COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Frank[1] and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
BSEA# 26-05857
RULING ON MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED HEARING REQUEST
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Motion filed on January 12, 2026 by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE or the Department) to Dismiss the Amended Hearing Request filed by Parents on behalf of Frank (Second Motion). On the same date, Parents filed their Opposition to DESE’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Hearing Request (Opposition). As neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, I am issuing this Ruling on the Department’s Second Motion without a hearing, pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules).
For the reasons set forth below, DESE’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Hearing Request is hereby ALLOWED.
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[2]
On November 27, 2025, Parents filed a Hearing Request against DESE “for its failure to ensure that the District complied with [the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] and Massachusetts special education requirements, resulting in continued denial of [a free appropriate public education] to” Frank.
According to Parents, Frank is a nine-year-old student with dyslexia, a specific language impairment, a pervasive phonological processing disorder, and profound dysgraphia, attending school within the Dudley-Charlton Regional School District (Dudley-Charlton or the District). In their initial Hearing Request, Parents contended that despite clear evidence and substantial documentation of these disabilities provided to both the District and DESE, Frank has not received the services, assessments, placement, or qualified instructors required for him to access a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Specifically, Parents asserted that the District’s actions and inactions have led to: (A) a “significant and longstanding failure to provide evidence-based, individualized reading instruction;” (B) a failure to evaluate Frank in all areas of suspected disability; (C) a failure to provide speech and language and writing services; and (D) predetermination of services and placement. In their final claim, (E), Parents alleged that the Department failed to ensure the District’s compliance, despite Parents notifying both Dudley-Charlton and DESE of the absence of qualified personnel; insufficient evaluation; the absence of speech or writing services; the lack of meaningful progress data; and the ineffective reading programs being used. According to Parents, DESE’s failure to act constitutes a violation of its duty under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) to ensure that school districts comply with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Finally, Parents argued that Frank has suffered harm in the form of severe academic regression, ongoing functional illiteracy, emotional harm, worsening writing-related physical pain, and loss of educational opportunity as a result of the District’s and DESE’s failures.[3] Parents requested, as a remedy, that DESE fund and place Frank in an out-of-district, substantially separate, language-based program; provide compensatory education; and provide an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public expense in all disputed areas.
The matter was assigned to Hearing Officer Catherine Putney-Yaceshyn, and the Hearing was scheduled for January 2, 2026.
On December 3, 2025, DESE requested a two-week extension to file its Response to Parents’ Hearing Request, noting that Parents, through their advocate, had assented. On December 4, 2025, Parents filed a letter indicating that they no longer agreed with the Department’s request for an extension and asking that the BSEA deny it. On December 8, 2025, Hearing Officer Putney-Yaceshyn allowed the Department’s request, extending the due date for DESE’s Response to December 22, 2025. The matter was transferred for administrative reasons to the undersigned Hearing Officer on December 9, 2025.
DESE filed its first Motion to Dismiss (First Motion) on December 18, 2025, asserting that Parents’ Hearing Request failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, further, that the BSEA lacked jurisdiction over their claims. On the same date, Parents filed a Rebuttal Motion in Opposition to Department’s Motion to Dismiss (Rebuttal).
On December 24, 2025, the Department requested that the Hearing be postponed to January 16, 2026, to permit the parties to work together toward resolution of the issues in the underlying Hearing Request. On the same date, Parents filed an Amended Hearing Request against DESE,[4] alleging that the Department “failed to meet its non-delegable obligation as the [State Educational Agency (SEA)] to ensure the provision of [a] FAPE” to Frank; that “DESE’s Program Review Services [sic] (PRS) monitoring and corrective action process was legally insufficient and contributed to the ongoing denial of [a] FAPE;” and that “DESE’s failure to take timely and effective corrective action after notice of district noncompliance resulted in compensable educational harm.” According to Claim A of the Amended Hearing Request, Parents provided DESE with actual notice of Dudley-Charlton’s IDEA noncompliance affecting Student, including information that identified both student-specific and systemic violations that are ongoing, not historical, and directly implicate Student’s right to a FAPE. In Claim B, Parents allege that PRS monitoring was inadequate to identify and correct known violations of the IDEA, and, as such, DESE (through PRS) permitted unlawful practices to persist. In Claim C, Parents argue that once DESE was alerted by Parents to these issues, the Department “had an affirmative obligation to: ensure district compliance; require timely and effective corrective action and intervene where local efforts were ineffective;” its failure to do so “allowed the District to continue providing services that were not reasonably calculated to enable progress.” Parents contend that DESE’s failure, as alleged in Claim C, “was independent and in addition to the District’s violations.”[5]
In their Amended Hearing Request, Parents argue that the Department “bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring IDEA compliance,” and (without citing cases) that BSEA precedent holds that where DESE has notice of district noncompliance and fails to require timely and effective correction, the Department “may be held directly liable for denial of [a] FAPE, regardless of district fault.” As relief, Parents request findings and orders that: (1) DESE failed to meet its SEA obligations, thereby contributing to a denial of a FAPE; (2) DESE is responsible for ensuring and funding “compensatory eduction sufficient to remedy educational harm” and “placement in an appropriate program capable of implementing evaluators’ recommendations without further delay;” and (3) “DESE shall take whatever supervisory and corrective action is necessary to ensure” that Frank receives a FAPE going forward.
