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In Re: Student 1, Student 2, Student 3, and Student 4 and Dudley-Charlton Regional School District BSEA# 26-05107

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

In Re: Student 1, Student 2, Student 3, and Student 4 and Dudley-Charlton Regional School District

BSEA# 26-05107

RULING ON THE DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS

This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Dudley-Charlton Regional School District’s (District) December 23, 2025, Motion for Summary Judgment as to FAPE Denial Claims and Motion to Dismiss Parents’ Remaining Claims (Motion). Specifically, the District contends that the Hearing Request, as it is filed as one action on behalf of four separate siblings (hereinafter “Student 1, Student 2, Student 3 and Student 4”, individually or collectively “Students”), must be dismissed as it is beyond the BSEA’s jurisdiction to proceed with a due process hearing involving more than one student in the same matter.  Further, the District submits that all claims related to a denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for Students must be dismissed as sufficient allegations to identify the basis for these claims were not presented in the Hearing Request.  Moreover, and alternatively, the District contends that summary judgment is warranted as to the FAPE challenges to a disputed communication protocol (referred to in the Hearing Request as a “gag order” (Protocol)), and no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the implementation of the Protocol.  Finally, the District argues that the Hearing Request should be dismissed as to the remaining claims, as they all involve allegations and seek relief outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). 

On January 6, 2026, Parents filed Parents’ Consolidated Opposition to District’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and Parents’ Motion to Strike Improper Exhibits (Opposition), opposing dismissal or summary judgment and contending that genuine issues of material fact exist requiring a hearing on the merits[1]. According to Parents, the Motion is “inconsistent with BSEA precedent, First Circuit law and the IDEA’s procedural safeguards” and improperly seeks to “bury[ ] the operative issued under collateral history, withdrawn filings, and advocacy disputes”. 

No hearing was requested on the Motion, andas neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing pursuant to Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules)Rule VII(D). For the reasons articulated below, the Motion is ALLOWED in part with and in part without prejudice as indicated.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL AND PRIOR MATTER HISTORY:

  1. On November 7, 2025,[2] Parents, through their two advocates, Kelly LaRoe and Benjamin Tobin, filed the underlying Hearing Request raising allegations they advise to be “identical issues” presented in a matter Parents had “voluntarily withdrawn … without prejudice in light of the November 6, 2025 ruling” (identified as BSEA Number 2603713)[3].  The Hearing Request alleges violations of various provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1983 (Section 504) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Hearing Request). 
  1. In addition to indicating that Parents voluntarily withdrew BSEA Number 2603713, the instant Hearing Request also alleges that this prior matter was dismissed via a November 6, 2025, ruling “citing procedural grounds and noting the absence of certain letters and correspondence in the file[4]” (Disputed Ruling).  (Hearing Request).
  1. The instant Hearing Request contains the case caption “[Student 1], [Student 2], [Student 3] and [Student 4] v. Dudley-Charlton Regional School District” (indicating, without citation to any law regulation or procedural rule that it is a “consolidated” Hearing Request). Notwithstanding, as set forth below, it raises claims challenging certain actions by the BSEA taken in BSEA Number 2603713. (Hearing Request).
  1. Each of the Students has been the individual subjects of prior state complaints and/or due process hearing requests filed within the past year as follows:
    1. In November 2024, the District filed a Hearing Request regarding Student 1 challenging Parents’ request for a publicly-funded independent educational evaluation (IEE) (BSEA No.  2505290).  This matter was resolved between the Parties and withdrawn by the District without prejudice on December 2, 2024. (Motion, Ex. 21);
    2. On November 21, 2024, the District filed a Hearing Request regarding Student 3 challenging Parents’ request for a publicly-funded IEE (BSEA No. 2505283).  This matter was also resolved between the Parties and withdrawn by the District without prejudice on December 2, 2024. (Motion, Exs. 3 and 4);
    3. On March 12, 2025, Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed a state complaint with the Problem Resolution System Office (PRS) of the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) (PRS #13181), challenging the appropriateness of certain terms, the proposed placement and implementation of Student 1’s IEP.  PRS issued a Letter of Closure on May 9, 2025 finding the District in compliance on all investigated issues. (Motion, Ex. 2);
    4. On April 7, 2025, Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed a complaint with PRS (PRS # 13350) challenging the composition of a November 14, 2024 Team, the initial denial of eligibility for special education at this Team meeting (although later Student 4 was found eligible), and implementation of certain of Student 4’s 504 accommodations. PRS issued a Letter of Finding and Closure on July 10, 2025, finding the District in compliance on all investigated issues except for failing to invite the School Nurse to the Team meeting[5]. (Motion, Ex. 6);
    5. On May 7, 2025, Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed a complaint with PRS (PRS #13559) challenging Team determinations and a draft IEP from a Team meeting held earlier that day for Student 4.  PRS issued a No Further Action Letter on May 9, 2025 declining to investigate all issues in the Complaint as being premature or otherwise not supported by the documents submitted. (Motion, Ex. 7).
    6. On May 12, 2025, Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed a complaint with PRS (PRS #13599) challenging the appropriateness of certain parts of the May 2025 proposed IEP for Student 4.  PRS issued a Letter of Closure on July 10, 2025, finding the District in compliance on all investigated issues[6]. (Motion, Ex. 6);
    7. On May 27, 2025, Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed a complaint with PRS (PRS #13706) again challenging the appropriateness of certain other parts of the May 2025 IEP, the District’s evaluation of Student 4, and the District provision of  timely progress reports for Student 4.  PRS issued a Letter of Closure on July 25, 2025 finding the District in compliance for all investigated issues. (Motion, Ex. 6);
    8. On May 27, 2025 Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed another complaint with PRS (PRS #13697) further challenging the appropriateness of Student 1’s IEP and the District’s evaluation Student 1. PRS issued a Letter of Closure on July 25, 2025 finding that the District in compliance on all investigated issues. (Motion, Ex. 2);
    9. In or about June 2025, Parents’ then-Advocate Andrea MacGovern filed a Hearing Request challenging a determination of no eligibility for special education for Student 2 (BSEA No. 2513859).  Parents’ Advocate Tobin then withdrew this matter without prejudice on September 9, 2025. (Motion, Exs. 1 and 5);
    10. On August 8, 2025, the District filed a Hearing Request regarding Student 1 challenging a new request by Parents for a publicly-funded IEE (BSEA No. 2601884).  On November 10, 2025, the BSEA issued a Decision after a hearing on the merits held on October 9, 2025 finding that Parents were not entitled to a publicly-funded IEE. (Motion, Exs. 2, 23 and 24);
    11. On September 15, 2025, Parents’ Advocate Tobin filed a Hearing Request again challenging the determination of no eligibility for special education for Student 2, that had been raised in the previously filed matter of BSEA No. 2513859 (BSEA No. 2603229) which Parents had withdrawn one week earlier. Parents withdrew BSEA No. 2603229 without prejudice on October 25, 2025[7]. (Motion, Exs. 11, 32 and 33); and
    12. On September 26, 2025, Parents’ Advocate LaRoe filed a Hearing Request challenging rulings made by the Hearing Officer in BSEA No. 2601884 and other actions taken in relation to Parents’ Advocates in that matter, as well as alleged misconduct by the District during an undated Team meeting for Student 1 (BSEA No. 2603713).  Parents withdrew this matter without prejudice on November 6, 2025[8]. (Motion, Exs. 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 and 31)[9].
  2. The instant Hearing Request, submitted approximately 15 minutes after withdrawal of BSEA Number 2603713, contains five separate issues[10], that I summarize here as follows[11]: (a) whether the Protocol is appropriate with regard to Parents’ and their advocates’ “communicat[ion] with school staff, participat[ion] in IEP development and advoca[cy] for [Students] under the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA; (b) whether the District and the BSEA engaged in unlawful retaliation towards Parents or their advocates; (c) whether the BSEA erred in issuing the Disputed Ruling and not including itself as a party in BSEA Number 2603713; (d) whether the Protocol denies each Student a FAPE by “impeding parent participation, silencing ADA advocate, and preventing the consideration of appropriate services, accommodations and supports”; and (d) whether “corrective and compensatory relief” is warranted for the “cumulative actions” by the District and the BSEA. (Hearing Request).
  1. The instant Hearing Request contains the following requests for relief[12] that I summarize as follows:
    1. Orders for: (1) immediate cessation of implementation of the Protocol and a declaration that it “violates the Parents’ and Advocate’s rights” guaranteed in the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA; (2) that the District “fully restore communication and collaboration with the Parents and ADA [A]dvocate, including reinstating open email and meeting access consistent with IDEA participation rights”; (3) that all “future IEP and facilitated meetings be accessible and accommodating to Parents and Advocate, including the use of virtual platforms (Zoom or equivalent) when requested as a reasonable ADA accommodation”; and (4) that the Superintendent and District Counsel “appear personally at the hearing to explain the continued enforcement of the [Protocol]”;
    2. An acknowledgement that there was a “procedural error” with the Disputed Ruling and “confirm that all relevant correspondence, evidence, and filings must be requested, included and reviewed in full before any determination is issued”;
    3. “Appropriate compensatory and corrective relief” to address denials of FAPE and procedural violations, “including services, supports, and any other remedy necessary to restore [Students] educational access”; and
    4. An Order that the BSEA “direct” itself to “ensure ADA compliance in its own operations and to provide accommodations to the Advocate as a qualified individual with a disability, pursuant to the ADA. (Hearing Request).

