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In Re: Giovanni BSEA# 26-04220

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

In Re: Giovanni[1]

BSEA# 26-04220

RULING ON SMITH VOCATIONAL AND AGRICULTURAL HIGH SCHOOL’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion or, when addressed separately, Partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment) filed by Smith Vocational and Agricultural High School (SVAHS or Smith) on November 26, 2025.[2] Parents and Giovanni[3] filed Student’s Motion in Opposition to Smith Vocational and Agricultural High School’s Partial Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Smith Vocational and Agricultural High School’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Opposition) on December 2, 2025.[4] As neither party requested a hearing on the Motion, and as neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, I am issuing this Ruling on SVAHS’s Motion without a hearing, pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules).

  1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 14, 2025, Giovanni filed a Hearing Request against SVAHS alleging that Smith has not responded adequately to academic and behavioral concerns that evolved over the previous year, resulting in his exclusion from cooperative employment opportunities; that SVAHS had improperly declined to convene a Team meeting to discuss disciplinary incidents; and that SVAHS refused to permit his Counsel to attend a disciplinary hearing where a short-term suspension was contemplated. Giovanni proposed the following resolutions: “(1) reconvene the Team to determine [Giovanni]’s explanation for the alleged offenses; (2) [d]evelop a realistic plan that will allow [Giovanni] to graduate and that [Giovanni] will agree to follow; and (3) [s]top using suspension,” as suspending Giovanni makes it more difficult for him to complete the amount of work he must complete (including “significant make-up credit”) in order to graduate.

The Hearing was scheduled for November 3, 2025.[5]

On October 23, 2025, Smith filed its Response to Giovanni’s Hearing Request, accompanied by eight exhibits.[6] According to SVAHS, all IEPs while Giovanni has been at Smith have been accepted in full, including his current IEP, dated 6/6/25-6/5/26 (2025-2026 IEP). Giovanni cannot now challenge fully accepted, implemented, expired IEPs. SVAHS argues that all relief requested by Giovanni is either moot or beyond the jurisdiction of the BSEA. First, a school district is not obliged to convene a Team whenever requested by parents; nevertheless, Smith did reply to Parent’s email on October 6, 2025, requesting the family’s availability for a meeting, and followed up on October 14, 2025, providing potential dates. Parents did not respond regarding their availability. To the extent Giovanni asserts that SVAHS failed to hold a Team meeting when Parents requested one, therefore, this claim is moot. Smith also contends that Giovanni’s request for relief in the form of an order to develop a realistic plan that will allow him to graduate and that he agrees to follow does not implicate issues within the BSEA’s jurisdiction, as graduation requirements are a general education issue. As of the filing of Smith’s Response October 17, 2025, Giovanni was not on track to graduate at the end of the current school year, as he had not attended school during Shop weeks, had received no credit in Shop classes, and had expressed that he did not intend to attend school during vocational weeks. Finally, SVAHS argues that to the extent Giovanni requests relief regarding two one-day in-school suspensions, such relief is beyond the jurisdiction of the BSEA, as Giovanni’s 2025-2026 IEP does not contain accommodations or modifications with respect to the Smith code of conduct and no evaluative information would warrant such accommodation or modification.

On November 4, 2025, the parties jointly requested that the Hearing be postponed to December 15, 2025 to permit the Team to convene on November 14, 2025 to address some of the issues underlying the Hearing Request. This request was allowed for good cause. On November 20, 2025, the parties requested a further postponement for 10 weeks to permit SVAHS to conduct a Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA), which could assist the parties in narrowing the issues. This request was allowed for good cause and the Hearing was further postponed to March 2 and 3, 2025.[7]

In the instant Motion, Smith contends that Giovanni’s second and third claims must be dismissed as a matter of law, as the BSEA lacks jurisdiction to hear them, and that SVAHS is entitled to summary judgment regarding his first claim. With respect to Giovanni’s first claim, alleging failure to convene a Team meeting during the 2025-2026 school year, Smith argues that as Giovanni’s 2025-2026 IEP has been accepted in full, there is no allegation that Smith is not implementing any aspect of the accepted IEP, and there is no new evaluative information for the Team to consider, SVAHS is not obligated to convene Giovanni’s Team solely based on the request of Giovanni, Parents, or Counsel. Nevertheless, Smith did convene the Team on November 14, 2025, which Giovanni, Parents, and Counsel all attended, rendering moot Claim 1.

SVAHS asserts that Claim 2, alleging failure to provide a clear overview of Giovanni’s credits and explanation of what is needed to graduate, implicates general education issues that are not within the BSEA’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the BSEA does not have the jurisdiction to provide the remedy Giovanni requests for this claim – an order to develop a “realistic plan” that will allow Giovanni to graduate and that Giovanni agrees to follow. According to Smith, Giovanni’s third claim, failure to allow for counsel to attend a short-term discipline hearing and failure to consider alternative remedies to suspension (and his corresponding request for an order directing Smith to stop using suspension), is also beyond the jurisdiction of the BSEA. SVAHS asserts that decisions regarding short-term and in-school suspensions are general education decisions and that there is no entitlement to counsel at a short-term discipline hearing. As such, the BSEA does not have the authority to hear Claim 3.

