next steps without “full information.” (S-11)

LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICATION :

1. GAL’s Motion Relative to Untimely Response and Failure to Convene a Resolution Meeting

1. Legal Standard Relative to Untimely Response

BSEA Hearing Rule I(D) states that within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the moving party’s hearing request, the opposing party must send to the other party and the Hearing Officer a response that specifically addresses the issues raised in the hearing request. However, if the school district sent a prior written notice to the parent regarding the issues raised in the parent’s hearing request in accordance with 34 C.F.R. § 300.503, the school district need not send an additional response.

Neither the  BSEA Hearing Rules nor the IDEA addresses sanctions for untimely filing of a response. Hence, I look to the Massachusetts and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. Pursuant to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which mirror, to a large extent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, answers to pleadings must be filed within 20 days and contain all defenses to a claim, including affirmative defenses, as well as an admission, denial, or statement of insufficient knowledge to each of the allegations upon which the claim relies.[13] Mass. R. Civ. Pro. 6(b)(2) provides that when “an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion … upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.”  

2. Legal Standard Relative to District’s Failure to Convene Resolution Meeting

The IDEA requires a school district to hold a resolution session within 15 days of receiving notice of a parent’s due process complaint.[14] A resolution meeting is required unless both the parent and the district agree to waive it or agree to use the mediation process in lieu of the resolution meeting.[15]  If the district fails to hold the resolution meeting within the required 15 days, the parent may seek the intervention of a hearing officer to begin the due process hearing timeline.[16] 

3. Application of Legal Standards:

Here, GAL filed her Hearing Request on November 12, 2025. Springfield’s Response deadline was November 22, 2025, but Springfield filed its Response on November 24, 2025.  GAL seeks the following remedies for the untimely filing: “[i]mmediate scheduling of a motion hearing within the next 24–48 hours,” “[i]ssuance of an interim tutoring order requiring daily 1:1 tutoring (minimum 2 hours/day) to begin immediately,” and that “the District’s failure to respond be treated as non-opposition consistent with administrative due-process practice when a party fails to submit a required response.”

First, GAL’s generalized allegation that administrative due-process practice when a party fails to submit a required response is judgment for the moving party  must fail, as she cites to no legal authority to support this allegation, and as noted supra, none exists.[17] Next, I cannot find that the two-day delay warrants any of the requested relief, as the delay was minimal, and, more importantly, GAL has failed to suggest or demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the District’s late filing.  involved.

GAL accurately states that the District failed to convene a resolution meeting. Instead, it attempted to convene a Team meeting on November 19, 2025, which GAL chose not to attend. Springfield believes that because the BSEA lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case, a Team meeting, not a resolution meeting, was appropriate. GAL contends that the notice for the November 19, 2025 Team meeting was sent to her one hour before she filed the Hearing Request, and once said request was filed, the next step under the IDEA was not an IEP meeting but rather a resolution meeting.

The District’s obligation to schedule a resolution meeting was triggered when GAL filed her Hearing request, regardless of the District’s belief that the BSEA lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. Nevertheless, while the IDEA and the federal regulations discuss penalties imposed upon parents who fail to attend resolution sessions, in situations when a school district fails to convene or participate in the session, the only rights available to a parent are to “seek the intervention of a hearing officer to begin the due process hearing timeline.”[18]

GAL seeks an unspecified “[e]nforcement action regarding the overdue Resolution Meeting” for the District’s failure to convene the required Resolution Session.  However, such relief is unavailable, as the only action available to GAL at this time is to seek my intervention to advance the currently scheduled Hearing date.   

Therefore, GAL’s Motion Relative to Untimely Response and Failure to Convene a Resolution Meeting is DENIED with prejudice.

