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In Re: Student v. Longmeadow Public Schools BSEA# 25-10207

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

In Re: Student v. Longmeadow Public Schools

BSEA# 25-10207

RULING ON PARENT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

AND DECLARATORY [RELIEF]

REGARDING DENIAL OF FAPE DECEMBER 20, 2024 – APRIL 16, 2025

On November 4, 2025,  Parent filed Parent’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgement And Declaratory [Relief] Regarding Denial of FAPE December 20, 2024 – April 16, 2025 (Motion for Summary Judgment)[1], asserting that “no Individualized Education Program (IEP) was in effect for the Student between December 20, 2024 and April 16, 2025, thereby constituting a per se denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under federal and state law,” and seeking

“only a declaratory finding on this discrete issue so that the Bureau [of Special Education Appeals (BSEA)] may take this established denial into account when fashioning comprehensive relief at hearing. Parent does notseek to duplicate evidence or request immediate remedy in this motion; rather, the requested declaration will narrow the factual disputes for hearing and promote judicial economy.”

The procedural history of this matter is delineated in prior rulings and orders and shall not be repeated here. For the purpose of this Ruling, I note that the hearing in this matter, currently scheduled to begin on January 28, 2026, will proceed on the following issues: 

  1. Academic Year 2022-2023[2]
    1. Whether Longmeadow failed to implement Student’s IEP for the period 3/18/22 to 3/17/2023, as amended on November 18, 2022[3], from March 21, 2023 until the end of the 2022-2023 school year (during Student’s ninth grade) (i.e., access to assistive technology and other accommodations);
    2. Whether Longmeadow violated Student’s and Parent’s procedural due process rights during the relevant time period in the 2022-2023 school year (i.e., March 21, 2023 through the end of the school year), including whether Longmeadow violated the child find requirement of the law in failing to identify a specific learning disability in written expression;
    3. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
  2. Academic Year 2023-2024
    1. Whether Longmeadow failed to implement the accepted stay put IEP (3/18/22 to 3/17/2023, as amended on November 18, 2022) and accepted portions, if any, of the IEP for the period 12/20/2023 to 12/19/2024 during the 2023-2024 school year ( Student’s tenth grade) i.e., access to assistive technology and other accommodations);
    2. Whether Longmeadow violated Student’s and Parent’s procedural due process rights during the 2023-2024 school year, including whether Longmeadow violated the child find requirement of the law in failing to identify a specific learning disability in written expression;
    3. Whether the District failed to convene an IEP meeting to consider the results of an IEE  within 10 school days;
    4. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
    5. Whether Parent is eligible for reimbursement for a July 2024 privately funded independent educational evaluation, and, if so, whether she is eligible for such reimbursement in full (i.e., at a rate above the state rate)?
  3. Academic Year 2024-2025
    1. Whether the District failed to propose an IEP in a timely manner for the 2024-2025 school year;
    2. Whether the  IEP for the period 12/20/2023 to 12/19/2024 failed to offer Student a FAPE for the 2024-2025 school year[4];
    3. Whether the District failed to provide Student with assistive technology for the 2024-2025 school year;
    4. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
  4. Academic Year 2025-2026
    1. Whether the District failed to provide Student with assistive technology for the 2025-2026 school year;
    2. Whether the April 16, 2025 IEP failed to provide the student with a FAPE  due to its failure to consider Student’s trauma, its failure to include an Autism and/or Specific Learning Disability in writing in the Disability Categories, and its proposal of a full inclusion program at Longmeadow High School;
    3. Whether the District failed to hold a timely meeting to review the rejected April 16, 2025 IEP and Parent’s concerns;
    4. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
  5. Academic Year 2022-2023[5]
    1. Whether Longmeadow failed to implement Student’s IEP for the period 3/18/22 to 3/17/2023, as amended on November 18, 2022[6], from March 21, 2023 until the end of the 2022-2023 school year (during Student’s ninth grade) (i.e., access to assistive technology and other accommodations);
    2. Whether Longmeadow violated Student’s and Parent’s procedural due process rights during the relevant time period in the 2022-2023 school year (i.e., March 21, 2023 through the end of the school year), including whether Longmeadow violated the child find requirement of the law in failing to identify a specific learning disability in written expression;
    3. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
  6. Academic Year 2023-2024
    1. Whether Longmeadow failed to implement the accepted stay put IEP (3/18/22 to 3/17/2023, as amended on November 18, 2022) and accepted portions, if any, of the IEP for the period 12/20/2023 to 12/19/2024 during the 2023-2024 school year ( Student’s tenth grade) i.e., access to assistive technology and other accommodations);
    2. Whether Longmeadow violated Student’s and Parent’s procedural due process rights during the 2023-2024 school year, including whether Longmeadow violated the child find requirement of the law in failing to identify a specific learning disability in written expression;
    3. Whether the District failed to convene an IEP meeting to consider the results of an IEE  within 10 school days;
    4. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
    5. Whether Parent is eligible for reimbursement for a July 2024 privately funded independent educational evaluation, and, if so, whether she is eligible for such reimbursement in full (i.e., at a rate above the state rate)?
  7. Academic Year 2024-2025
    1. Whether the District failed to propose an IEP in a timely manner for the 2024-2025 school year;
    2. Whether the  IEP for the period 12/20/2023 to 12/19/2024 failed to offer Student a FAPE for the 2024-2025 school year[7];
    3. Whether the District failed to provide Student with assistive technology for the 2024-2025 school year;
    4. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?
  8. Academic Year 2025-2026
    1. Whether the District failed to provide Student with assistive technology for the 2025-2026 school year;
    2. Whether the April 16, 2025 IEP failed to provide the student with a FAPE  due to its failure to consider Student’s trauma, its failure to include an Autism and/or Specific Learning Disability in writing in the Disability Categories, and its proposal of a full inclusion program at Longmeadow High School;
    3. Whether the District failed to hold a timely meeting to review the rejected April 16, 2025 IEP and Parent’s concerns;
    4. If the answer to any of the above is affirmative, then what is the proper remedy?