In his Opposition, Giovanni argues that Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss should be denied because he has asserted legally cognizable claims, including that SVAHS “discriminated against [him] on the basis of disability and failed to comply with mandatory procedural and substantive obligations under federal and state law.” Giovanni asserts, incorrectly, that “dismissal is proper only when ‘no set of facts’ could entitle the nonmoving party to relief.”[8] For the first time, in his Opposition, Giovanni contends that SVAHS failed to conduct timely and comprehensive evaluations despite “clear indicators of escalating academic and behavioral need.” Moreover, Giovanni argues that summary judgment should be denied, as the record “is replete with disputed factual question, including whether [Smith]’s inaction and discriminatory treatment denied [Giovanni a FAPE], caused educational regression, and contravened mandates articulated in both federal law and Massachusetts regulations.” Giovanni’s arguments will be discussed in additional detail in Section III, below.

For the reasons set forth below, Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED. Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

  1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the pleadings and exhibits submitted by the parties. Where a factual dispute exists, I construe it in favor of Giovanni, as the party opposing summary judgment.[9] To the extent Giovanni and/or Smith makes allegations in pleadings but there is no evidence before me to support those allegations, I specify the source of these factual allegations. I take those pled by Giovanni as true for purposes of Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom,[10] but I do not consider these unsupported allegations for purposes of SVAHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment.[11]