2. GAL’s Motion to Compel[19]

1. Legal Standards Relative to Student Records Requests:

Rights related to student records are protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 USC 1232(g), and 34 CFR Part 99, as well as by M.G.L. c. 71 §34D in Massachusetts. 603 CMR 23.07(2) states that an eligible student or the parent, subject to the provisions of 603 CMR 23.07 (5), shall have access to the student record “as soon as practicable and within ten days after the initial request, except in the case of non-custodial parents as provided in 603 CMR 23.07(5).” For students eligible for special education, IDEA’s implementing regulation 34 CFR § 300.613 addresses additional rights to student records in due process proceedings. Specifically, 34 CFR 300.613(a) states that “[e]ach participating agency must permit parents to inspect and review any education records relating to their children that are collected, maintained, or used by the agency under this part. The agency must comply with a request without unnecessary delay and before any meeting regarding an IEP, or any hearing pursuant to § 300.507 or §§ 300.530 through 300.532, or resolution session pursuant to § 300.510, and in no case more than 45 days after the request has been made.” 

2. Application of Legal Standards:

Here, GAL states that she has requested the records at issue several times.  The District retains the IDEA obligation to provide GAL with the ability to inspect and review Student’s school records without unnecessary delay and before the BSEA hearing on the merits, but  in no case more than 45 days after the request has been made. [20] Although pursuant to state law, the District must provide GAL with such an opportunity within 10 days,[21] the BSEA has no jurisdiction to enforce 603 CMR 23.07.  Rather, GAL must file her appeal relative to the District’s compliance with same to the Superintendent.[22]

GAL submitted no evidence regarding the dates on which she requested Student’s Student Records, and the District indicates it has no record of such requests. Although GAL’s Motion to Compel may be premature, pursuant to the IDEA, Springfield should produce the requested records before the hearing on the merits scheduled for December 17, 2025, but no later than 45 days from when she filed her November 26, 2025[23] Motion to Compel.[24]  

Because it is premature, GAL’s Motion to Compel is DENIED at this time.

3. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

1. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment:

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[25] BSEA hearing officers further look to  Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance in determining whether to grant summary judgment. Said Rules provide that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[26] A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if a fact that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit” is disputed such that “a reasonable [fact-finder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”[27] “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”[28]

The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[29]

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[30] To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” in its favor that the fact finder could decide for it.[31] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.”[32] The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”[33]

Faced with Cross-Motions for summary judgment, I must review each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.[34] If I determine that one party is not entitled to summary judgment, I must turn to the Cross-Motion and give the unsuccessful movant ‘all of the favorable factual inferences that [I have] just given to the movant’s opponent.’”[35] If the non-cross movant’s evidence is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment may be granted.[36]

Guided by this legal authority, I find as follows:[37]

1. Summary Judgement is Not Warranted as to the Assertions that Springfield Failed to Consult with GAL in the Process of Providing a Comparable Setting for Student and that Springfield High School is Not Comparable to Student’s Last Accepted Placement.

1. Legal Standards Relative to Stay-Put and Intrastate Transfers

1. Intrastate Transfers

Under the IDEA, when a student moves from one school district to another school district within the same state, the receiving district must “provide such child with a free appropriate public education, including services comparable to those described in the previously held IEP, in consultation with the parents [or guardians] until such time as the local educational agency adopts the previously held IEP or develops, adopts, and implements a new IEP that is consistent with Federal and State law.”[38] In Massachusetts, when an eligible student moves from one Massachusetts school district to another, “the last IEP written by the former school district and accepted by the parent shall be provided in a comparable setting without delay until a new IEP is developed and accepted.”[39]

Although neither the IDEA nor state regulations define “comparable,” the United States Department of Education’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (“OSERS”) has interpreted “comparable,” to mean “similar” or “equivalent” to the previous services.[40] One court found comparability where the receiving district, unable to replicate the unique educational environment of the old school district, offered a placement “that approximated the last agreed-upon IEP as closely as possible under the circumstances.”[41]  

2. Stay-Put

The IDEA’s “stay-put” provision requires that unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, during the time that a parent and school district are engaged in an IDEA dispute resolution process, “… the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.”[42] To determine a child’s “stay-put,” courts often look for the “operative placement,” or the IEP that is “actually functioning at the time the dispute first arises.”[43]

It is established law that the “physical school alone does not constitute an ‘educational placement.’ [An] educational placement consists of the instruction and services spelled out in [Student’s] IEP.”[44] Courts have held that a change in placement for this purpose occurs when “a fundamental change in, or elimination of, a basic element of the educational program has occurred,”[45] or when a change in location “results in dilution of the quality of a student’s education or a departure from the student’s LRE [least restrictive environment]-compliant setting.”[46]