On November 5, 2025, Longmeadow Public Schools (Longmeadow or the District) filed Longmeadow Public School’s Opposition To Parent’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgement And Declaratory Relief (Opposition), asserting that Parent “misunderstands” the IEP process. According to Longmeadow, even if a new IEP is overdue, the previous accepted IEP remains in effect, and services cannot be stopped simply because a new IEP has not yet been issued. Therefore, the Parent’s claim that no IEP was in effect from December 20, 2024 to April 16, 2025 is incorrect. The District further asserts that a procedural delay only amounts to a denial of FAPE if educational harm is proven, and such a finding requires a hearing. Since the Student continued attending Flex School throughout the timeframe involved in the Motion for Summary Judgment, by Parent choice, any allegation of harm must be proven through evidence at hearing. Accordingly, the Parent is not entitled to declaratory relief, and the issue of whether FAPE was denied during this timeframe must be resolved through the hearing process.

Because neither party requested a hearing on the Motion, and as neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer’s understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing, pursuant to Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rule VII(D). 

For the reasons articulated below, Parent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is ALLOWED[8].

RELEVANT FACTS:[9]

  1. Longmeadow Public Schools (Longmeadow or the District) is Student’s district of residence and local education agency (LEA). (P-A)
  2. In December 2023, Longmeadow proposed an IEP for the period 12/20/2023 to 12/19/2024 (December 2023 IEP) with a full inclusion placement at Longmeadow High School. (P-A)
  3. The Team next reconvened on April 16, 2025. As a result of this meeting, the District proposed an IEP for the period 4/16/2025 to 4/15/2026  (April 2025 IEP) with a full inclusion placement at Longmeadow High School. (P-B)

LEGAL STANDARDS:

  1. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[10] In determining whether to grant summary judgment, BSEA hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[11] A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if a fact that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit” is disputed such that “a reasonable [fact-finder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”[12] “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”[13]


The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[14]

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[15] To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” in its favor that the fact finder could decide for it.[16] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.”[17] The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”[18]

  1. Failure To Offer An IEP To A Private School Student

When a child has an IEP, school districts are required to review that IEP annually.[19] Consistent with the IDEA’s requirements, a school district must ensure that the child’s placement is determined at least annually, is based on the child’s IEP, and is as close as possible to the child’s home.[20] The Supreme Court has found that “when a child requires special-education services, a school district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP.”[21] In the same way, the federal district court for Massachusetts has recognized that the “failure to schedule a Team meeting or propose an IEP [is] a sufficiently significant procedural violation, even in the absence of demonstrable educational harm, that it ha[s] the effect of denying [a student] a FAPE.[22]

DISCUSSION:

Here, Parent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether the District’s failure to propose an IEP for Student between December 20, 2024 and April 16, 2025 was a per se violation of federal and state law and a denial of a FAPE. To prevail on this claim, I must determine if Parent has met her burden based on the documents she submitted in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, to show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   