  1. Giovanni is an 18-year-old resident of Southampton, Massachusetts. He retains full decision-making authority. (S-1, SR-2)
  2. Giovanni has disabilities in the areas of Health Impairment, Sensory Impairment (profound hearing loss), and a Specific Learning Disability. (S-1)
  3. Giovanni’s current IEP, dated 6/6/2025 to 6/5/2026, was fully accepted on October 6, 2025. As of the filing of the Hearing Request, this IEP has not been rejected in whole or in part. (S-1; Response to HR)
  4. Parents have been concerned about Giovanni’s progress since middle school, requesting a 1:1 tutor at one point. Between seventh and tenth grades, Giovanni received Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) scores within the “Not Meeting Expectations” range in English Language Arts and the “Partially Meeting Expectation” range in Math. (Hearing Request (HR))
  5. On November 7, 2024, Smith held a disciplinary hearing before Assistant Principal Anthony Sabonis, Jr. regarding an incident that occurred on November 4, 2024. Giovanni and Parents attended. Based on information presented at the hearing, security camera footage, and witness statements, Mr. Sabonis determined that Giovanni had used a binder he was carrying to hit another student in the face, after the student had dropped a notebook, Giovanni had kicked the notebook, and the other student had responded verbally. This led to a physical altercation, for which Giovanni received a five0day suspension. (P-2)
  6. Due to allegations made by both students, Smith opened a formal Bullying Investigation on November 8, 2024. Following the investigation, Mr. Sabonis determined that although negative peer interactions had occurred, “there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaint of bullying; specifically, the existence of a power imbalance could not be proven.” (P-1, P-2) There is no evidence that further formal steps were taken by Giovanni, Parents, or Smith regarding this incident.
  7. Giovanni and Parents maintain that notwithstanding Smith’s conclusion otherwise, Giovanni was bullied based on his disability, particularly as the District’s Bullying Investigation included a statement that the other student “admits to mocking [Giovanni] and his hearing impairment” on the day of the fight between them, though he denied mocking Giovanni before that day. (P-1; HR; Opposition)
  8. Giovanni alleges that following this incident in November 2024, he “became angry and demoralized,” and began to skip school or leave early. (HR)
  9. Smith’s Student Handbook describes Cooperative Education Programming (Co-op) as an opportunity that is extended to students in eleventh and twelfth grades who meet eligibility requirements. Co-op allows students to work every other week at a job off campus, alternating with academic weeks. To be eligible for Co-op during senior year, students must have achieved a minimum grade of 80 in their eleventh-grade Shop class and of 75 in each eleventh-grade academic class. Students must also meet other attendance requirements and receive recommendations. (S-7; HR)
  10. Giovanni began having difficulty in Shop class in the fall of 2024, the beginning of his junior year. At some point during the 2024-2025 school year, he received a grade of 79 in his Shop class. In accordance with Smith policy, this grade prohibited him from participating in Co-op. (HR)
  11. On February 6, 2025, Giovanni requested a Team meeting, through Counsel, but Smith did not believe that one was warranted and did not agree to convene the Team at that time. (HR)
  12. On or about March 7, 2025, SVAHS and Giovanni drafted an agreement setting forth conditions Giovanni would have to meet to remain on Co-op for the rest of his junior year (2024-2025) and at the start of his senior year.[12] (S-2; Opposition)
  13. Giovanni was on Co-op for the remainder of the 2024-2025 school year, his junior year, in accordance with the agreement. (Motion)
  14. On April 12, 2025, Giovanni’s school counselor, Max Weider, notified Parents that Giovanni was at risk of failing multiple classes, as he was receiving failing grades for all second trimester courses. (S-3; Opposition)
  15. As of June 2025, toward the end of his junior year, Giovanni had not completed enough work during the third trimester to show proficiency with content. His teachers were reporting that his attendance and lack of engagement with academic curriculum was impeding his progress. Teachers were also reporting difficulty sustaining attention, and Giovanni was “frequently miss[ing] instruction and directions even with the cochlear implant and hearing aids.” At this time, Giovanni was meeting vocational competencies in Shop, but not in his related class. (S-1)
  16. On June 18, 2025, Mr. Weider sent a letter to Parents, informing them that because Giovanni had failed all but three junior year courses, he would need to complete credit recovery over the summer to stay on track to graduate. Mr. Weider provided information regarding Smith’s summer Credit Recovery Program, including a registration form. (S-4; Opposition)
  17. On August 8, 2025, Smith’s principal, Joseph Bianca, sent a letter to Giovanni and Parents informing them of Giovanni’s ineligibility for senior Co-op per Smith policy, as he had failed the majority of his junior year classes and had not completed the necessary credit recovery to pass them. Mr. Bianca stated that he would review Giovanni’s Co-op eligibility in October to see whether he had completed sufficient credit recovery, but that in the meantime he was expected to begin his senior year in the Horticulture Shop. He also informed Giovanni and Parents that Giovanni was not on track to graduate, as he needed to both pass all senior year classes and recover 19 additional credits. (SR-5; Opposition)
  18. On September 24, 2025, Giovanni was allegedly out of the classroom without permission, wandering around the school, for approximately 30 minutes. (S-8)
  19. On September 26, 2025, Smith convened a short-term suspension hearing for the September 24, 2025 infraction. Neither Giovanni nor Parents attended. SVAHS Assistant Principal Ethan Percy determined, after the disciplinary hearing, that Giovanni had left class for an extended time, attempted to enter the cafeteria to buy food during a time he was not permitted to do so,[13] went to his vehicle, and entered a Shop in another building without permission. Mr. Percy also noted that Giovanni had violated the Student Handbook by failing to serve detentions in the past despite several reminders. Giovanni received a one-day, in-school suspension, to be served on October 7, 2025 (S-8)
  20. On or about October 7, 2025, Giovanni’s guidance counselor met with him to review his options with respect to alternatives to graduation from Smith. (Response)
  21. On October 10, 2025, SVAHS notified Parents that a disciplinary hearing would be held on the next school day, and that Smith would consider a short-term suspension, as Giovanni had allegedly violated the Student Handbook by committing two infractions: Leaving School without Permission and Inappropriate Behavior. Specifically, on October 6, 2025, Giovanni had disrupted a class and had to be spoken to by the teacher and on October 9, 2025, he was alleged to have left campus without school permission, after being told by Mr. Bianca that he was not permitted to leave until the proper protocol had been completed. (S-9; HR)
  22. Counsel for Giovanni contacted Smith to request that a Team meeting be held rather than a disciplinary hearing. She also requested that she be present in the event that SVAHS held a disciplinary hearing. Mr. Bianca denied both requests. (HR)
  23. Neither Giovanni nor Parents attended the disciplinary hearing on October 14, 2025.[14] Giovanni was issued a one-day, in-school suspension for leaving school without permission, to be served on November 5, 2025. (S-9)
  24. Also on October 14, 2025, Mr. Bianca sent a letter to Giovanni and Parents explaining that Giovanni remained ineligible for Co-op due to his grades and excessive absences, and that he was not on track to graduate. Specifically, Mr. Bianca noted that Giovanni had failed to attend school during any Shop weeks and was, therefore, failing Shop and the related Shop classes (SR-3, SR-4, S-6)
  25. Giovanni and Parents believe that Giovanni should not have to attend Shop class during the current school year, as he completed the one and a half years of Shop class required under state law before he began Co-op during his junior year. Moreover, Giovanni and Parents both indicated to Smith that Giovanni is uncomfortable in Shop class because the other student who was involved in the physical altercation in November 2024 and was the subject of the subsequent bullying investigation, is in the same class. Finally, Giovanni has made it clear to Smith that he does not feel safe in Shop class due to his hearing impairment, as students are “just learning to use the heavy machinery and other potentially dangerous tools, and [Giovanni] is unable to clearly hear the goings-on to the extent that he has had some near-accidents.” Conversely, Giovanni’s “co-workers through his employment are much more experienced with machinery . . . and they all wear technologically advanced headgear that allows [Giovanni] to hear every word.” (Opposition)
  26. A Team meeting was held on November 14, 2025, to review Giovanni’s progress in classes and to discuss ongoing behavioral concerns and lack of attendance on Shop weeks. Smith proposed a Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA) “to look more closely at the recent increase behaviors [sic] that are impacting [Giovanni]’s progress, including refusal to attend school on [S]hop weeks.” At the meeting, Parents requested that Co-op be added to Giovanni’s IEP as an accommodation. SVAHS refused this request, noting that Co-op is a regular program for students within Chapter 74 vocational programs and not an accommodation or any type of specially designed instruction that would qualify as special education. Team members explained, further, that Co-op is not a requirement for a high school diploma from SVAHS and that only some Smith students are eligible for Co-op, as students must meet the requirements for the program in order to participate and maintain their participation. (S-10)
  27. Also at the meeting, Giovanni indicated that he would not attend school during vocational weeks or return to Shop class, as he did not want to give up his employment.[15] When he and Parents were asked whether any other IEP-related supports or services could help Giovanni re-engage in the Shop program, Giovanni stated that there were teacher concerns and that he could not return to Shop. Giovanni was not willing to consider any options or a plan for re-engaging in Shop. Team members emphasized that if Giovanni continued to work in outside employment during the school day during Shop weeks, rather than attend Shop, he would not be able to make progress toward a Smith diploma. They explained that if Giovanni were to re-engage in Shop during the second trimester and meet the other requirements set forth in the Student Handbook, he could potentially be reviewed for eligibility for Co-op during the third trimester. (S-10)
  28. Following the meeting, on November 17, 2025, Smith issued a N-1. SVAHS proposed an IEP Amendment adjusting Giovanni’s graduation date to 12/31/26, noting that he would have to return to Smith during at the least the fall trimester of the 2026-2027 school year to complete all requirements for a SVAHS diploma. Smith proposed a FBA and amended the 2025-2026 IEP to reflect a revised graduation date. No other changes to the IEP were proposed. (S-10)
  29. As of November 26, 2025, Giovanni had failed to attend school 50% of the time during the 2025-2026 school year, missing 31 out of 62 school days. (Motion)
  30. As of November 26, 2025, Parents had not returned the FBA consent form. (S-10; Motion)
  1. DISCUSSION