2. Application of Legal Standards:[47]

In the instant matter, GAL conflates the stay-put and intrastate transfer standards. Here, the stay-put standard does not apply; rather, this matter implicates the “change in residence” or “intrastate transfer”[48] provisions of federal and state law.  As explained by the Third Circuit Court, the applicable standard is different because when

“a student voluntarily transfers to a new district, the status quo no longer exists. In such situations, the parents of the student must accept the consequences of their decision to transfer districts. Given the tailored nature of the intrastate transfer provision, we hold that the ‘stay-put’ provision does not apply when a student voluntarily transfers school districts within a state and the new school district will satisfy the IDEA by complying with the intrastate transfer provision.”[49]

1. Procedural Claim Regarding Selection of a Comparable Program

Notably, the selection of a comparable program pursuant to federal and state intrastate changes in residence does not implicate a Team process that would necessitate parental participation. [50]  While 603 CMR 28.03(1)(c)(1) is silent as to a parent’s involvement in the provision of a “comparable setting,” 34 CFR § 300.323(e) requires, at most, “consultation with the parents,” but does not require a convening of a Team nor does it mandate that parents or guardians be part of the Team making such a decision.  Rather, a parent or guardian who disagrees that the new setting is “comparable,” is able to challenge the determination through the IDEA’s dispute resolution procedural options, including filing for a due process hearing.

Here, if Springfield relied on the SOC process to determine Student’s comparable placement, as the GAL alleges, its decision is perplexing, as the record before me does not indicate that Student entered Springfield with any felony charge or conviction. Nevertheless, the method by which the District determined comparable placement is largely immaterial because neither federal nor state regulations prescribe a specific process for determining a comparable placement for interstate transfers, so long as the placement meets the comparability requirement. Although federal law requires consultation with parents, it imposes no particular manner for doing so, and state law is silent on the process entirely.

Viewing all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the GAL, I find that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the District’s provision of a comparable setting was made “in consultation with the [GAL] until such time as the local educational agency adopts the previously held IEP or develops, adopts, and implements a new IEP consistent with Federal and State law.” [51]  Accordingly, Springfield is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

However, as GAL was not a required member of the Team determining comparable placement, Springfield did not, as a matter of law, violate the IDEA by excluding her from the school assignment process, provided that the required “consultation” occurred. Because a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether such consultation took place, the GAL is likewise not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.[52] 

Springfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is DENIED. GAL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is likewise DENIED.

2. Substantive Claim Regarding Selection of a Comparable Program

With regard to GAL’s claim that Springfield failed to provide a comparable program, the exhibits indicate that, prior to relocating from South Hadley, Student was participating in its TTC substantially separate classroom.[53] This classroom was described as serving students whose primary needs are social, emotional, and/or behavioral, and whose profiles require a smaller, highly structured therapeutic setting for all or part of the school day. The program provides an increased staff-to-student ratio and is designed to teach students appropriate social and coping skills for emotional regulation while supporting their gradual transition to partial or full inclusion in general education classes. Despite GAL’s rejection of all discrete related services and accommodations proposed in the South Hadley IEP, the substantially separate classroom accepted by GAL on November 5, 2025 inherently includes specially designed instruction, specialized staffing, modified curriculum, and environmental and behavioral supports, all of which are components to which Student retains “comparability” rights.  Any rejected related services proposed in the South Hadley IEP, however, fall outside the District’s obligation for which it must provide comparable services. Where the only accepted portion of the South Hadley IEP was this substantially separate classroom, its description constitutes the special education program to which Student’s new program must be comparable.[54]

According to Springfield, Springfield High Schoolis a comparable setting because itis a small, alternative education option offered within Springfield Public Schools for students in grades 9-12. The school provides students with a safe and nurturing learning environment to assist all students in reaching academic proficiency. Springfield High School has specially trained staff, including onsite counselors and additional support staff who work to meet students’ individual needs and assist in developing positive, productive and confident children to young adults. The school utilizes Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) to manage safe learning environments. It also provides academic, social, and emotional support to both general and special education students with diverse needs.  

