COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: KB & Ashland Public Schools & DCF & DMH
BSEA# 26-01972
RULING ON THE DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR A STAY
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the portion of the Ashland Public School District’s (District) August 21, 2025 Motion to Dismiss and/or in the Alternative Motion to Stay (Motion for a Stay), pertaining specifically to the request for a stay of the BSEA proceedings. The District’s request seeks the stay in order to allow for conclusion of a pending action it filed against Parent in the Massachusetts Superior Court. On August 28, 2025, Parent filed her Response to Ashland Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss (Response), in part, opposing a stay[1]. During a Conference Call on September 2, 2025, the District requested that a rulingon its request for a stay be issued separately from the request for dismissal, as it advised that it intends to seek a stay through the state or federal courts if its request is denied here[2].
No Party requested a hearing on the Motion for a Stay. As neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer’s understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing pursuant to Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules)Rule VII(D). For the reasons articulated below, the Motion for a Stay is DENIED with prejudice.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
The instant matter consists of a re-filing of a prior Hearing Request filed by Parent on February 10, 2025 against the District, DMH and DCF (BSEA No. 2508203), that was ultimately withdrawn without prejudice on May 30, 2025, for reasons unrelated to the pending Motion for a Stay (Prior Matter). Prior to being withdrawn, the District sought a stay as part of a Motion to Reconsider to allow it to seek judicial review of the BSEA’s denial of a Motion to Dismiss that had been filed in that matter. This request for a stay was denied via a May 27, 2025 Ruling on Ashland Public Schools’ Motion to Reconsider (Prior Matter May 2025 Ruling)[3].
On August 11, 2025, Parent filed a new Hearing Request against the District, raising many of the same substantive allegations as in the Prior Matter, and seeking the same relief, namely an order finding that Student requires a residential educational program to receive a free, appropriate, public education (FAPE).
On August 21, 2025, the District filed the Motion for a Stay, seeking dismissal based on the District’s contention that a Settlement Agreement[4] entered into by Parent and the District (Settlement Agreement) precludes Parent from seeking the relief she requests, or alternatively, a stay.
As part of its Motion for a Stay, the District advises that between the time Parent filed her withdrawal of the Prior Matter and the time she filed the instant Hearing Request, it filed a complaint against Parent in Superior Court for breach of contract and declaratory relief as to the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. The District attached as an exhibit an Amended Complaint filed on July 22, 2025 in Middlesex Superior Court captioned Ashland Public Schools v. Jane Doe, Civil Action No. [XXXXX] (Superior Court Matter). The substance of the Amended Complaint in the Superior Court Matter replicates the District’s claims for dismissal of the instant matter (which arguments will be addressed via a separate Ruling, as noted, supra).
According to the District, Parent has moved to dismiss the Superior Court Matter[5].
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
According to the District, pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), the instant matter should be stayed as there is “pending litigation on a parallel matter in a separate tribunal”. Specifically, the District contends that the Superior Court Matter, should be decided first as it was filed prior to the instant matter and involves essentially the same threshold issue as the current matter (i.e., the preclusive effect of the Settlement Agreement on Parent’s FAPE claim). Thus, if the BSEA is not going to dismiss the matter based on the pendency of the Superior Court Matter, it should stay it “for clarity and legal efficiency”.
Parent opposes both dismissal and a stay on these grounds contending that the issues she has raised in her Hearing Request are wholly within the jurisdiction of the BSEA to determine in the first instance. Parent asserts that the District fails to provide any legal citations that support a stay, and that the case law actually supports resolution of the BSEA proceeding prior to the Superior Court Matter. According to Parent, as the First Circuit has recognized, the BSEA will provide the Superior Court a “‘fully developed record by a factfinder versed in the educational needs of disabled children’ which is ‘an invaluable resource for a state or federal court required to adjudicate a subsequent civil action covering the same terrain’”[6].
ANALYSIS
As I previously advised in the Prior Matter May 2025 Ruling, “neither the IDEA, the BSEA’s Procedural Rules, nor the Formal Rules of the Massachusetts Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure (801 CMR 1.01), provide for due process hearings to be stayed to allow parties to seek judicial review of a pre-hearing motion”. Nor do they allow for a stay for any other reason, including, as is requested here, to provide an opportunity for pending litigation in another tribunal to be completed. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), relied on by the District, pertains wholly to motions to dismiss, and states, in relevant part that “[t]he Presiding Officer may at any time, on his or her own motion or that of a Party dismiss a case … because of the pendency of a prior, related action in any tribunal that should first be decided” (emphasis added). The word “stay” does not appear anywhere in that regulation, nor does it appear anywhere in 801 CMR 1.01, generally.
Moreover, the IDEA has explicit mandatory timeframes and procedural requirements related to when a decision in a due process hearing must be issued. 34 CFR 300.515(a) requires that “not later than 45 days after the expiration of the 30-day period under §300.510(b), or the adjusted time periods described in §300.510(c)—(1) A final decision is reached in the hearing; and (2) A copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties.” While a hearing officer may “grant specific extensions of time beyond the periods set out in paragraph() (a) … at the request of either party” (emphasis added)[7], this means that any such extensions must identify a new hearing date. In other words, a “stay” or an extension for an indeterminate amount of time, directly contradicts the procedural requirements of the IDEA.
For these reasons, the District’s request for a stay is DENIED with prejudice.
By the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Marguerite M. Mitchell
Marguerite M. Mitchell
Date: September 3, 2025
[1] The Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Department of Mental Health (DMH) did not file any reply to the Motion for a Stay; however, they were not joined as Parties until September 2, 2025. During the September 2, 2025, Conference Call, neither agency expressed any position on the Motion for a Stay, either.
[2] Given that the Hearing in this matter is currently scheduled for September 15, 2025 (although a short postponement of approximately a week is expected to be sought to provide additional hearing days for testimony of all witnesses, and to accommodate Party availability), I agreed to separate my analysis of the stay request from the dismissal request. This Ruling thus pertains only to the request for a stay.
[3] As the Prior Matter May 2025 Ruling was not published, to the extent I rely on its analysis, I repeat it here.
[4] Based upon Exhibit 2 to the Motion for a Stay the Parties entered into this Settlement Agreement was executed on or about May 9, 2024.
[5] This was confirmed by Parent’s counsel during the Conference Call on September 2, 2025.
[6] Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm.,276 F.3d 52, 61 (1st Cir. 2002).
[7] 34 CFR 300.515(c).