Before evaluating Smith’s requests for partial dismissal and summary judgment, I summarize Giovanni’s Opposition in additional detail.

Smith contends, first, that Giovanni’s current IEP, dated 6/6/25-6/5/26, was accepted in full on October 6, 2025, as were his previous IEPs, such that he cannot now challenge these IEPs as failing to provide him with a FAPE. Giovanni responds by stating that he and Parents “have since recognized that the IEP must be changed to consider new information;” that “it must be edited;” and that the IEP “may also need to be revised when the FBA and independent evaluation are completed.” Giovanni does not dispute, however, that the 2025-2026 IEP was fully accepted, and remained fully accepted at the time the Hearing Request was filed.

In response to Smith’s assertion that the BSEA does not have jurisdiction over his second claim, Giovanni acknowledges that the parties made an agreement on March 7, 2025 regarding the conditions to be met for him to go out on Co-op, but states that Smith’s “unilateral decision to discontinue [his] cooperative employment education is discriminatory,” and therefore is a matter for the BSEA. According to Giovanni’s Opposition, Smith’s “demand that [Giovanni] discontinue the cooperative education program where he has been quite successful is arbitrary, discriminatory, obviously intended as a punitive measure, and not in keeping with the spirit of Massachusetts General Law Chapter 74.” Giovanni asserts that “rigid application of a grade threshold” for participation in Co-op constitutes disability discrimination and denial of equal access in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He argues that Smith must provide “individual consideration, reasonable modification, or conven[e] the Team,” rather than demand that Giovanni meet the requirements all students must meet to participate in Co-op during their senior year. For the first time, in his Opposition, Giovanni contends that he “has not received his entitled supports and accommodations per his IEP,” as he began having difficulty in Shop class in the fall of 2024, but when he asked his teacher for extra help the teacher refused, saying that Giovanni had not been paying attention when the material was first covered.

In his Opposition, Giovanni also objects to Smith administrators’ warnings that without credit recovery through summer programming he would not be able to graduate on time. Citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) and 34 CFR  300.324(a), Giovanni argues that “[i]in terms of [SVAHS]’s mandate that [he] attend summer school, under the IDEA, any requirement that a disabled student attend summer services must arise from an IEP Team determination that Extended School Year (ESY) services are necessary to ensure [a] FAPE.” He also asserts that Section 504 “prohibits schools from imposing eligibility criteria or conditions that discriminate on the basis of disability . . . and requires reasonable modifications such as schedule adjustments or alternative credit-recovery options to ensure equal access.” Giovanni implies that to the extent the District informed him that he needed to complete credit recovery over the summer to stay on track for graduation, this was a “mandate” that he attend ESY services; a form of “punishment or attendance enforcement;” and improper discipline of him, as a student with a disability, “for conduct or attendance issues that relate to disability-based needs, without an appropriate evaluation.” Specifically, Giovanni argues that the fact that he and Parents received a letter on August 8, 2025 stating that he was ineligible for Co-op at the start of the school year because he had failed the majority of his classes junior year and had not completed the necessary credit recovery to pass those classes, “provides evidence that [the principal]’s decision was a de-facto punishment for [Giovanni]’s need to work his [sic] full-time during the summer months rather than attend summer school.” Giovanni asserts, further, that he “is employed by the only company in the area in his line of work willing to hire a person with a hearing impairment,” and, as such, it “is critical that [Smith] consider [Giovanni]’s employment schedule if the goal is for [him] to have successful employment beyond high school graduation.”

Giovanni acknowledges that Smith notified Parents several times that he was at risk of failing. He contends, however, that this notification “provides evidence that despite knowing that [he] was at risk of failing, there was no attempt to reconvene the [T]eam, consider additional assessments, or consider any other solution.” Moreover, Smith’s allegations that Giovanni was out of the classroom on September 24, 2025, and allegedly left the school without following protocol on October 9, 2025, should have triggered a Team meeting and the need for further evaluation, including but not limited to a FBA, rather than discipline. Giovanni maintains that Smith should have acted on its affirmative duty to reassess and reconvene the Team in response to his “sudden academic regression or escalating behavior.”  He asserts that Smith’s “neglect in this regard” has caused him to lose “a year of educational progress [such that he] must recover 19 lost academic credits.” For the first time in his Opposition, Giovanni contends that he was not given sufficient notice of the disciplinary hearing held on October 14, 2025, nor was he informed as to whether the Smith was contemplating in-school or out-of-school suspension.