RELEVANT FACTS[13]:

  1. Between July 3, 2025 and December 19, 2025, Mother and/or Advocate Tobin sent over 50 emails[14] to various District employees, usually including multiple staff on each email, as well as State Congressmen and/or Federal Department of Education employees.  Seventeen of these emails were sent over a two-week span, between Monday, September 22, 2025 and Friday, October 3, 2025, during which time there were three pending BSEA matters involving Students 1 and 2 (with Student 2’s pending matter having only been filed by Advocate Tobin one week earlier). (Motion, Exs. 2, 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33 and 34).
  1. Mother’s emails were often lengthy but generally cordial.  Advocate Tobin’s emails varied in length were often sent using a “double emailing” format (i.e. multiple emails were sent without waiting for a follow-up), and frequently included unnecessarily antagonizing, personally accusatory, offensive, and caustic language.  For instance, Advocate Tobin sent an email on August 27, 2025 (his third in an hour and 10 minutes) that included the following statement: “… such a person would have no soul … an emptiness and a lack of basic humanity that is truly hard for me to understand”.  Advocate Tobin also sent an email on August 29, 2025 that included the following: “… given the district’s ill-intent here and callous disregard for [Student 2’s] well-being…”.  On September 2, 2025, he sent an email that concluded with “It’s truly shocking and appalling just how little care has been put in here.  Truly shocking and soulless”. Then on September 25, 2025, he sent an email including the following:

“Its cowardice. Pure cowardice…. The sin belongs to you and you alone…. If cruelty and power is what you value, have the courage to take ownership of that too…. You disgrace and tarnish what it means to be educators every day and with every breath…. “I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again … you’d have to have a nihilistic emptiness and a soullessness to treat a child this way that is so far removed from basic decency and humanity that I simply can’t wrap my head around it…. For lack of a better word SHAME!”. (Motion, Exs. 9, 11 and 34).