Whether or not Springfield High School is comparable to the substantially separate program Student is entitled to be placed in is a material fact, which is clearly disputed.  In the context of summary judgment, however, I cannot conclude that the descriptions of the two programs establish comparability. Although GAL asserts that the programs are not comparable, she has offered no probative evidence to support that assertion, and I must make all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Accordingly, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether the two programs are comparable, necessitating an evidentiary hearing on the merits. Springfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is DENIED. GAL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is likewise DENIED.

2. Summary Judgment is Warranted as to Assertions that Springfield Denied Student Services and/or Tutoring.

1. Legal Standards Relative to Service Provision and Tutoring:

603 CMR 28.05(7)(b) states that upon parental response to the proposed IEP and proposed placement, the school district shall implement all accepted elements of the IEP without delay. However, where a parent voluntarily fails to make a student available for programming, a school district cannot be found to have violated its obligations to provide a FAPE.[55]

With regard to tutoring services, 603 CMR 28.03(3)(c) dictates that

“[u]pon receipt of a physician’s written order verifying that any student enrolled in a public school or placed by the public school in a private setting must remain at home or in a hospital on a day or overnight basis, or any combination of both, for medical reasons and for a period of not less than fourteen school days in any school year, the principal shall arrange for provision of educational services in the home or hospital. Such services shall be provided with sufficient frequency to allow the student to continue his or her educational program, as long as such services do not interfere with the medical needs of the student. The principal shall coordinate such services with the Administrator of Special Education for eligible students. Such educational services shall not be considered special education unless the student has been determined eligible for such services, and the services include services on the student’s IEP.”

2. Application of Legal Standards:

GAL contends that Student “has not attended school” and has received no services. She requests immediate tutoring. The District responds that Student “has not attended, so it is impossible to provide [Student] with ‘services.’” In addition, no services in the IEP have been accepted. Student is “out of school voluntarily due to the dispute between the Education GAL and the Springfield Public Schools. Hence, this situation is more akin to the when a parent is voluntarily keeping a student out of school due to the dissatisfaction with a school’s proposed education programming and is playing a role in the denial of FAPE….”

The District is correct that Student’s current lack of receipt of educational services is wholly due to GAL’s voluntary decisions that Student not attend his assigned school in Springfield. GAL has not submitted any “physician’s written order” calling for tutoring in accordance with 603 CMR 28.03(3)(c), either. GAL’s request for tutoring rests on her assertion that Student’s current school assignment is inappropriate. However, to the extent GAL seeks to challenge the appropriateness of that assignment, neither nonattendance nor a demand for tutoring constitutes a proper form of relief or a procedurally appropriate mechanism for advancing such a claim.

As no genuine issue of material fact exists that GAL has voluntarily withheld Student from school and has not submitted a tutoring request in compliance with 603 CMR 28.03(3)(c), then, as a matter of law, Springfield has not violated the IDEA by failing to provide out of school services or tutoring during Student’s voluntary absence. Accordingly, summary judgment in Springfield’s favor on this claim is warranted.  Springfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is ALLOWED. GAL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.  For the same reasons, GAL’s Motion for Tutoring is also DENIED with prejudice.

ORDER:

GAL’s Motion Relative to Untimely Response and Failure to Convene a Resolution Meeting is hereby DENIED with prejudice.

GAL’s Motion to Compel is DENIED at this time.

Springfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, in part, and ALLOWED, in part. Specifically, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding GAL’s assertions that Springfield failed to consult with her when providing a comparable setting for Student and that Springfield High School is not comparable to Student’s last accepted placement. Accordingly, neither Springfield nor the GAL is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. However, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding GAL’s claim that Springfield denied Student services and/or tutoring. Accordingly, Springfield is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

GAL’s Cross-Motion for Judgment is DENIED in full, as is GAL’s Motion for Tutoring with prejudice.

GAL’s Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions With Prior Sworn Testimony, And Misuse Of SOC Process is ALLOWED insofar as the “impeachment evidence” submitted by GAL was considered for purposes of this Ruling, but is otherwise DENIED in full.