Finally, in his Opposition, Giovanni asserts that his “academic decline and sudden uptick in behavioral issues” began after the physical altercation in November 2024, with a student who had called him names and mocked his disability. Giovanni argues that Smith “does not understanding its obligations with regard to bullying;” and that the district, having notice that Giovanni was mocked or harassed because of his disability, failed to take “immediate and appropriate action to investigate, end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and remedy its effects,” in violation of Section 504 and the ADA. According to Giovanni, the federal Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights “has repeatedly found that failure to address disability-based taunting can result in the denial of a FAPE when the harassment interferes with the student’s academic achievement, attendance, emotional functioning, or ability to participate fully in school activities. In such circumstances, as is the present case with [Giovanni], the school’s duty is not merely disciplinary; it is educational and restorative.” Giovanni characterizes his request for programmatic changes, namely that he be permitted to participate in Co-op, as a “partial remedy for the loss of educational access directly resulting from years of bullying, and [Smith]’s failure to acknowledge it or take appropriate action.”

Bearing these arguments in mind, I turn to Smith’s Motion. Evaluating this Motion requires an examination of the applicable substantive law and procedural standards, and application of these laws and standards to the facts outlined above. I begin with so much of the Motion as requests a partial dismissal of Giovanni’s Hearing Request, then address the remainder, in which Smith moves for summary judgment.

  1. Partial Motion to Dismiss
  1. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVI(B) of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This rule is analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, what is required to survive a motion to dismiss “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[16] Moreover, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[17] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[18] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . .”[19]

  1. BSEA Jurisdiction

The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides parents the right to pursue a formal due process complaint with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[20] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency before which any impartial due process hearing regarding these issues takes place. The BSEA is an agency of limited jurisdiction; it has jurisdiction over requests for hearing filed by:

a parent or school district  . . . on any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 . . . .[21]

As a forum of limited jurisdiction circumscribed by particular statues and regulations, the BSEA “can only grant relief that is authorized by these statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services.”[22] “[I]ndividual claims must be dismissed . . . if they do not arise under federal or state special education statutes, or applicable portions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”[23]

  1. School Discipline

The IDEA provides a number of protections for students with disabilities facing disciplinary action to ensure that they are not punished for conduct that is related to their disabilities and that they are able to continue to receive educational services.[24] These protections are triggered by a change in placement.[25] Federal regulations implementing the IDEA characterize the removal of a child with a disability from his current educational placement as a “change of placement” in two circumstances: where the removal is for more than 10 consecutive days; or where the child has been subject to a series of removals that constitute a pattern.[26] To constitute a pattern, these removals must total more than 10 school days in a school year and be based on behavior that is substantially similar to the child’s behavior in previous incidents that resulted in the series of removals.[27] Notwithstanding these protections that apply for removals of at least 10 days in a school year, “school personnel . . . may remove a child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct from their current placement to an appropriate interim alternative educational setting, another setting, or suspension, for not more than 10 school days (to the extent such alternatives are applied to children without disabilities).”[28] While Massachusetts follows federal law and regulations with respect to discipline of students with disabilities, the Commonwealth also provides, through Massachusetts General Laws chapter 71, § 37H ¾, that any “student who has been suspended or expelled from school for more than 10 school days for a single infraction or for more than 10 school days cumulatively for multiple infractions in any school year shall have the right to appeal the suspension or expulsion to the superintendent,” and the student has the right to counsel at that appeal hearing.[29] Although the rights outlined in the IDEA and in M.G.L. chapter 71 apply only where a student with a disability is being removed from his current education placement for more than 10 consecutive days or has been subject to a pattern of removals, “[n]othing in the law prevents a school district from providing additional protections for children with disabilities.”[30]

  1. Application of these standards requires partial dismissal of Giovanni’s Hearing Request

Toward the end of his Opposition, Giovanni contends that his “original request for hearing coupled with the details included in this motion more than adequately state claims for which relief may granted.” Giovanni again misconstrues the legal standard governing a motion to dismiss. To determine whether Claims 2 and 3 of Giovanni’s Hearing Request survive Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, I examine only the allegations contained in the Hearing Request, taking them as true and drawing any inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom in Giovanni’s favor.[31] If these allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, the motion to dismiss will denied.[32] In accordance with these standards, to the extent Giovanni articulates claims (and allegations corresponding to those claims) for the first time in his Opposition, I do not consider them for purposes of evaluating Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.

As to Claim 2, in its Motion Smith argues that graduation is a general education issue, and thus, beyond the BSEA’s jurisdiction. It is unclear, however, that Giovanni’s Hearing Request is challenging the application of SVAHS’s graduation requirements to him. The only reference he makes to graduation requirements is in his proposed resolution of the problem, wherein he requests that the BSEA order Smith to “[d]evelop a realistic plan that will allow [Giovanni] to graduate, and that [Giovanni] will agree to follow.” Moreover, unlike an order for changed or additional services or additional evaluations, such relief is not authorized by the statutes and regulations governing special education.[33] Giovanni has not alleged that the 2025-2026 IEP is not reasonably calculated to provide him with a FAPE; in fact, this IEP was accepted in full and remained fully accepted at the time he filed his Hearing Request.[34] The Hearing Request contains no factual allegations related to this request for relief; additionally, the relief requested is not within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.  