Pursuant to BSEA Hearing Rule I(G), the Hearing on Parents’ Amended Hearing Request was scheduled for January 28, 2026.[6] On January 5, 2026, the Department filed a request for a two-week postponement of the Hearing due to the unavailability of Counsel and requested an extension until January 16, 2026, to file its Response to Parents’ Amended Hearing Request. Parents assented to both requests. DESE’s extension was allowed, and the Hearing was postponed for good cause to February 12 and 13, 2026.
On January 7, 2026, the undersigned Hearing Officer issued a Ruling on the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion to Dismiss (Ruling) dismissing all claims contained in Parents’ initial Hearing Request. Specifically, Claims A through D were dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Claim E was dismissed as outside the jurisdiction of the BSEA.
In DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss, the Department asserts that because – as the undersigned Hearing Officer recognized in the previous Ruling in this matter as to Claim E – there is no private right of action under the IDEA against the Department based on its supervisory responsibility over special education in Massachusetts, all claims in Parents’ Amended Hearing Request must be dismissed as beyond the jurisdiction of the BSEA. Specifically, in Claim A, regarding DESE’s alleged failure to meet its “non-delegable obligation as the SEA to ensure the provision of [a] FAPE” to Frank, Parents argue that the Department knew that Dudley-Charlton was not meeting its obligations to Frank but did not take action to remedy this violation of his rights. In Claim B, Parents allege that through its Problem Resolution System, or PRS, DESE “failed to conduct monitoring sufficient to ensure timely correction of IDEA violations,” and that its monitoring and corrective action process was legally insufficient, contributing to the ongoing denial of a FAPE. Through Claim C, Parents contend that DESE failed to exercise its SEA authority by failing to “take timely and effective corrective action after notice of district noncompliance.” The Department argues that all three claims “are based on the Department’s supervisory authority over special education in Massachusetts pursuant to the IDEA;” and that DESE’s compliance with its supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA is properly monitored not through a BSEA Hearing Request against the Department, but through regular monitoring by the United States Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP). As such, like all claims in Parents’ initial Hearing Request, Parents’ Amended Hearing Request should be dismissed in its entirety.
In their Opposition, Parents argue that where a state agency, such as DESE, has notice of persistent district noncompliance and fails to act, “the BSEA retains jurisdiction to order student-specific equitable relief, including compensatory education and corrective action necessary to ensure [a] FAPE.” According to Parents, their claims are “FAPE-based” and seek student-specific relief they view as necessary to remedy Frank’s ongoing deprivation of a FAPE, not “a declaratory ruling on DESE’s statewide compliance obligations” or “generalized enforcement of supervisory duties.” Finally, citing Gadsby v. Grasmick,[7] a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Parents assert that the BSEA may order relief against a SEA “where necessary to ensure [a] FAPE.”
- DISCUSSION
Whether Parents’ claims survive a Motion to Dismiss turns on both the procedural standards for such a motion and the substantive standards governing their claims.
- Standard for Ruling on Motion to Dismiss a Hearing Request
Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVIIB of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This rule is analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, as such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, what is required to survive a motion to dismiss “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[8] Moreover, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[9] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[10] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . .”[11]
- BSEA Jurisdiction
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides parents with a formal due process complaint process with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[12] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency before which any impartial due process hearing regarding these issues takes place. The BSEA is an agency of limited jurisdiction; it has jurisdiction over requests for hearing filed by:
a parent or school district . . . on any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 . . . .[13]
As BSEA Hearing Officers have recognized, “individual claims must be dismissed . . . if they do not arise under federal or state special education statutes, or applicable portions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Unlike a court with general jurisdiction, the BSEA may consider only those claims for which enabling statutes and regulations expressly grant authority.”[14]
It is within this legal framework that I now examine the allegations in this case.