All other requested relief is DENIED at this time.

So Ordered by the Hearing Officer,

/s/ Alina Kantor Nir

Alina Kantor Nir

Dated: December 9, 2025

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL

Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment

20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only. 

Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.

Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay.  This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided.  Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.

Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.” 

Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau.  School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).  Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1^st Cir. 1983).

Compliance

A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).

Rights of Appeal

Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).

An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).

Confidentiality

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.

Record of the Hearing

The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.

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[1] GAL is also an experienced Advocate. She has been making all filings on her own behalf.

[2] Hearing Officer Figueroa’s November 21, 2025 Ruling explicitly addressed GAL’s Motion for Expedited Status.  

[3] The District filed 12 exhibits in support of its Motion (hereby marked as School Exhibits S-1 through S-12) as well as an Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Summary Decision (hereby marked as School Exhibit S-13). On December 2, 2025, the District filed another exhibit (hereby marked as School Exhibit S-14) (Springfield Public Schools Foster Care School Committee Policy, updated 2024). Via email of the same date, GAL indicated that she planned to object to the submission of S-14 as she had not seen it before.  Despite the undersigned Hearing Officer reminding GAL to make her objections formally and not to embed substantive issues in an email (consistent with the BSEA’s procedural practices and Standing Orders), no such formal objection was ever filed.  Notwithstanding, S-14 is admitted into the record as an exhibit to the Motion for Summary Decision, as there is norule, regulation or procedural mandate requiring pre-filing exchange of summary judgment exhibits.  I note that GAL has appeared before the BSEA for several years as a professional educational advocate and is fully familiar with the BSEA’s procedural practices, Hearing Rules and Standing Orders.

[4] Specifically, GAL requested production of the following: “1. Full SOC Record [i]ncluding but not limited to: The complete SOC referral documentation; Names and roles of SOC participants; Notes, minutes, summaries, emails, or communications exchanged before, during, or after the SOC meeting; All documents used or reviewed by the SOC team; Any internal criteria or rubrics used; The SOC decision documentation; Communications with special education administrators (e.g., []); 2. Enrollment Communications [including:] All email, phone logs, internal notes, and communications: Between the Enrollment Department ([]); DCF (including []); The GAL; Any building administrator; Special education supervisors; SOC members; 3. Assignments and Placement Records [including:] Documentation showing the initial assignment to Commerce High School; Documentation showing the change from Commerce to Public Day; Any notes regarding ‘safety’, ‘risk’, ‘concern’, or similar; Any internal discussion suggesting predetermination; 4. Completed or Partial Evaluations [including:] Any communication with South Hadley regarding [Student’s] ongoing evaluations; Any Springfield-based assessment, observation, or review; Any records regarding proposed or pending testing; 5. Resolution Meeting Documents [including:] Proposed dates; Internal notes; Explanations for failure to convene; Any “documentation” the District claims as proof a resolution meeting occurred or was offered[.]”

[5] GAL reiterates the same arguments across multiple filings. I restate them here for completeness in describing each submission.

[6] GAL filed no exhibits in support of her Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, despite multiple invitations from the Hearing Officer to do so. During the parties’ conference call on December 3, 2025, GAL stated that she had no exhibits because the District had not provided her with any records, while simultaneously asserting that the District’s exhibits are “in her favor.”

[7] As the Opposition To District’s Opposition To GAL’s Cross-Motion For Summary Decision was filed after business hours on December 2, 2025, it is deemed to have been filed on the next business day, December 3, 2025.

[8] This Motion was supported by two exhibits which are hereby marked as GAL Exhibits P-1 and P-2, respectively.

[9] The information in this section is drawn from the parties’ pleadings and is subject to revision in further proceedings.

[10] According to Springfield, the “Service Delivery Grid for the February 2025 IEP (which has been rejected)

does not reflect a substantially separate program, as it only provides for approximately 55

minutes per day of ‘pull out’ academic services….” In part, this inconsistency was the reason Springfield attempted to schedule a Team meeting. (S-13)

[11] The BSEA asks that complainants who are persons appointed by court to

make educational decisions submit copies of such appointments. See BSEA Hearing Request Form which may be found at https://www.mass.gov/doc/bsea-due-process-hearing-request-form/download. While the BSEA received GAL’s court appointment documentation on December 4, 2025.