Claim 3 of Giovanni’s Hearing Request seeks relief related to the imposition of two, one-day in-school suspensions imposed in September and October of 2025. I take as true Giovanni’s allegations that his attorney requested that no disciplinary hearing be held in connection with the October 9, 2025 incident and that Giovanni’s Team convene instead; that Giovanni’s counsel requested that she be permitted to attend any disciplinary hearing that Smith decided to hold; that SVAHS Principal Bianca denied both requests, informing Giovanni’s counsel that he was not entitled to representation at a short-term suspension hearing; and that Giovanni and Parents declined to attend the disciplinary hearing themselves, as they were uncomfortable attending without counsel.[35]

As discussed above, removal of a student with a disability from his current educational placement triggers a panoply of rights under the IDEA when that removal constitutes a “change of placement.”[36] In Massachusetts, suspension or expulsion from school of students with or without disabilities for more than 10 days also triggers a number of rights, pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 71, § 37H ¾. Giovanni has not alleged that he qualifies for these protections; his only dispute is with Smith’s refusal to allow his attorney’s request for a Team meeting instead of a disciplinary hearing or her request that she be allowed to attend his short-term suspension hearing. Taking these allegations as true, however, I do not find that they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief[37] as, under both state and federal law, where Giovanni has received only two total days of in-school suspension this school year, Smith was within its right to impose on Giovanni both short-term, in-school suspensions for violations of the code of student conduct.[38] In these circumstances, Smith was not required to permit Giovanni’s counsel to attend the disciplinary hearing on October 14, 2025.[39]

  1. Summary Judgment

Smith characterizes Giovanni’s first claim as limited to the question whether SVAHS improperly failed to convene a Team meeting in response to his request, made through his attorney, in connection with an anticipated short-term suspension in October 2025. I view this claim a bit more broadly, encompassing Giovanni’s allegation that Smith has not responded adequately to evolving academic and behavioral concerns.[40] To determine whether to allow Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim – that Smith improperly failed to convene a Team meeting this school year – I must examine both the standard for summary judgment and substantive law regarding SVAHS’s obligation to convene a Team meeting.

  1. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[41] In determining whether to grant summary judgment, BSEA hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[42] “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if a fact that ‘carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit’ is disputed such that ‘a reasonable [fact-finder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.’”[43] Whether a fact is material depends on the applicable substantive law.[44] “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”[45]

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[46]  This means that the adverse party must show that a finder of fact (in BSEA cases, a hearing officer) must hear the case because the facts in dispute are genuine – in other words, they may “reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”[47] This requires “sufficient evidence” in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.[48] Moreover, if the evidence the non-moving party brings forth in its efforts to create a genuine dispute of material fact is comprised of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation,”[49] or if it is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”[50]

The moving party bears the burden of proof on this motion. To analyze whether the party moving for summary judgment has met its initial burden such that the burden shifts to the opposing party, I must view all of the evidence it has submitted in the light most favorable to the opposing party[51]and determine that  there is no genuine issue of material fact related to the moving party’s claims. Only if the moving party is successful in this first step does the burden shift to the opposing party to demonstrate, by use of specific facts, that there is actually a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment because a fact-finder might reasonably resolve the issue in its favor.

  1. Obligation to Convene a Team Meeting

The IDEA directs school districts to ensure that a student’s IEP Team: “(i) reviews the child’s IEP periodically, but not less frequently than annually, to determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved; and (ii) revises the IEP as appropriate to address – (I) any lack of progress toward the annual goals and in the general education curriculum, where appropriate . . . (IV) the child’s anticipated needs; or (V) other matters.”[52] A school district’s failure to reconvene a timely Team meeting would be considered a procedural violation. Pursuant to the IDEA, procedural errors may amount to a deprivation of the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) if “the procedural inadequacies – (I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”[53] Under this standard, not all procedural errors automatically entitle a parent or disabled child to relief; some procedural errors may not result in any substantive harm.[54]

  1. Application of this standard does not permit summary judgment in Smith’s favor on Claim 1

Giovanni claims that Smith failed to convene a Team meeting during the year leading up to the filing of his Hearing Request, when SVAHS should have done so pursuant to his attorney’s request or on its own initiative, in response to his academic and behavioral struggles. This failure, submits Giovanni, resulted in his exclusion from Smith’s cooperative employment program. In SVAHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Smith contends that there are no material facts in dispute with regard to this claim, as Smith did convene a Team meeting on November 14, 2025 and thus, as a matter of law, it must be dismissed as moot.

In addressing Smith’s argument, I first view all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Giovanni and determine whether Smith has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.[55] In other words, can SVAHS establish that it was not required to convene a Team meeting at any other additional time(s) during the relevant period?

The evidence demonstrates that Giovanni’s Team met for his annual review on June 6, 2025. (S-1) In convening the Team at that time, SVAHS met its obligation under the IDEA, as set forth in Section III(B)(ii), above, to convene a Team meeting at least annually.[56] The evidence also shows that the Team met again on November 14, 2025 to review Giovanni’s progress and discuss ongoing behavioral concerns and lack of attendance during Shop weeks. The evidence does not show that the IEP was revised at this time (or at any prior time), other than with respect to the adjustment of Giovanni’s graduation date, to address “any lack of progress toward the annual goals and in the general education curriculum.”[57] (S-10)