  1. On October 3, 2025, the District’s Superintendent emailed Parents and other District staff a “communication plan” that he advised was “being implemented today due to the volume, frequency and tone of communications received from [Mother] and affiliated advocates that have placed an undue burden on district staff and have not facilitated productive dialogue.  The plan is designed to ensure clear, consistent, and effective communication while respecting parental rights under state and federal law”.  The headings for each section of this “communication plan” were “Point of Contact, Method and Frequency of Communication, Exceptions, Conduct Standards, District Responsibilities, Duration and Review, and Redundant Requests and Due Process Matters”.  Among other provisions, the “communication plan” required all communications to the District to come from Mother. (Motion, Ex. 12).
  1. On the same date, October 3, 2025, Parents provided a “Formal Objection to Communication Plan…” (Objection), contending that it “… unlawfully restricts my (sic) rights as a parent, advocate, and school employee, and has caused embarrassment, stress, undue burden, and workplace hostility … and denies [Students] their federally guaranteed right to a [FAPE] under IDEA and has caused embarrassment and emotional distress to [Students]”.  Despite making these generalized allegations and objections, the Objection fails to provide any specific examples to support its allegations.  The headings for each section of this Objection were Parents’ Conduct Has Never Disrupted the School, Denial of FAPE and Impact on [Students], Due Process Advocate Rights, Disability Accommodation (Dyslexia), Employment Protection and Hostile Work Environment[15], Legal Violations and Case Law Support, Emotional, Social, and Professional Impact, Implementation Concerns, Demands for Immediate Actions, and Notice of Potential MCAD and Federal Filing. (Motion, Ex. 13).
  1. In violation of the “communication plan”, on October 31, 2025, Advocate Tobin emailed the District’s “point of contact” person.  The tone and content of this email continued to be challenging, though slightly tempered compared to his prior emails. (Motion, Ex. 34).
  1. On November 21, 2025 the District forwarded an amended “communication plan” with the same headings, albeit with amended provisions.  Among the amendments, the requirement that all communications come from Mother was changed to require all communications to come from Parents. (Motion, Ex. 15).
  1. On the same date, November 21, 2025, Advocate LaRoe provided a “Cooperative Parent Response to District Communication Plan (GAG ORDER)” (Response) advising that “the purpose of this submission is to demonstrate the Parent’s (sic) good-faith effort to work collaboratively with the District, acknowledge the District’s stated concerns regarding email volume and request reasonable adjustments to ensure that any communication framework remains consistent with the Parent’s (sic) rights under IDEA, Section 504, ADA, FERPA and 603 CMR 28.07”.  The Response also advised that Parents and their “assisting Advocate” have “reflected on” the “periods of high email volume” and were “fully committed to adjusting communication practices in order to improve efficiency, reduce strain on staff, and maintain respectful interactions”.  The Response then proposed certain “balanced and reasonable adjustments” under the headings of Appropriate, Limited Direct Access to Teachers, Adjustment of the “One Weekly Response” Requirement, Advocates Will Be cc’d When Appropriate, Reasonable Meeting Availability, Commitment from Parent and Advocate, Acknowledgment of Staff and Appreciation, and Partnership-Focused Closing.  Of note, while the Response proposed that Advocates would be “cc’d where appropriate”, it did not make any proposed changes to the requirement that all communications with the District come from Parents. (Motion, Ex. 16). 
  1. Despite this proposal, on November 26, 2025 and December 19, 2025, Advocate Tobin sent three emails to the District’s point of contact and several other district staff regarding Students 1, 3, and 4.  The tone of these emails was cordial and professional, and two were noted to be “end of week” communications, while the third was noted to be the “first MyPath report”. (Motions, Ex. 17, 18 and 19). 

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Motions to Dismiss

Rule XVI(B)(1) and (4) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) allow for dismissal of a hearing request for several reasons, including if the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over a claim or if a party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[16].  To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief…”[17]. The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor”[18]. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level… [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the [hearing request] (even if doubtful in fact) ….”[19]. 

II. Motions for Summary Judgment

801 CMR 1.01(7)(h) allows summary decision (also known as summary judgment) to be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”[20]. A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if it involves a dispute of a fact that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit” and “a reasonable [factfinder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party”[21]. 

The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment[22]. To successfully challenge a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”[23].  The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation[24].” 

III. Jurisdiction of BSEA

20 USC §1415(b)(6) grants parties the right to file timely complaints with the designated state educational agency “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child”[25]. “… [C]laims must be dismissed, however, if they do not arise under [federal or state special education statutes, or applicable portions of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act].  Unlike a court with general jurisdiction, the BSEA may consider only those claims for which enabling statutes and regulations expressly grant authority”[26].  Further, every alleged wrong imposed on an IDEA or 504-eligible student is not necessarily actionable at the BSEA[27].  The BSEA does not have jurisdiction, for instance, to address violations that pertain to a right that is available to all students regardless of their disability status or eligibility under the IDEA[28] or over class claims[29]. 

IV. The IDEA’s Protection of Meaningful Participation

In addition to the right to provide consent prior to a district implementing any proposed identification, evaluation, educational placement or services for a student with a disability, 20 USC §1415(b)(1) of the IDEA guarantees parents of such students procedural protections to ensure they have, “[a]n opportunity … to examine all records relating to such child and to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child, and to obtain an [IEE] of the child…”.  Subsections (b)(3) and (4) also guarantee parents the right to receive (in their native language “unless it clearly is not feasible to do so”) “[w]ritten prior notice … whenever the local educational agency – (A) proposes to initiate or change; or (B) refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child.”  Finally, subsections (b)(5)(6)(7) and (8) grant parents the right to an opportunity for mediation and to file due process hearing complaints “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child” provided the disputed issues “occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint”[30]. 

Although the procedural protections granted to parents in the IDEA “‘provide for a meaningful parent participation[,] are particularly important,’ and signal Congress’s ‘effort to maximize parental involvement’ in each child’s education”[31], the Courts recognized that parents’ rights under the IDEA are not “boundless”[32].  Moreover, procedural violations must significantly affect parents’ IDEA-guaranteed rights to constitute a FAPE violation[33].  


V. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

Res judicata precludes a party from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in an action for which a final judgment on the merits has issued[34].  The three elements of this doctrine are (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) “sufficient identicality” between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and (3) “sufficient identicality” between the parties in the two suits[35].  Relatedly, issue preclusion, also known as “collateral estoppel”, “means simply that when a[n] issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit”[36].

It is well settled that disgruntled parties cannot relitigate matters that have already been decided[37].  This“prevent[s] plaintiffs from splitting their claims by providing a strong incentive for them to plead all factually related allegations and attendant legal theories for recovery the first time they bring suit”[38].  It also “relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication”[39].  Similarly, the BSEA has consistently held that claims which are or could have been fully adjudicated in prior BSEA proceedings “cannot be relitigated” in subsequent proceedings and parents’ “recourse if they disagree with [a prior dispositive decision or ruling] is to file an appeal in a court of competent jurisdiction”[40].  