[12]  Although the SOC process is at issue in this matter, nothing in the record to date indicates that Student has been charged with or convicted of a felony.

[13] Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1).  I note that the BSEA is not bound by the Federal or State Rules for Civil Procedure, although Hearing Officers routinely look to them for guidance.

[14] See 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. §300.510(a).

[15] See 34 C.F.R. §300.510(a)(3).

[16] 34 C.F.R. §300.510 (b)(5).

[17] Nor is the scheduling of a motion hearing on this issue necessary, because neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer’s understanding of the issues. See BSEA Hearing Rule VII(D).

[18] 34 C.F.R. 300.510(b)(5); see 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(1)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. 300.510; see also  In re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools (Ruling on Motions for Eight Items of Relief), BSEA # 2203555 (Berman, 2022); Amherst Pelham Regional School District v. Student, BSEA # 07-2259 and 07-3796 (Figueroa, 2007); In Re: Ann (Parent’s Motion for a Default Judgment), BSEA # 06-1175 (Oliver, 2005); In Re: Mount Greylock Regional School District, BSEA # 06-6459 (Figueroa, 2006).

[19] To the extent GAL’s Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions with Prior Sworn Testimony, and Misuse of the SOC Process seeks an order compelling production of all SOC-related documents, my findings are the same as those set forth infra.

[20] See 34 CFR 300.613(a).

[21] See 603 CMR 23.07(2).

[22] See 603 CMR 23.09.

[23] I rely on the date of the filing of the Motion to Compel because GAL did not identify when any records requests were made, and the District represents that it has no record of receiving such a request. Although GAL’s November 6, 2025 email to Springfield sought “immediate written disclosure of the district’s ‘Student of Concern (SOC)’ process, including who participates, how referrals are made, and whether such a review has been applied to [Student],” I cannot construe said communication as a formal records request not did GAL assert that this was one of the several records requests she had made. I note that GAL is an experienced educational advocate who has experience making formal records requests.

[24] To the extent that GAL has made any requests for document production through the discovery process, such requests have not yet reached the thirty-day calendar response deadline, rendering a Motion to Compel premature. See BSEA Hearing Rule V(A).

[25] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).

[26] Id.

[27] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st  Cir. 1994).

[28] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

[29] See id. at 252; see also In Re: Westwood Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol County Agricultural Sch., BSEA # 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006).

[30] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

[31] Id. at 249.

[32] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).

[33] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

[34] Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, No. 15-2207, 273 F.Supp.3d 986, 997–98, 2017 WL 1197104, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int’l Union of Operating Engrs., Local Union 150, 335 F.3d 643, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2003)).

[35] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.

[36] Id. at 249.

[37] To the extent that GAL’s Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions With Prior Sworn Testimony, And Misuse Of SOC Process seeks an order “to admit impeachment evidence,” such evidence is admitted for the purpose of GAL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. To the extent that GAL seeks an order “to strike or disregard affidavits submitted by Dr. [] and [Ms. []],” such request is DENIED. Rather, the evidence submitted by each party in support of its respective motion for summary judgment demonstrates that a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists.  

[38] 20 USC §1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I) (applying to intrastate transfers within the same academic year); 34 CFR § 300.323(3) (same). See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46682 (2006) (clarifying with respect to this provision that when a child moves to new school district before the next school year begins and an IEP was developed or reviewed and revised at or after the end of a school year for implementation during the next school year, the new school district could decide to adopt and implement that IEP, unless the new school district determines that an evaluation is needed. Otherwise, the newly designated IEP Team for the child in the new school district could develop, adopt, and implement a new IEP).

[39] 603 CMR 28.03(c)(1).

[40] See id.; 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46681(2006) (declining commenters’ suggestion to define “comparable services” in the regulations).

[41] Ms. S. ex rel. G v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).