Giovanni has set forth sufficient evidence to show that he was not progressing effectively in the general education curriculum during the relevant time, and that Smith’s administrators were aware of this. (S-3, S-4, SR-5) Although the evidence does not support Giovanni’s contention that he experienced “sudden academic regression or escalating behavior” (he actually alleges, and argues, that he has experienced difficulty in both areas since November 2024), the issue whether Smith should have convened a Team meeting prior November 2025 reasonably could be resolved in his favor.[58] The evidence shows that Giovanni has been unable to participate in Co-op, as he has failed multiple classes; whether this amounts to a deprivation of educational benefit attributable to a procedural error – namely, Smith’s failure to convene an earlier Team meeting – is a genuine issue of material fact.[59]

Whether Smith should have convened a Team meeting at an earlier time due to Giovanni’s academic and behavioral concerns, and, if so, whether the failure to do so violated Giovnni’s right to a FAPE, are both open questions. The answers to these questions will determine whether Giovanni has a right to relief.[60] Smith has not established the absence of genuine issues of material fact, and, as such, is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. [61]  

CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of Smith’s Motion and accompanying documents, as well as Giovanni’s Opposition thereto, his Hearing Request, and accompanying documents, as appropriate, I find that Smith has not met its burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact relating to Giovanni’s claim that Smith violated his right to a FAPE by failing to convene a Team meeting prior to November 14, 2025. Smith has, however, met its burden to demonstrate that the remainder of the claims in Giovanni’s Hearing Request do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief that the BSEA can grant.

ORDER

Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED.

Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

The Hearing on Giovanni’s first claim, regarding Smith’s obligation to convene a Team meeting prior to November 14, 2025, is scheduled for March 2 and 3, 2026 at the Offices of the BSEA.

By the Hearing Officer:

/s/ Amy Reichbach

Amy M. Reichbach

Dated: January 22, 2026

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL

Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment

20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only. 

Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.

Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay.  This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided.  Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.

Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.” 

Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau.  School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).  Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).

Compliance

A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).

Rights of Appeal

Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).

An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).

Confidentiality

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.

Record of the Hearing

The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.

[1] “Giovanni” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in documents available to the public.

[2] Smith filed 10 exhibits in support of its Motion, which are labeled S-1 through S-10.

[3] The Hearing Request was filed by Counsel on behalf of both Parents and Giovanni. Because Counsel references Student as the petitioner, I do as well.

[4] Giovanni filed two exhibits in support of his Opposition, which are labeled P-1 and P-2.

[5] The initial hearing date was scheduled based on administrative error, which processed the Hearing Request as one filed by a school district.

[6] These exhibits are labeled SR-1 through SR-8.

[7] On December 8, 2025, Giovanni filed a Request for Clarification and Motion to Compel the District to Allow Student’s Attorney to Communicate with the Evaluator Prior to Assessment (Request),“seeking guidance from the Hearing Officer regarding a procedural barrier that is currently preventing [SVAHS] from initiating Student’s evaluation in a manner consistent with state and federal law, and a Motion to Compel [SVAHS] to allow such communication between the Student’s attorney and the evaluator.” On December 15, 2025, SVAHS filed Smith Vocational Agricultural High School’s Motion in Opposition (Motion in Opposition), asserting that “there is nothing in the state or federal regulation that would require Smith to agree to this request.” Smith explained that SVAHS and the evaluator who would complete the FBA that the parties had contemplated would be willing to meet with Giovanni and/or Parents, but not with Giovanni’s attorney. To date, neither Parents nor Giovanni had requested to meet with the evaluator. During a Conference Call on December 16, 2025, the parties discussed Giovanni’s attorney’s desire to speak with the evaluator and Smith’s belief, as outlined in its Motion in Opposition, that nothing in the law required Smith to allow Giovanni’s attorney to meet with SVAHS’s evaluator, in addition to Smith’s position that Giovanni’s attorney could not speak with SVAHS personnel absent Smith’s attorney. The undersigned Hearing Officer explained that there did not appear to be any authority for a BSEA Order requiring SVAHS to permit Giovanni’s attorney to meet with the evaluator. The parties agreed that Giovanni’s attorney could write a letter to the evaluator outlining her concerns, rendering this Request moot.

[8] This lenient pleading rule, derived from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) was overturned and rendered invalid by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). The standard was further refined by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), such that to avoid dismissal, a complainant must make factual allegations that constitute a claim that is plausible, not merely conceivable. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; see also Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)’”).

[9] See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).

[10] See Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).     

[11] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (in response to a motion for summary judgment, opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial); id. at 249 (noting that to create a genuine issue for trial, there must be “sufficient evidence” in favor of the party opposing summary judgment).

[12] Specifically, according to the agreement, Giovanni agreed to do the following in order to remain on Co-op: (1) Complete Greenius and all Co-op procedures; (2) attend school regularly and maintain passing grades; (3) work independently on Shop-week related work with support provided during the academic week, as necessary; and (4) recover outstanding Trimester 2 work throughout Trimester 3 during Academic Support classes. To support Giovanni in accomplishing his tasks, SVAHS agreed to the following: (1) Giovanni’s Academic Support teachers and counselor would create a schedule for him during his Shop weeks to progress through Greenius, and he would not need to attend Shop; (2) teacher and service providers will determine what is realistic and necessary for Gioivanni to recover lost learning and pass for the year; and (3) the Team will consider additional support, if necessary. The agreement specified that April vacation and summer recovery might be necessary for Giovanni to complete junior year, if he were to become overwhelmed with recovery work while trying to stay on track with Trimester 3 work. Furthermore, according to the agreement, Giovanni would have to complete all junior year courses with passing grades by the start of senior year to remain on Co-op for the start of senior year. (S-2)

[13] According to the Hearing Request, the cafeteria is only open at this time to students who are attending Shop that week, rather than academic classes. Giovanni attempted to access the cafeteria during his academic week.