ANALYSIS

A. The BSEA Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear, as Parents Request, a “Consolidated” Case.

As a threshold matter, I first address the Motion’s argument that the instant Hearing Request must be dismissed in its entirety as it was filed on behalf of four Students.  Parents contend that proceeding on what they term a “consolidated claim” is warranted and appropriate as “forc[ing] four separate hearings is unsupported by stated, regulation or binding BSEA precedent” and “where a single District policy is challenged and applied uniformly, the BSEA has discretion to hearing the matter jointly to avoid: duplicative litigation, inconsistent rulings, and unnecessary financial burden on families”.  According to Parents, proceeding on behalf of all four Students is consistent with the “IDEA’s procedural safeguards [that] are intended to ensure access, not to force families into financial distress to vindicate rights”. 

Parents fail to cite any legal authority to support their argument, relying wholly on general ideological statements untied to specific facts pertaining to any or all of Students or to any legal authority.  I recognize, however, that 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h)[41] provides that in situations where there are multiple Adjudicatory Proceedings and where these Adjudicatory Proceedings involve “common issues” upon notification by a Party to the underlying administrative agency of that fact “stating with particularity the common issues”, then “the Presiding Officer or Agency may in its discretion consolidate the Proceedings” [42] (emphasis added).  In addition to such relief being discretionary with the Hearing Officer, as I have previously held, in In Re: Quincy and DESE, since the BSEA is an agency of limited jurisdiction,

“rather than having its jurisdiction expressly excluded by law, the BSEA’s jurisdiction must be explicitly provided for by statute.  As the BSEA’s enabling legislation specifically references ‘the child’ in the singular rather than plural[43], it is clear from this statute that the BSEA is only able to consider cases and claims on an individual student-specific basis, rather than cases or claims made on behalf of a group of students”[44].

I do not see any reason to depart from this analysis in the instant matter, even though the challenge to the Protocol’s application here pertains to four students in the District rather than to systemic claims (as was the situation in Quincy and DESE). The needs, special education eligibility, supports and services for each Student are unique and individual. Thus, what constitutes or precludes receipt of a FAPE, and by extension, the impact that implementation of the Protocol has, also differs from Student to Student.  While I appreciate Parents’ concern regarding potential increased resource expenditure, it is simply not feasible to address the FAPE-based challenges to the Protocol for each Student in one combined due-process hearing.  Other than the Protocol itself, the factual findings will be different for each Student[45].  As such, the District’s Motion seeking dismissal of this matter based on the BSEA’s lack of jurisdiction to address a hearing request on behalf of more than one student at a time is ALLOWED.

B. The Form of Dismissal of Each Claim.

I turn now to considering whether each claim is dismissed with or without prejudice.  Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVI(A), matters are dismissed with or without prejudice at the discretion of the Hearing Officer.  Issues dismissed with prejudice “… are closed and cannot be reopened/relitigated in subsequent cases before the BSEA”, whereas issues dismissed without prejudice “may be litigated at a later date by the filing of a new request for hearing within the statutory time period”[46]. 

As noted above, there have been extensive prior proceedings before the BSEA and DESE involving each Student and often involving repetitive filings of previously presented issues.  In all but one of the BSEA actions, the filing Party has chosen to withdraw the matter prior to final adjudication. Thus, in the interests of administrative efficiency, and to ensure appropriate expenditure of public and litigation resources and time, it is necessary to clarify the nature of dismissal of all claims in this matter. 

  1. FAPE-Based Claims Relating to the Communication Protocol.

Parents’ challenges to the Protocol that are grounded in allegations that Students’ rights to a FAPE were violated by its implementation and use, involve claims falling wholly within the BSEA’s jurisdiction. Thus, these claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 

The District contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on these claims and has submitted substantial documentation, unrefuted by Parents, in support of this request.  Parents argue that “… procedural IDEA claims – especially those involving parental participation – are fact-intensive and rarely suitable for summary disposition”. Although Parents mis-cited the legal authority to support this argument[47], matters for which disputed material facts exist are not amenable to summary judgment[48]. While Parents did not dispute the material fact of the existence of the Protocol or the District’s evidence of multiple Team meetings for each of the Students (see Motion, Ex. 20 identifying eleven Team meetings held to date this school year for Students), they argue that “the question here is not whether meetings occurred, but whether the [Protocol] interfered with Parents’ ability to participate between meetings” which they contend involves unidentified material facts in dispute.  (I note, however, that neither the Hearing Request nor the Opposition provides any specific instances where use of the Protocol is claimed to have impacted any of the Students’ receipt of a FAPE or Parents’ rights under the IDEA). 

While communication protocols are neither expressly prohibited by the IDEA, nor are they a per se denial of FAPE, case law on their use focuses on the individual facts and circumstances regarding how the communication protocol affects parents’ rights under the IDEA[49]. As such, while communication protocols should be implemented sparingly, and only in limited circumstances, their use does not necessarily deny or implicate rights granted by federal and state special education laws. Given this, any due process complaint challenging their implementation must include specific allegations of instances of loss of IDEA-protected guarantees, rather than generalized statements of violations of FAPE and meaningful participation. Thus, should Parents re-file a Hearing Request on behalf of an individual Student challenging the Protocol, that Hearing Request must allege, with specificity, the interaction(s), meeting(s), service(s), support(s), and/or other specific communication(s) that were allegedly improperly impacted by the use of the Protocol. Failure to do so may subject that matter to dismissal or summary judgment. 

  1. Other FAPE-Based Claims.

As with Parents’ challenges to the Protocol, all other FAPE-based claims alleged by Parents in the instant Hearing Request, including but not limited to claims of alleged FAPE-based retaliation by the District and claims for compensatory services for alleged FAPE denials also fall wholly within the BSEA’s jurisdiction to review, and thus are DISMISSED without prejudice.  Notwithstanding, any re-filed Hearing Request on behalf of any individual Student raising such FAPE-based allegations, must specifically identify the interaction(s), meeting(s), service(s), support(s), and/or other specific communication(s) that were allegedly subjected to improper FAPE-based retaliation, or which warrant compensatory services for FAPE denials.  Failure to do so may also subject such matter to dismissal or summary judgment. 