- Application of Legal Standards Permits Dismissal of All Claims Raised in Parents’ Amended Hearing Request
The Department asserts that all claims set forth in Parents’ Amended Hearing Request should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- Even Read Together, Claim A, Parents’ Claim that the Department Had Actual and Constructive Notice of District IDEA Violations, and Claim C, Parents’ Claim that DESE Failed to Exercise its SEA Authority After Notice, Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
In Claim A, Parents allege that DESE had actual notice of Dudley-Charlton’s IDEA noncompliance through parent communications and submissions; IEE disputes implicating evaluation and service delivery failure; documentation demonstrating lack of progress and functional illiteracy; and PRS involvement and review activities. Specifically, Parents allege that this information identified student-specific and systemic violations, including failure to evaluate in all areas of suspected disability; failure to provide evidence-based, individualized reading instruction; use of unqualified or insufficiently trained personnel; lack of progress-monitoring and data-based decision-making; improper predetermination of services and placement; and violation of procedural safeguards.
Although Parents list Claim A as raising the issue whether “DESE failed to meet its non-delegable obligation as the SEA to ensure the provision of [a] FAPE to [Frank], in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)[15] and 34 C.F.R. § § 300.149-300.153,” they make no allegations regarding any action or inaction by DESE in connection with the actual and constructive notice the Department received regarding the District’s alleged noncompliance with the IDEA.[16]
For this reason, I combine Claim A with Claim C, in which Parents allege that despite notice of Dudley-Charlton’s noncompliance, as outlined in Claim A, DESE failed to “require immediate correction of evaluation and service delivery violations,” mandate compensatory education for these violations and the harm to Frank arising from them, or ensure Frank’s placement “in a program capable of implementing evaluators’ recommendations” for him.
To evaluate DESE’s Second Motion as Claims A and C, read together, I must take as true Parents’ factual allegations, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom in Parents’ favor, and I must find that they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.[17] As such, I take as true as true Parents’ allegations that they alerted the Department to Dudley-Charlton’s violations of Frank’s right to a FAPE and that DESE failed to “take timely and effective corrective action after notice of district noncompliance,” resulting in harm to Frank.
In its Motion, DESE contends that these claims implicate DESE’s supervisory responsibility over special education in Massachusetts. As such, Parents cannot assert these claims directly against the Department, as there is no private right of action within the IDEA that allows them to do so.[18] In support of this proposition, DESE cites to my previous Ruling in the instant case on its initial Motion to Dismiss, wherein I concluded that “there is no private right of action for violations of the DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA.”[19]
In their Opposition, Parents contend that they are not asserting “abstract challenges to supervision” or a free-standing supervisory enforcement claim; that the BSEA has jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 over these “FAPE-based claims seeking student-specific relief;” and that even absent a private right of action, the IDEA expressly authorizes relief necessary to ensure a FAPE, “including relief directed to an SEA where the LEA has failed and the SEA has notice.” Parents argue that Gadsby v. Grasmick stands for the proposition that a SEA may be liable for funding a student’s private placement. In Gadsby, the student’s parents had entered into a private settlement with a school district, under which the district had agreed to pay a portion of the student’s tuition in exchange for the parents’ agreement not to proceed with a local due process hearing.[20] When the district submitted the student’s application for State funding to the SEA, the SEA found that it “contained serious deficiencies preventing its consideration” and returned the application without decision.[21] In determining “whether a[] SEA may ever be held liable where there is a failure to provide a [FAPE] to a particular child within its jurisdiction,” the Court analyzed the version of the IDEA in effect in 1997.[22] Notably, in finding that the SEA “may be held liable under IDEA for the failure to provide” a FAPE, the Court cited to a subsection of the IDEA that it referred to as a “stopgap measure, ensuring the provision of a free appropriate education” in the event “that a[] LEA has no program for a [FAPE] in place or fails to maintain an existing program.” Specifically, in 1997, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1), provided:
Whenever . . . a[n] [LEA] . . . is unable or unwilling to establish and maintain programs of free appropriate public education which meet the requirements established in subsection (a) . . . the [SEA] shall use the payments which would have been available to such [LEA] to provide special education and related services directly to handicapped children residing in the area served by such [LEA].[23]
This provision of the IDEA is no longer in effect. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(g) now sets forth the contours of a SEA’s responsibility for providing direct services to children with disabilities. Under this provision:
- A State educational agency shall use the payments that would otherwise have been available to a local educational agency or to a State agency to provide special education and related services directly to children with disabilities residing in the area served by that local educational agency, or for whom that State agency is responsible, if the State educational agency determines that the local educational agency or State agency, as the case may be-
- has not provided the information needed to establish the eligibility of such local educational agency or State agency under this section;
- is unable to establish and maintain programs of free appropriate public education that meet the requirements of subsection (a);
- is unable or unwilling to be consolidated with 1 or more local educational agencies in order to establish and maintain such programs; or
- has 1 or more children with disabilities who can best be served by a regional or State program or service delivery system designed to meet the needs of such children.[24]
The language of this provision, which is currently in effect, outlines part of a SEA’s general supervisory responsibilities, as it involves not individual students but determinations by the SEA about a particular LEA’s ability to “establish and maintain programs of free appropriate public education that meet the requirements” of the IDEA.[25] In my prior Ruling in this matter, I examined case law from several courts and the BSEA and concluded, as did the judges and Hearing Officers in those fora, that there is no private right of action for violations of DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA.[26] Nothing in Parents’ Opposition has persuaded me to alter that conclusion.