[42] 20 U.S.C. §1415(j); see 34 CFR §300.514; M.G.L. c. 71B; 603 CMR 28.08(7); see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988); Verhoven v. Brunswick School Committee, 207 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999); M.R. and J.R. v. Ridley School District, 744 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014); see also In Re: Framingham Public Schools and Quin, BSEA # 1605247 (Reichbach, 2016); In Re: Abington Public Schools, BSEA # 1407763 (Figueroa, 2014).

[43] Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 859, 867 (3rd Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edu., 918 F. 2d 618. 626 (6th Cir., 1990).

[44] D.K. v. D.C., 983 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146 (D.D.C. 2013).

[45] Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 206 (5th Cir. 1992).

[46] A.W. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir.2004)

[47] As an initial matter, I note that Springfield erred in categorically stating that the “BSEA does not have jurisdiction over Springfield’s internal assignment policies.” Specifically, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” To the extent that Student’s school assignment, either through the general school assignment process or the SOC process, implicates his access to a FAPE, the BSEA retains jurisdiction over the issue of whether the resultant placement is comparable in accordance with state and federal special education intrastate transfer laws and regulations.

[48] 20 USC §1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I); 34 CFR 300.323 (e); 603 CMR 28.03(1)(c)(1).

[49] Y.B. on behalf of S.B. v. Howell Twp. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.4th 196, 200 (3d Cir. 2021) (omitting internal quotations and citations); see Michael C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 651 (3d Cir.2000) (“However, where a parent unilaterally removes a child from an existing placement determined in accordance with state procedures, and puts the child in a different placement that was not assigned through proper state procedures, the protections of the stay-put provision are inoperative until the state or local educational authorities and the parents agree on a new placement”); see also Ms. S., 337 F.3d at 1133, 1134 (recognizing that unlike a stay-put case, “when a student falls under the responsibility of a different educational agency . . . the new agency need not provide a placement identical to that provided by the old agency,” and holding that “when a dispute arises under the IDEA involving a transfer student. . . the new district will satisfy the IDEA if it implements the student’s last agreed-upon IEP; but if [that] is not possible . . . the new district must adopt a plan that approximates the student’s old IEP as closely as possible”); J.F. v. Byram Twp. Bd. of Educ., 629 F. App’x 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2015) (“the key point for our purposes is that we held the stay-put provision yields to other procedures governing transfers. Congress explicitly provides those procedures for intrastate transfers in § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I). We therefore hold that, because J.F.’s parents unilaterally relocated him from Westwood to Byram, the stay-put provision is inoperative and Byram meets its obligation by complying with § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I)”).

[50] See  34 CFR 300.116(a)(1); 34 CFR 300.501(c); and 71 Fed. Reg. 46585 (2006).

[51] 20 USC §1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I).

[52] To the extent that GAL’s Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions With Prior Sworn Testimony, And Misuse Of SOC Process seeks denial of the District’s Motion for Summary Decision, my findings are addressed infra.

[53] Although Student was attending TTC as part of an extended evaluation, this was not intended by the Team to be temporary location for the purpose of the evaluation, as, it appears from the records, that South Hadley proposed the substantially separate TTC classroom for the full term of the South Hadley IEP. Compare Verhoeven v. Brunswick Sch. Comm., 207 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999) (a temporary placement could not constitute the student’s “current educational placement” for stay-put purposes). Because on November 5, 2025, GAL accepted this placement, the TTC program constitutes the last agreed-upon and implemented placement. 

[54] See In Re: Leominster Public Schools, BSEA #11-5123 (Berman, 2011) (“While a parent does not necessarily have the right—under principles of ‘stay[-]put’ or pursuant to this regulation—to a precise replication of the previous IEP, the parent and student do have the right to receive services in a “comparable” setting, until a new IEP is both developed and accepted”).

[55] See, e.g., In Re: Boston Public Schools v. Student, BSEA # 14-01653 (Figueroa, 2015) (“during all relevant times, Student’s services and placement at Horace Mann remained available. Student’s failure to access said program was entirely the result of parental choice); In Re: Leominster Public Schools, BSEA #11-5123 (Berman, 2011) (Leominster’s ability to implement a program “comparable” to Haverhill’s was hampered by Parents).