COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Frank[1] and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
BSEA# 26-05857
RULING ON MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Motion filed on December 18, 2025 by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE or the Department) to Dismiss the Hearing Request filed by Parents on behalf of Frank. On the same date, Parents filed their Rebuttal Motion in Opposition to Department’s Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by one exhibit. As neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, I am issuing this Ruling on the Department’s Motion to Dismiss without a hearing, pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules).
For the reasons set forth below, DESE’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED.
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 27, 2025, Parents filed a Hearing Request against DESE “for its failure to ensure that the District complied with [the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] and Massachusetts special education requirements, resulting in continued denial of [a free appropriate public education] to” Frank.
According to Parents, Frank is a nine-year-old student with dyslexia, a specific language impairment, a pervasive phonological processing disorder, and profound dysgraphia, attending school within the Dudley-Charlton Regional School District (Dudley-Charlton or the District). Parents contend that despite clear evidence and substantial documentation of these disabilities provided to both the District and DESE, Frank has not received the services, assessments, placement, or qualified instructors required for him to access a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Specifically, Parents assert that the District’s actions and inactions have led to: (A) a “significant and longstanding failure to provide evidence-based, individualized reading instruction;” (B) a failure to evaluate Frank in all areas of suspected disability; (C) a failure to provide speech and language and writing services; and (D) predetermination of services and placement. In their final claim, (E), Parents allege that the Department has failed to ensure District compliance, despite Parents notifying both Dudley-Charlton and DESE of the lack of qualified personnel; insufficient evaluation; the absence of speech or writing services; the lack of meaningful progress data; and the ineffective reading programs being used. According to Parents, DESE’s failure to act constitutes a violation of its duty under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) to ensure school districts’ compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Finally, Parents argue that Frank has suffered harm in the form of severe academic regression, ongoing functional illiteracy, emotional harm, worsening writing-related physical pain, and loss of educational opportunity as a result of the District’s and DESE’s failures.[2] Parents request, as a remedy, that DESE fund and place Frank in an out-of-district, substantially separate, language-based program; provide compensatory education; and provide an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public expense in all disputed areas.
The matter was assigned to Hearing Officer Catherine Putney-Yaceshyn, and the Hearing was scheduled for January 2, 2026.
On December 3, 2025, DESE requested a two-week extension to file its Response to Parents’ Hearing Request, noting that Parents, through their advocate, had assented. On December 4, 2025, Parents filed a letter indicating that they no longer agreed with the Department’s request for an extension and asking that the BSEA deny it. On December 8, 2025, Hearing Officer Putney-Yaceshyn allowed the Department’s request, extending the due date for DESE’s Response to December 22, 2025. The matter was transferred for administrative reasons to the undersigned Hearing Officer on December 9, 2025.
DESE filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Motion) on December 18, 2025, asserting that Parents’ Hearing Request fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, further, that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over their claims. On the same date, Parents filed a Rebuttal Motion in Opposition to Department’s Motion to Dismiss (Rebuttal).
On December 24, 2025, the Department requested that the Hearing be postponed to January 16, 2026, to permit the parties to work together toward resolution of the issues underlying the Hearing Request. On the same date, Parents filed an Amended Hearing Request. Parents did not object to DESE’s postponement request, nor did they request DESE’s consent or the permission of the Hearing Officer to amend their Hearing Request. [3] The Department did not object to Parents’ Amendment, which is hereby allowed. DESE’s postponement request was allowed; however, in light of Parents’ amendment of the Hearing Request, “the entire process starts over for the purpose of timelines.”[4] In accordance with the Amended Notice of Hearing issued December 29, 2025, the Hearing on Parents’ Amended Hearing Request was scheduled for January 28, 2026. On January 5, 2026, the Department filed a request for a two-week postponement due to the unavailability of Counsel.[5] Parents assented, and the Hearing was postponed for good cause to February 12 and 13, 2026.
- DISCUSSION
Whether Parents’ claims survive a Motion to Dismiss turns on both the procedural standards for such a motion and the substantive standards governing their claims.