  1. Claims Involving Parents’ Advocates.

Although the Opposition advises that it is “expressly disclaim[ing]” claims involving “personal relief for advocates”, the instant Hearing Request contains multiple references to allegations involving Parents’ Advocates. As explained in Part A of the Analysis, the BSEA’s limited jurisdiction is derived from federal and state special education laws and regulations, and it can enforce only the rights granted by its enabling statutes.  Thus, persons such as advocates, who do not have express grants of legal rights under the IDEA cannot pursue due process complaints on their own behalf. All claims seeking relief for or on the basis of alleged harm to Parents’ Advocates, including but not limited to Advocates LaRoe, Tobin and MacGovern, are, therefore, DISMISSED with prejudice.

  1. Claims Challenging Prior BSEA Proceedings.

As explained above, application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, to the instant matter dictated that allegations of improprieties that occurred in a separate BSEA matter, can only be challenged by an appeal of that matter after a final disposition has been issued[50].  All but one of the prior BSEA matters were withdrawn without prejudice by the filing party, prior to issuance of a final disposition[51]. Thus, it appears that at this time only issues involving rulings, process, or other disputed actions taken in BSEA No. 2601884 may be pursued via a timely filed appeal in that matter. As such, all claims of alleged improprieties occurring during any of the previous BSEA due process proceedings filed on behalf of any of the Students are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice[52].

  1. ADA Claims and Non-FAPE Retaliation Claims.

Given the BSEA’s lack of jurisdiction to hear claims outside its enabling legislation or not otherwise grounded in FAPE, all non-FAPE-based allegations in the instant Hearing Request, including ADA violation claims, and non-FAPE based retaliation claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. BSEA decisions and rulings have consistently held that retaliation claims must have a FAPE basis for them to be within the BSEA’s jurisdiction, even if only for exhaustion purposes[53]. Similarly, I have previously recognized that ADA claims are beyond the BSEA’s jurisdiction[54]. 

  1. Claims Asserted Against the BSEA.

Although the BSEA was not named as a party in the instant matter, some of the allegations and requests for relief in the Hearing Request are directed specifically at the BSEA. As Parents were previously advised by Hearing Officer Rosa Figueroa, in dicta, in the Disputed Ruling, the BSEA lacks party jurisdiction over itself[55].  As such, any allegations raised against the BSEA are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

  1. Claims to Compensate Emotional Harm or for “Corrective Relief”.

Finally, I note that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction to compensate for allegations of emotional harm or award “corrective relief”.  As the Motion correctly argues, I have recently addressed the BSEA’s lack of jurisdiction over claims involving emotional harm[56].  The relief available for claims within the BSEA’s jurisdiction is limited, and as recognized by the First Circuit, punitive and tort-like compensatory damages are not available in BSEA proceedings[57]. Thus, all allegations for “corrective relief” based on alleged emotional harm are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

For these reasons, the District’s Motion is ALLOWED in part with and in part without prejudice as detailed above[58].    

By the Hearing Officer,

/s/ Marguerite M. Mitchell
Marguerite M. Mitchell

Date: January 13, 2026

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL

Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment

20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only. 

Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.

Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay.  This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided.  Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.

Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.” 

Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau.  School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).  Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).

Compliance

A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).

Rights of Appeal

Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).

An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).

Confidentiality

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.

Record of the Hearing

The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.

[1]   To the extent the Opposition seeks to have me disregard or strike all references in the Motion relating to prior matters, for being “irrelevant to IDEA compliance[,] improperly invites character inference” and is misleading as “collateral complaints” that do not result in “findings” or involve “pending investigations” “… have no probative value in an IDEA proceeding”, I decline to do so.  While I agree that prior or contemporaneously filed BSEA proceedings involving issues for which a dispositive Ruling or Decision has not been issued are not barred by principles of res judicata or issue preclusionas discussed further below, that does not justify striking them from review in this proceeding.  In fact, it is necessary to review such matters to confirm what viable claims can proceed in the instant matter.  See In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., et. al., BSEA No.  2309351, 29 MSER 154 (Mitchell, 2023); Hearing Rule XII(B).  My review of these prior matters is, however, solely with regard to their relevance to the issues in the instant matter.

[2]   Although the Hearing Request was dated November 6, 2025, as it was submitted by email after the close of business, it is deemed filed the next business day.

[3]   Parents sought to have the matter granted expedited status, however, they were informed by a November 7, 2025 letter from the Director of the BSEA that it did not appear from the hearing request that the matter met the standard for an expedited hearing and thus it was processed on the regular track.  Parents were advised that they could contact their assigned Hearing Officer to review the status of their request but did not do so.  However, I do not find any claims made in the Hearing Request to warrant expedited status in any regard.  See 20 USC 1415(k)(3) and (4).

[4]   According to the Hearing Request “the [Disputed Ruling] referenced certain correspondence as ‘not found’ [however] such materials were timely sent and properly referenced in the record.  The absence of those documents from the BSEA’s internal file does not render them irrelevant or nonexistent, and the Hearing Officer had both the discretion and obligation to request or clarify those materials before issuing a ruling”.

[5]   The Letter of Finding and Closure indicates that six of the allegations contained in the initial complaint were not investigated by PRS as being beyond the one-year statute of limitations, premature, related to Section 504 issues that are outside its jurisdiction, or lacking in specificity. (Motion, Ex. 6).

[6]   The Letter of Closure indicates that four of the allegations in the initial complaint were not investigated by PRS as being beyond its one-year statute of limitations, premature, related to teacher training issues that are outside PRS’s jurisdiction, or inconsistent with its findings on investigated issues. (Motion, Ex. 6).

[7]   The withdrawal was submitted after business hours on October 24, 2025.

[8]   The Hearing Officer deemed the initial Hearing Request in this matter insufficient.  In that Ruling, she also noted that all of the claims challenging Rulings and determinations or the procedural process of another BSEA matter may only be properly raised as grounds for an appeal in that other matter, following issuance of a decision in that other matter, but cannot be raised in a separate matter filed with the BSEA.  (Motion, Ex. 28).

[9]   According to the Motion, there also appears to have been two additional PRS Complaints filed, at least one of which was related to Student 1 (PRS # 14036 – closed on or about September 17, 2025 and PRS #14607 – which appears to involve a No Further Action letter by PRS dated September 18, 2025 presumably declining to investigate the allegations in the complaint).  Additionally, on October 8, 2025, Parents’ Advocate LaRoe filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) naming two employees of the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), the umbrella agency for the BSEA, the Director of the BSEA, the Hearing Officer for BSEA Nos. 2601884 and 2603713, and the attorney for the District as Respondents. (Motion, Ex. 24).