For the reasons above, the factual allegations asserted by Parents in Claims A and C, taken as true, do not suggest an entitlement to relief for which the BSEA may find DESE liable,[27] because the responsibility for developing and implementing IEPs “is placed upon local school districts and not the state,”[28] and because there is no private right of action for violations of the DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA.[29] For these reasons, to the extent Parents wish to pursue claims against the Department for failing to ensure Dudley-Charlton’s compliance with the IDEA after receiving notice that the District had allegedly violated several provisions of the statute, such claims do not arise under federal or state special education statutes that are within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.[30]
- Claim B, Alleging That DESE, Through PRS, Failed to Maintain a Legally Sufficient Monitoring and Corrective Action Process, Contributing to the Ongoing Denial of FAPE, Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
According to the Department, “[t]hrough its Problem Resolution System (PRS), DESE handles complaints that allege a school or district is not meeting legal requirements for education.”[31] By providing a forum for stakeholders to initiate investigations into school districts’ compliance with the IDEA and state special education requirements, PRS is one way in which DESE meets its duty to supervise the provision of special education in Massachusetts.
Claim B, therefore, also implicates DESE’s supervisory responsibility. In fact, Parents contend specifically in Claim B of their Amended Hearing Request that as a result of its primary reliance on documentation provided by the District and its failure to require corrective actions, “PRS monitoring did not function as effective general supervision, but instead permitted unlawful practices to persist.”
Even taking as true Parents’ factual allegations that as to Frank, DESE (through PRS) failed to conduct sufficient monitoring to ensure that any IDEA violations were timely corrected, and any inferences that may be drawn therefore, these allegations do not suggest an entitlement to relief for which the BSEA may find DESE liable due to the absence of a private right of action for violations of DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA .[32]
- CONCLUSION
Upon reviewing DESE’s Motion to Dismiss Parents’ Amended Hearing Request and Parents’ Opposition thereto, I find that each claim in the Amended Hearing Request is outside the jurisdiction of the BSEA.
ORDER
The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Hearing Request is hereby ALLOWED. Parents’ Amended Hearing Request is DISMISSED, with prejudice, in its entirety.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Amy Reichbach
Amy M. Reichbach
Dated: January 14, 2026
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL
Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment
20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only.
Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.
Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay. This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided. Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.
Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.” Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau. School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
Compliance
A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).
Rights of Appeal
Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).
An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).
ConfidentialityIn order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove_School District v. Pulitzer Publishing
Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.
Record of the Hearing
The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.
[1] “Frank” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in the documents available to the public.
[2] Much of this section is drawn from the Ruling on Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion to Dismiss (Ruling) issued by the undersigned Hearing Officer in the above-referenced matter on January 7, 2026.
[3] In their Hearing Request, Parents alleged harm to Frank as Claim F.
[4] Parents did not object to DESE’s postponement request, nor did they request DESE’s consent or the permission of the Hearing Officer to amend their Hearing Request. Cf. Rule I(G) of the BSEA Hearing Rules (permitting moving party to amend hearing request under two circumstances: in response to a Hearing Officer’s determination that a hearing request is insufficient, and if the other party consents in writing or the Hearing Officer grants permission, not later than five calendar days before the start of the Hearing). The Department did not object to Parents’ Amendment, which was allowed.
[5] Claim D alleges “causation and educational harm” to Student as a “direct and foreseeable result of DESE’s failure to ensure compliance,” as outlined in Claims A through C.
[6] Under BSEA Hearing Rule I(G), when the moving party amends its Hearing Request,“the entire process starts over for the purpose of timelines.”