- Standard for Ruling on Motion to Dismiss a Hearing Request
Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVIIB of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This rule is analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, what is required to survive a motion to dismiss “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[6] Moreover, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[7] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[8] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . .”[9]
- BSEA Jurisdiction
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides parents with a formal due process complaint process with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[10] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency before which any impartial due process hearing regarding these issues takes place. The BSEA is an agency of limited jurisdiction; it has jurisdiction over requests for hearing filed by:
a parent or school district . . . on any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 . . . .[11]
As BSEA Hearing Officers have recognized, “individual claims must be dismissed . . . if they do not arise under federal or state special education statutes, or applicable portions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Unlike a court with general jurisdiction, the BSEA may consider only those claims for which enabling statutes and regulations expressly grant authority.”[12]
It is within this legal framework that I now examine the allegations in this case.
- Application of Legal Standards Permits Dismissal of All Claims Raised in Parents’ Initial Hearing Request
The Department asserts that all claims set forth in Parents’ initial Hearing Request should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. As DESE divides its arguments into two sections, I do the same.
- Claim E, Parents’ Claim that the Department Failed to Ensure District Compliance, Is Not Within the Jurisdiction of the BSEA.
Parents allege that they repeatedly notified both DESE and Dudley-Charlton regarding the District’s lack of qualified personnel; insufficient evaluation; the absence of speech or writing services; the lack of meaningful progress data; and the ineffective reading programs being used. Despite this, they assert, the Department “did not ensure the District corrected violations, provided [sic] oversight, or required [sic] compliant services” violating DESE’s “ultimate responsibility” under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) to ensure district compliance with the IDEA.[13]
In its Motion, DESE contends that Parents cannot assert this claim directly against the Department, as there is no private right of action within the IDEA that permits an individual to enforce a State’s supervisory responsibilities over special education. The Department cites to a ruling from the federal District Court in the Southern District of New York dismissing claims against a state agency, as the IDEA does not “authorize[] claims against a state agency rooted in the State’s general supervisory role under the IDEA.”[14] The Department also cites to a 2023 Ruling where the BSEA considered this question and ruled the same way, concluding that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities because Section 1415 of the IDEA does not authorize a private right of action for violations of Section 1412.[15]
In their Rebuttal, Parents argue that DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under IDEA “are actionable.” In support of their assertion, Parents cite to (and attach as an exhibit) a Report issued by the United States Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), issued January 16, 2025, detailing instances of noncompliance by DESE. They contend that because “Parents’ claims arise in the context of demonstrated and ongoing systemic noncompliance by the Department,” Parents’ claims are “actionable . . . based on established federal findings” (emphasis in the original). Moreover, according to Parents, the Department is a necessary party for effective relief, and the BSEA has jurisdiction “to address systemic noncompliance directly impacting FAPE.”
To evaluate DESE’s Motion as to this claim, I must take as true Parents’ factual allegations, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom in Parents’ favor, and I must find that they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.[16] As such, I take as true as true Parents’ allegations that they alerted the Department to Dudley-Charlton’s violations of Frank’s right to a FAPE and that DESE failed to act in accordance with its supervisory responsibility over school districts’ provision of special education services to eligible students.
These facts, however, taken as true, do not suggest an entitlement to relief for which the BSEA may find DESE liable,[17] because the responsibility for developing and implementing IEPs “is placed upon local school districts and not the state,”[18] and because there is no private right of action for violations of the DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA.[19] For these reasons, to the extent Parents wish to pursue claims against the Department for failure to supervise Dudley-Charlton, such claims do not arise under federal or state special education statutes that are within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.[20]
- Claims A through D, Alleging Actions and Inactions by Dudley-Charlton, Fail to State a Claim Against the Department
The remainder of Parents’ claims allege that Dudley-Charlton: (A) failed to provide evidence-based, individualized reading instruction for Frank; (B) failed to evaluate Frank in all areas of suspected disability; (C) failed to provide speech/language and writing services; and (D) predetermined services and placement, all in violation of the IDEA; and that these actions and inactions (F) caused harm to Frank.
In its Motion, the Department contends that in this portion of the Hearing Request, Parents do not identify any action or inaction taken by the Department and, as such, Claims A, B, C, and D each fail to state a claim for relief against DESE. To the extent Parents imply that DESE may be held liable on these claims based on the Department’s supervisory responsibility, DESE asserts, these claims should be dismissed for the reasons applicable to Claim E.