[10]   The Opposition, however, advises that the instant matter involves a “single, narrow, legally cognizable issue:  Whether the [Protocol], as implemented, interfered with Parents’ meaningful participation in the IDEA process, resulting in a procedural denial of FAPE”.  However as the Opposition does not withdraw any other claims set forth in the Hearing Request, nor can anything in it be construed as doing so, this Ruling relies on the Hearing Request with regard to identifying the claims raised in the instant matter.

[11]   Verbatim, the five issues in the Hearing Request are: 

“1. Whether the Dudley-Charlton Regional School District’s gag order unlawfully restricts the Parents’ and ADA advocate’s ability to communicate with school staff, participate in IEP development, and advocate for their children, in violation of: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(l); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; 2. Whether the BSEA’s prior conduct and the District’s ongoing actions constitute retaliation for protected activities under the IDEA and ADA, including the Parents’ exercise of procedural rights and the Advocate’s engagement in disability-related advocacy; 3. Whether the BSEA’s failure to retain or request relevant correspondence before issuing the November 6, 2025 ruling, and its unilateral omission of itself as an appropriate party, violated the Parents’ and students’ due process rights under the IDEA and the Fourteenth Amendment; 4. Whether the District’s ongoing enforcement of the gag order constitutes a denial of FAPE to each child by impeding parent participation, silencing the ADA advocate, and preventing the consideration of appropriate services, accommodations, and supports; and 5. Whether the cumulative actions of the District and BSEA have caused educational, emotional, and procedural harm to the family, requiring corrective and compensatory relief.”

[12]   Separate from these statements of requested relief, the instant Hearing Request also seeks to have the BSEA: (1) “accept this consolidated hearing”; (2) schedule an expedited hearing”; (3) immediately order cessation of the Protocol; (4) ensure compliance with the ADA and Section 504 throughout the proceedings; and (5) “[p]reserve the family’s right to pursue subsequent federal relief under [the ADA and Section 504]”.

[13]   The information in this section is drawn from the parties’ pleadings and is subject to revision in further rulings and the Decision, if so issued.

[14]   This count does not include emails sent by Parents’ Advocates to the District’s Attorneys pertaining to specific pending BSEA matters.

[15]   Mother is a teacher employed in the District.

[16]   As these rules/regulations are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP and MRCP, respectively), hearing officers are generally guided by federal court decisions in deciding such motions.

[17]   Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).

[18]   Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).  As Advocates LaRoe and Tobin appear regularly before the BSEA, the instant Hearing Request is not entitled to deference that would otherwise be warranted for a hearing request filed by a pro se party.  See In Re:  Dudley-Charlton Reg. Sch. Dist., BSEA #2603713 31 MSER 450 (Figueroa, 2025);compare Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation [of their hearing request] is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled”).

[19]   Iannocchino 451 Mass. at 636 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).

[20]   801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).  As with motions to dismiss, hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the FRCP and MRCP, respectively, in deciding motions for summary judgment which provide that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. 

[21]   French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).

[22]   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 252 (1986) (“At the summary judgment stage the [hearing officer’s] function is not [her]self to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial”).  As noted supra with motions to dismiss, since Advocates LaRoe and Tobin appear regularly before the BSEA, the pleadings they filed are not entitled to deference that would otherwise be warranted for a hearing request filed by a pro se party.  See In Re: Dudley-Charlton, BSEA #2603713;compare Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d at 886.

[23]   Id. at 250 (quoting FRCP 56(e)).  The adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” that could be found in its favor that would allow the fact finder to decide for it at a hearing on the merits.  Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989) quoting Anderson, 477 US at 249-50 (to be “sufficient”, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial”).

[24]   Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

[25]   See M.G.L. c. 71B §2A (establishing the BSEA and authorizing it to hear disputes over “…(i) any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, education program or educational placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a free and appropriate public education to the child arising under [state or federal special education laws and regulations]; or (ii) a student’s rights under Section 504 …, and its regulations”); 34 CFR 300.507(a)(1); 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).

[26]   In Re:  Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA #2203555, 28 MSER 111 (Berman, 2022); see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm., 421 Mass. 570, 586 (1996) (“Any judicial review of agency action embodies the principle that an agency has no inherent authority beyond its enabling act and therefore it may do nothing that contradicts such legislation”). 

[27]   Fry v. Napoleon, 580 US 154, 167-68 (2017) (holding that in situations where a dispute does not involve the IDEA’s FAPE requirement “even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends … the hearing officer cannot provide the requested relief.  [The hearing officer’s] role, under the IDEA, is to enforce the child’s ‘substantive right’ to a FAPE….  And that is all”). (internal citations omitted).

[28]   In Re: Springfield, BSEA #2309351.

[29]   See In Re: Quincy Pub. Sch. and [DESE], BSEA #2408249, 30 MSER 176 (Mitchell, 2024); In Re: Holyoke Pub. Sch. and Jay, BSEA #1800619, 24 MSER 20 (Oliver, 2018).

[30]   See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1985) (the “Act emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the child’s educational program and assessing its effectiveness….  Section 1415(b) entitles the parents “to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child,” to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, and to present complaints with respect to any of the above. The parents are further entitled to “an impartial due process hearing,” … to resolve their complaint…”) citing §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345 (1984).

[31]   Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. Student, No. 3:12-CV-01837-AC, 2014 WL 2592654, at *13 (D. Or. June 9, 2014), aff’d, 665 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2016) quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 n.6 (1982); Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The IDEA and its implementing regulations give the parents of a child with a disability the right to participate in shaping their child’s education, including: (1) the right to review all student records; (2) the right to participate in all meetings regarding their child’s identification, evaluation, and educational placement; (3) the right to an independent educational evaluation; (4) the right to receive prior written notice (“PWN”) whenever the district proposes or refuses to initiate a change in the student’s educational program; (5) the right to be involved in the educational placement of their child; and (6) the right to a due process hearing before an ALJ if the school district does not meet the standards of the IDEA with respect to their child”) citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415; 34 C.F.R. § 300.501.