[7] Gadsby ex rel. Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940 (4th Cir. 1997).
[8] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[9] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
[10] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[11] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)’”).
[12] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
[13] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a). Sections 3(c) and 3(d) of 603 CMR 28.08 contain certain exceptions that do not apply here.
[14] In Re: Parent and Student v. Springfield Public Schools et al. (Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss), BSEA #2309351 (Mitchell, 2023) [hereinafter Springfield Ruling] (citing In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools, BSEA #2203555 and #2210887 (Berman, 2022) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted)).
[15] Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11), to maintain eligibility for federal funding under the IDEA Part B, a State must provide assurances that it has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that the State meets certain conditions. Specifically, the State educational agency is responsible for general supervision, which involves, in pertinent part, ensuring that the requirements of the relevant subchapter are met and that all educational programs for children with disabilities in the State, including those administered by local educational agencies, “(I) are under the general supervision of individuals in the State who are responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities; and (II) meet the educational standards of the State educational agency.”
[16] If I were to view Claim A in isolation, it would be dismissed. Taking as true Parents’ factual allegations that DESE had actual and constructive notice of Dudley-Charlton’s alleged violations of Frank’s right to a FAPE, and any inferences that may be drawn therefrom in their favor, this claim alone does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iannoccino, 451 Mass. at 636; Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[17] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iannoccino, 451 Mass. at 636; Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[18] See Larach-Cohen v. Porter, 2021 WL 1203686 (S.D.N.Y. 3/30/21) at *3 (holding that the IDEA does not authorize “claims against a state agency rooted in the State’s general supervisory role under the IDEA); see also B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. New York, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that State agency may not be sued as a defendant to an IDEA action brought pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(a)); Springfield Ruling at n.58(concluding that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities because § 1415 of the IDEA does not authorize a private right of action for violations of § 1412).
[19] See In Re: Frank v. Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling on Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion to Dismiss), BSEA #2605857 (Reichbach, 2026).
[20] See Gadsby, 109 F.3d at 945.
[21] Id. at 946. The SEA gave two reasons: (1) the State statute providing for reimbursement of private tuition did not apply due to the settlement; and (2) State procedures requiring prior approval for out-of-state residential placements had not been followed.
[22] Id. at 952-53.
[23] Id. at 943; see id. at 953.
[24] 20 U.S.C. § 1413(g)(1). “The State educational agency may provide special education and related services under paragraph (1) in such manner and at such locations (including regional or State centers) as the State educational agency considers appropriate. Such education and services shall be provided in accordance with this subchapter.” Id. at § 1413(g)(2).
[25] 20 U.S.C. § 1413(g)(1).
[26] See In Re: Frank (dismissing Parents’ claims against DESE based on its general supervision responsibilities, as outlined in 20 U.S.C. § 12(a)(11), because there is no mechanism for private enforcement of these duties). See also, e.g., Larach-Cohen at *3 (collecting cases supporting proposition that IDEA did not create a private right of action to remedy violations of § 1412); B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600-601 (collecting cases supporting proposition that state agencies may not be sued as defendants to an IDEA action based on their supervisory responsibilities); Springfield Ruling atn.58 (dismissing claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities, and collecting cases supporting proposition that no private right of action exists for violations of § 1412 of the IDEA).
[27] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
[28] B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
[29] See, e.g., Larach-Cohen at *3 (collecting cases supporting proposition that IDEA did not create a private right of action to remedy violations of § 1412); B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600-601 (collecting cases supporting proposition that state agencies may not be sued as defendants to an IDEA action based on their supervisory responsibilities); Springfield Ruling atn.58 (dismissing claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities, and collecting cases supporting proposition that no private right of action exists for violations of § 1412 of the IDEA).
[30] See Springfield Ruling. Parents argue that leaving to OSEP any enforcement action where a SEA fails to act once it has been notified of violations of the IDEA is “an outcome inconsistent with the IDEA’s remedial scheme and the BSEA’s role as a forum of first instance,” and that, as such, “jurisdiction follows the harm.” Notwithstanding Parents’ wishes otherwise, the remedial framework set forth within the IDEA does not include a private right of action against a SEA, and the BSEA is a body of limited jurisdiction. See 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a); Springfield Ruling; see also Larach-Cohen at *3 (no private right of action within the IDEA); B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600-601 (SEA may not be sued under the IDEA based on supervisory responsibilities).
[31] DESE Problem Resolution System Office, About Us, at https://www.does.mass.edu/prs/ (last accessed Jan. 13, 2026).
[32] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d. at 600-601, In Re Frank; Springfield Ruling.