In their Rebuttal, Parents offer the same arguments they make as to Claim E – essentially, that the context of OSEP’s findings regarding the Department’s noncompliance shifts “the nature of the claim from a theoretical supervisory failure to an actionable one based on established federal findings,” that falls within the BSEA’s jurisdiction. Parents also contend that Claims A through D “are directly linked to and exacerbated by Departmental supervisory failures,” such that these failures “created an environment where the District’s alleged noncompliance could persist unchecked, contributing to [Frank]’s denial of FAPE.” Finally, Parents assert that the BSEA has jurisdiction to address systematic noncompliance directly impacting FAPE.
The Department is correct that Claims A through D do not allege any action or inaction by DESE. As such, even taking as true Parents’ factual allegations and any inferences that may be drawn therefrom, as I must,[21] this factual content does not allow for a “reasonable inference that the [Department] is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[22] Claims A through D each fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against DESE.[23]
- CONCLUSION
Upon reviewing DESE’s Motion to Dismiss and Parents’ Rebuttal thereto, I find that Claims A through D fail to state a claim against the Department, and that Claim E is not within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.
ORDER
The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED, with prejudice, as to all of Parents’ claims in the initial Hearing Request.
The Hearing on Parents’ Amended Hearing Request will take place on February 12 and 13, 2026.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Amy Reichbach
Amy M. Reichbach
Dated: January 7, 2026
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL
Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment
20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only.
Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.
Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay. This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided. Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.
Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.”
Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau. School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
Compliance
A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).
Rights of Appeal
Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).
An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).
Confidentiality
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove_School District v. Pulitzer Publishing
Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.
Record of the Hearing
The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.
[1] “Frank” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in the documents available to the public.
[2] In their Hearing Request, Parents allege harm to Frank as Claim F.
[3] Cf. Rule I(G) of the BSEA Hearing Rules (permitting moving party to amend hearing request under two circumstances: in response to a Hearing Officer’s determination that a hearing request is insufficient, and if the other party consents in writing or the Hearing Officer grants permission, not later than five calendar days before the start of the Hearing).
[4] See id.
[5] The Department also requested an extension through close of business on January 16, 2026 to file its Response to Parents’ Hearing Request. Parents assented, and this request was allowed.
[6] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[7] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
[8] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[9] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)’”).
[10] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
[11] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a). Sections 3(c) and 3(d) of 603 CMR 28.08 contain certain exceptions that do not apply here.
[12] In Re: Parent and Student v. Springfield Public Schools et al. (Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss), BSEA #2309351 (Mitchell, 2023) [hereinafter Springfield Ruling] (citing In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools, BSEA #2203555 and 2210887 (Berman, 2022) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted)).
[13] Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11), to maintain eligibility for federal funding under the IDEA Part B, a State must provide assurances that it has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that the State meets certain conditions. Specifically, the State educational agency is responsible for general supervision, which involves, in pertinent part, ensuring that the requirements of the relevant subchapter are met and that all educational programs for children with disabilities in the State, including those administered by local educational agencies, “(I) are under the general supervision of individuals in the State who are responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities; and (II) meet the educational standards of the State educational agency.”
[14] Larach-Cohen v. Porter, 2021 WL 1203686 (S.D.N.Y. 3/30/31) at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. New York, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (State agency may not be sued as a defendant to an IDEA action brought pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(a)).
[15] Springfield Ruling at n.58.
[16] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iannoccino, 451 Mass. at 636; Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[17] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
[18] B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
[19] See, e.g., Larach-Cohen at *3 (collecting cases supporting proposition that IDEA did not create a private right of action to remedy violations of section 1412); B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600-601 (collecting cases supporting proposition that state agencies may not be sued as defendants to an IDEA action based on their supervisory responsibilities); Springfield Ruling atn.58 (dismissing claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities, and collecting cases supporting proposition that no private right of action exists for violations of Section 1412 of the IDEA).
[20] See Springfield Ruling.
[21] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[22] Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
[23] See 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). For this reason, I need not address Parents’ argument that the BSEA may address systemic noncompliance directly impacting FAPE. To the extent Claims A. B, C, and D were meant to include, indirectly, claims against DESE based on its supervisory responsibility, such claims are not within the jurisdiction of the BSEA for the reasons discussed in Section II (C)(i), above.