[32]   Forest Grove, 2014 WL 2592654, at *13 (“A school district need not involve parents in ‘informal or unscheduled conversations involving school district personnel and conversations on issues such as teaching methodology, lesson plans, or coordination of service provision if those issues are not addressed in the child’s IEP’….  So long as the parent is meaningfully involved in generating the IEP, the District has ultimate control over a student’s educational plan”) quoting O.A.R. 581-015-2190(4); and citing E. Z.-L. ex rel. R.L. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 763 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. R.E. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (While a district is required to “ensure that parents have the opportunity to participate in formulating their child’s general educational program, it is not required” to adopt a parent’s preferred placement decision) and T.P. ex rel S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253–54 (2nd Cir.2009) (so long as a District has “an open mind as to the content of” an IEP, a District may formulate pre-meeting recommendations as to a student’s ultimate program).

[33]   L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although the district court properly recognized that Parents have a substantial right to participate in the IEP process, it neglected to consider whether Parents’ right was significantly affected by the District’s procedural violation” (emphasis in original)); see Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Before an IEP is set aside, there must be some rational basis to believe that procedural inadequacies compromised the pupil’s right to an appropriate education, seriously hampered the parents’ opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits” (citations omitted)).

[34]   Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); In Re: Sonus Networks, Inc., Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 499 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007); Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 444 Mass. 837, 843-44 (2005).

[35]   Breneman v. U.S. ex rel. F.A.A., 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2004); In Re: Marshfield Pub. Schs., BSEA #2209242, 28 MSER 93 (Kantor Nir, 2022); see Gonzalez-Pina v. Rodriguez, 407 F.3d 425, 429 (1st Cir. 2005).

[36]   Gonzalez-Pina, 407 F.3d at 430 quoting Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 85 (1st Cir.2003) quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).

[37]   See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94;  Sonus Networks, Inc, 499 F.3d at 56-57; Gonzalez-Pina, 407 F.3d at 429; Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 843-44 (internal citations omitted) (A “final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding…precludes relitigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction”).

[38]   Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Amertex Enterprises Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir. 1995).

[39]   Id. quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.

[40]   In Re:  Walpole Pub. Schs., BSEA #1701652, 22 MSER 199 (Putney-Yaceshyn, 2016).  Parents’ Opposition incorrectly cited this case as its only legal authority for the argument that “the BSEA has repeatedly held that where at least one procedural IDEA claim is plausibly pled, dismissal must be denied” (Opposition Part II.B).  In fact, the Ruling actually dismissed that matter with prejudice.  See In Re:  Springfield, BSEA #2309351; In Re: Marshfield, BSEA #2209242; In Re: [DESE] and Xili, BSEA #1802999, 24 MSER 14 (Byrne 2018) (“The common law doctrine of estoppel … prevents BSEA consideration of the Parent’s residency-related claims as a Court in this jurisdiction considered and disposed of the same claims, arising from the same factual allegations against the same party. That ruling is binding on the BSEA”); In Re: The Gifford School and XiLi, BSEA #1803736, 24 MSER 18 (Byrne 2018) (“[t]he Parent now seeks to assert the same facts and the same claims for the same time period against the same party in interest/privy, [but t]raditional doctrines of estoppel preclude BSEA consideration of those previously determined facts and claims” (citation omitted)).

[41]   Parents’ Opposition incorrectly cites to this provision first as applying to motions for summary judgment (Opposition Part II(A)), and later as supporting arguments that “[p]rocedural participation claims are fact-dependent; [c]redibility and implementation cannot be resolved on motion; [and d]istractions and collateral history do not meet the movant’s burden” (Opposition, Part IV(second time)). 

[42]   According to the “Scope of Rules” section of the Hearing Rules, “unless modified explicitly by these Rules, hearings are conducted under the Formal Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01 et seq.”

[43]   By law, the BSEA’s jurisdiction extends only to those claims involving “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child” (emphasis added).  M.G.L. c. 71B §2A. See Jay, BSEA #1800619,

(“The BSEA is not a[n agency] of general jurisdiction….  Throughout M.G.L. c. 71 B, 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq., 29 U.S.C. Section 794 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to these statutes, the repeated references are to a child with a disability, the child, the student, all in the singular, individual form.  The BSEA’s jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to resolving disputes and providing relief for individual students.  Further, the [Hearing Rules], make no provision for class actions.  Given the above statutory and regulatory scheme, the charge of the BSEA Hearing Officer is to determine the individual student’s specific special education needs, and to determine whether or not the school district can appropriately address those individual needs.  Unlike the federal courts (see Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), the BSEA has no has no statute, regulation, or rule providing for class action claims.  The BSEA has never engaged in class-wide fact finding and does not have the experience, expertise, or institutional capacity to provide administrative fact finding on class action claims which could be of assistance to the federal court in any potential, subsequent class action litigation”).

[44]   BSEA #2408249. 

[45]   Prior to re-filing any hearing requests challenging the Protocol, the Parties are strongly encouraged to continue to collaborate about its terms.  The District’s amendments to the Protocol appear to have addressed some of Parents’ initial objections.  Similarly, Parents’ Response to the amended Protocol appears to reflect legitimate questions and presents thoughtful proposals appropriately framed in an attempt to work collaboratively with the District.  Should the Parties be unable to resolve their disputes over the Protocol collaboratively, however, Parents may want to consider pursuing their FAPE-based challenges to the Protocol on behalf of only one Student in the first instance, as a decision as to that Student may guide the Parties in their future implementation of the Protocol for the remaining Students. 

[46]   Hearing Rule XVI(A).

[47]   Parents’ Opposition cites to Roland M. in support of this claim; however, although Roland M. involved procedural IDEA claims, the procedural history of that matter did not involve any summary judgment determinations (the BSEA decision was issued after a hearing on the merits, and the district court decision appealed to the First Circuit was also issued after a trial).  See Roland M., 910 F.2d at 988-89.  

[48]   See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Iannocchino, 451 Mass. at 636 quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557.