The material fact pertaining to Parent’s claim involves whether the District failed to propose an annual IEP for Student on or before the expiration of his prior IEP. [23] Documents submitted by Parent in support of her claim, which were unrefuted by the District, evidence that the December 2023 IEP expired on December 19, 2024, and Longmeadow failed to propose a new annual IEP for Student until April 16, 2025. The District does not dispute this but instead argues that Student was not without an IEP during the months between December 2024 and April 2025, as the old IEP remained in place until the proposal of the April 2025 IEP. However, this argument is unpersuasive as it fails to account for the District’s obligation to convene the Team annually and develop a new IEP for an eligible Student. Since the failure to provide an appropriate IEP constitutes a denial of FAPE, the complete failure to offer any IEP during this four-month period is, by definition, a per se violation of the IDEA and a denial of FAPE. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact relating to whether the District’s failure to propose an IEP for Student between December 20, 2024 and April 16, 2025 was a per se violation of federal and state law and a denial of a FAPE, and Parent is entitled to prevail on said claim as a matter of law.[24]  Where the District failed to offer an IEP, Parent has satisfied the first prong for reimbursement of a unilateral private school placement.  The issue next becomes whether Student’s unilateral placement was an otherwise proper placement.[25] Parent requested no findings relevant to remedies at this time, and this issue will be addressed after a hearing on the merits.[26]

ORDER:

Parent’s Motion is ALLOWED.[27]  All remaining issues, including all of Parent’s claims for remedies related to procedural and substantive violations of FAPE, will proceed to hearing.

So Ordered by the Hearing Officer,

/s/ Alina Kantor Nir

Alina Kantor Nir

Dated: November 6, 2025

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS

EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL

Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment

20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only. 

Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.

Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay.  This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided.  Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.

Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.” 

Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau.  School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).  Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).

Compliance

A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).

Rights of Appeal

Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).

An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).

Confidentiality

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.

Record of the Hearing

The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.

[1] Parent filed two exhibits in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. These are marked as P-A and P-B for the purpose of this Ruling.

[2] The claims for this school year are limited to those arising from March 21, 2023 until the end of the 2022-2023 school year.

[3] This date was erroneously written as November 18, 2023 in my prior Ruling on Parent’s Motion To Compel Discovery, Motion For Sanctions, and Motion For Continuance issued on October 27, 2025.

[4] This IEP was accepted on January 22, 2024 but later rejected on June 28, 2024.

[5] The claims for this school year are limited to those arising from March 21, 2023 until the end of the 2022-2023 school year.

[6] This date was erroneously written as November 18, 2023 in my prior Ruling on Parent’s Motion To Compel Discovery, Motion For Sanctions, and Motion For Continuance issued on October 27, 2025.

[7] This IEP was accepted on January 22, 2024 but later rejected on June 28, 2024.

[8]  Nevertheless, Parent’s request for declaratory relief is DENIED as the BSEA has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. See In Re: Student & Boston Public Schools (Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment), BSEA # 19-00241 (Berman, 2019) (finding “[t]he equitable, declaratory and administrative relief properly sought by the Parents at the BSEA is inextricably intertwined with their additional requests for relief not available under the IDEA but authorized by other statutes”).

[9] The information in this section is drawn from the parties’ pleadings and is subject to revision in further proceedings.

[10] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).

[11] Id.

[12] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st  Cir. 1994).

[13] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

[14] See id. at 252; see also In Re: Westwood Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol County Agricultural Sch., BSEA # 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006).

[15] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

[16] Id. at 249.

[17] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).

[18] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

[19] See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).

[20] See 34 CFR 300.116(b).

[21] Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238–39, 245 (2009) (“It would be particularly strange for the Act to provide a remedy, as all agree it does, when a school district offers a child inadequate special-education services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situation in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such services altogether”).

[22] C.D. by & through M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., No. CV 19-12427, 2020 WL 7632260, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2020); see Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 451 (2d Cir. 2015) (“But without the benefit of an IEP from the district of residence, a parent could not intelligently evaluate whether the child was offered a FAPE or elect [ ] to place the child elsewhere. Thus, an educational agency must issue an IEP for a resident qualifying child, even if that child has been enrolled in a private school outside the boundaries of the school district”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

[23] C.D., WL 7632260, at *5.

[24] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).

[25] See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (Parents “are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under the Act”); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 247 (“When a court or hearing officer concludes that a school district failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the parents and the school district’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s private education is warranted”).

[26] See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (finding that the IDEA authorizes courts to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private education for a child if the court ultimately decides that such placement, rather than the proposed IEP, is proper under the IDEA).  

[27] As stated supra, Parent’s request for declaratory relief is DENIED as the BSEA has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. See In Re: Student & Boston Public Schools (Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment).

Updated on November 11, 2025

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