[14] Giovanni and Parents did not attend this disciplinary hearing because they felt uncomfortable doing so without Counsel. (HR)

[15] I infer from the evidence that Giovanni is currently working at a job every other week and attending school every other week; and that this schedule, pursuant to which Giovanni fails to attend school during Shop weeks, has not been approved by Smith.

[16] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).  

[17] Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

[18] Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.                                                                               

[19] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12.

[20] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).

[21] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a). Sections 3(c) and 3(d) of 603 CMR 28.08 contain certain exceptions that do not apply here.

[22] In Re: Georgetown Public Schools, BSEA #1405352 (Berman, 2014).

[23] In Re: Parent and Student v. Springfield Public Schools et al. (Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss), BSEA #2309351 (Mitchell, 2023) (citing In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools, BSEA #2203555 and #2210887 (Berman, 2022) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted)).

[24] See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).

[25] See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A) (permitting school personnel to consider unique circumstances on a case-by-case basis when determining whether to order a change in placement for a child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct); id. at § 1415(k)(1)(D) (outlining services a child with a disability removed from his or her placement shall receive); id. at § 1415(k)(1)(E) (providing for a manifestation determination review within 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a child with a disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct).

[26] 34 C.F.R. § 300.536.

[27] Id. at § 300.536(a)(2).

[28] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B).

[29] M.G.L. c. 71, § 37H ¾ (e).

[30] In Re: Ryan (Ruling on North Middlesex Regional School District’s Partial Motion to Dismiss), BSEA #2001219 (Reichbach, 2019).

[31] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.

[32] See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

[33] See In Re: Georgetown.

[34] In his Opposition, Giovanni argues (regarding the letter he received in June 2025 stating that he needed to complete credit recovery over the summer to stay on track for graduation) that Smith failed to offer reasonable modifications such as schedule adjustments or alternative credit-recovery options to ensure equal access. It is unclear, however, to what he contends he was denied equal access. To the extent Giovanni means to assert, for the first time in his Opposition,that modifications are necessary for him to receive a FAPE, it is undisputed that he has fully accepted his current IEP, and there is no evidence to contradict Smith’s assertion that each expired IEP was similarly accepted in full. In his Opposition Giovanni also states that he and Parents “are confused by [Smith]’s insistence that [he] attend Shop class.” He asserts that Smith’s unwillingness to waive the requirements of its Co-op policy, as outlined in the Student Handbook and applicable to all students, to permit him to participate in Co-op instead of Shop, constitutes disability-based discrimination and denial of equal access in violation of Section 504. I need not consider these arguments for purposes of Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, as Giovanni did not raise these allegations in his Hearing Request nor could I reasonably infer from the contents of the Hearing Request that they are part of his claims.

[35] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.

[36] 34 C.F.R. § 300.536.

[37] See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

[38] See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B).

[39] Cf. M.G.L. c. 71, 37H ¾ (e).

[40] Although Giovanni alleges that Smith failed to propose evaluations in response to his ongoing academic and behavioral concerns, because this allegation appears for the first time in his Opposition and is not contained within his Hearing Request, I do not consider it here. See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407 (hearing officer deciding a motion to dismiss takes as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom” (emphasis added)).

[41] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).

[42] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247; Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581; see also In Re: Student v. Medway Public Schools, BSEA # 2410703 (Figueroa, 2024) (applying this standard); Student v. Littleton Public Schools,BSEA # 2313812 (Putney-Yaceshyn, 2023) (same).

[43] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted).

[44] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

[45] Id.

[46] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

[47] Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581 (internal citation omitted).

[48] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).

[49] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

[50] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

[51] See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157; Anderson, 477 U.S. at255; see also Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581 (summary judgment involves “scrutinizing the entire record in the light most flattering to the nonmovant and indulging all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor”).

[52] 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(4)(A).

[53] 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 CFR 300.513(a)(2); see Roland M. v Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

[54] See Michael D.M. ex rel. Michael M. v. Pemi-Baker Reg’l Sch. Dist., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17400, at *12 (D.N.H. 2004); see also Murphy v. Timberlane Reg’l Sch. Dist. 22 F.3d 1186, 1196 (1st Cir. 1994) (“It is plainly true, of course . . . that not every procedural irregularity gives rise to liability under the IDEA”).

[55] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247; Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581; Medway Public Schools.

[56] See 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(4)(A).

[57] See id.

[58] See French, 15 F.4th at 123. I note, however, that even if Giovanni demonstrates that Smith should have convened a Team meeting to review his IEP before November 2025, he will prevail on this claim only if, at Hearing, he proves that SVAHS’s failure to convene an earlier meeting impeded his right to a FAPE, significantly impeded Parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to him; or caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 CFR 300.513(a)(2); Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994; Murphy, 22 F.3d at 1196.

[59] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; French, 15 F.4th at 123.

[60] See In Re: Student & Belmont Public Schools (Ruling on Parents’ Motion for Summary Judgment), BSEA #2509536 (Reichbach, 2025).

[61] See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247; Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581; In Re: Student v. Medway Public Schools.

Updated on January 26, 2026

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