[49]   See Forest Grove, 2018 WL 6198281, at *20–21(concluding after a detailed examination of the record that indicated evidence of the parents active participation in team meetings, and continued access to staff by phone and in person, that a communication protocol based upon the volume, “terse and aggressive” tone, and conflation of topics contained in parent emails which directed parents to communicate on identified topics with specific staff “did not seriously infringe Parent’s ability to participate and did not deny Student a FAPE”, despite the District temporarily blocking parents emails from its server when parents did not follow the protocol); In Re:  Natick Pub. Schs., 118 LRP 22343 (OCR E.Div., MA, 2018) (concluding that a communication protocol adopted as a result of parents sending over 3000 emails since the student was enrolled in the district, requiring parent to email only specific staff on specific topics, but still allowed for parent to “call, write letters, or arrange appointments for in-person meetings with other members of the staff or otherwise advocate on behalf of your daughter” did not “negatively impact[ ] the Complainant’s ability to advocate, or otherwise deterred her from doing so”, or evidence retaliation by the district for parent’s advocacy, particularly in light of evidence of parent’s compliance and staff responsiveness to compliant communications); In Re: Old Rochester Reg.l Sch. Dist., 118 LRP 35595 (OCR. E.Div., MA  2018) (concluding there was no violation of Section 504 for implementing a communication protocol and No Trespass Order in response to parent’s and student’s voluminous, frequent and duplicative emails that “result[ed] in near-non-stop contact with the District” and contained accusations and insults, as well as police reports evidencing violent acts by parent); see also Camfield v. Bd. of Trs. of Redondo Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 800 F. App’x 491, 493 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding no discrimination or retaliation for advocacy by a parent with the district’s implementation of a 24-hour notice requirement prior to parent appearing at the district that was implemented after parent repeatedly called the cell phone of several staff members, appeared on school grounds without notice approaching staff and using repeated vulgar and intimidating language at times in the presence of the student).

[50]   See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; In Re: Sonus Networks, Inc., 499 F.3d at 56-57; Gonzalez-Pina, 407 F.3d at 430 quoting Jackson, 337 F.3d at 85 quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443; Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 843-44.

[51]   As appellate rights only arise after issuance of dispositive determinations in a matter, withdrawing a case eliminates the ability to appeal.  Parties cannot seek to avoid this lost appellate option by collaterally challenging disputed process that occurred in a withdrawn matter in a separate hearing.  Id.; see also Hearing Rules XIII and XVI(E). 

[52]   My analysis is strictly with regard to whether a new BSEA proceeding can be used to challenge alleged improprieties that occurred during a separate BSEA proceeding.  If other forums exist to pursue such claims, it is beyond my jurisdiction to consider this. 

[53]   See Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA #2208440, 28 MSER 250 (Kantor Nir, 2022); In Re: Ollie v. Springfield Pub Schs., BSEA #2004776, 26 MSER 62 (Reichbach, 2020) (concluding that unless a claim of retaliation is tied to a FAPE claim, it is outside the jurisdiction of the BSEA) compare Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000)(holding all the plaintiff’s claims, including that the school “retaliated against [the student] in response to the [parents’] efforts to enforce his educational rights,” were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement because they “relate unmistakably to the evaluation and educational placement of [the student]”); Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2000)(“Weber’s claim of retaliation is literally ‘related’ to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [her] ‘child.’”).

[54]   In Re: Springfield, BSEA #2309351; see In Re: Fernando and Worcester Pub. Schs., BSEA #1800970, 23 MSER 183 (Reichbach, 2017); In Re: Student v. Chicopee Pub. Schs. & DESE, BSEA #1608986, 23 MSER 1 (Berman, 2017); see In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs. & Xylia, BSEA #12-0781, 18 MSER 373 (Byrne, 2012).  Notwithstanding, however, I note that the First Circuit’s analysis of discrimination under Section 504 applies identically to claims under the ADA. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 31, n. 4 (1st Cir. 1996); see Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ of Alburquerque Pub. Sch., 565 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10thCir. 2009) (for another Circuit Court decision that agrees with the First Circuit’s identicality of analysis for discrimination claims under both the ADA and Section 504).

[55]   In Re:  Dudley-Charlton, BSEA #2603713; see In re: Zeke, BSEA #2300305, 28 MSER 228 (Reichbach, 2022) (involving a sua sponte dismissal of BSEA Director as a party); see also In Re: Student v. [DALA] & [BSEA], BSEA #2303901, 28 MSER 358 (Figueroa, 2022).

[56]   In Re: Newton Pub. Schs., BSEA# 2512686, 31 MSER 346 (Mitchell, 2025).

[57]   Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 36 (1st Cir. 2006) (reasoning that “… the windfall of such awards to IDEA plaintiffs would likely come at the expense of other educational benefits for other schoolchildren by diverting from them scarce educational resources”); see Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting without explanation that “… the array of remedies available under the IDEA does not include money damages.”).

[58]   As a final note, Parents’ Opposition (prepared by Advocate LaRoe) initially consisted of four and a half pages of “poetically formatted” ideological statements about the IDEA that potentially appears to have been drafted using artificial intelligence supports as some of the legal claims/citations contained within it are wholly inaccurate.  For instance, one portion of this section of the Opposition states:

“Rowley tells us

FAPE is not a checklist

It is an opportunity for benefit[.]”

However, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188–89, actually indicates that the Court does in fact consider the provisions of FAPE in the IDEA to be akin to a checklist.  Specifically, the Court reasoned that,

“According to the definitions contained in the Act, a “free appropriate public education” [FAPE] consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child “to benefit” from the instruction. Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public expense and under public supervision, meet the State’s educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State’s regular education, and comport with the child’s IEP. Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a “free appropriate public education” as defined by the Act”. 

While such submissions by legal counsel for a party would be unprofessional, possibly unethical, and potentially contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct with which licensed attorneys must comply, here, Parents’ representatives are not governed by any such professional conduct standards, as there are currently no licensure requirements associated with being an educational advocate and representing parties at proceedings before the BSEA in Massachusetts.  Regardless, filing a poem as a pleading is inconsistent with the respect and professionalism expected at the BSEA and could warrant refusal to accept such a pleading.  However, here, I considered only that portion of the Opposition following the poem.  Further, given the overall concerns with the Opposition’s citations, as noted in prior footnotes, the Opposition was reviewed and considered only with regard to those limited valid legal arguments specific to the issues in the instant matter. 

Updated on January 17, 2026

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