COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Revere Public Schools
BSEA# 26-04600
RULING ON PARENT’S MOTION FOR INTERIM RELIEF
AND ON REVERE PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
On December 8, 2025, Parent filed the instant Motion for Interim Relief (Motion for Interim Relief) with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA), requesting that the Hearing Officer “issue a short-term interim order maintaining [Student’s] current school location at A.C. Whelan Elementary School until the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing [on Parents’ hearing request] scheduled for January 26, 2026, in BSEA No. 2604600.” Parent asserts that “[t]his request does not seek reconsideration of the December 8, 2025 [Decision] in BSEA No. 2604601. Rather, it seeks narrowly tailored equitable relief to prevent documented harm during the brief period before the merits hearing.” Specifically, Parent contends that “unrebutted” medical and behavioral evidence shows that transitions pose significant regression risks for Student, making a mid-December move destabilizing. Parent does not dispute that Beachmont can implement Student’s IEP; rather, she argues that an immediate transfer before the evidentiary hearing would be harmful and unnecessary and that relocating Student now could result in two rapid transitions if Parents prevail on their case on the merits. According to Parent, the interim relief they seek is consistent with the December 8, 2025, Decision in BSEA # 2604601 issued by the undersigned Hearing Officer (hereinafter, the December 8, 2025 Decision), which did not require immediate relocation.
On the same date, Revere Public Schools (Revere or the District) filed Revere Public Schools’ Motion To Dismiss And Opposition To Parent’s Motion For Interim Relief (Motion to Dismiss and Opposition for Interim Relief), moving for dismissal of the above-captioned matter on the grounds that Parent’s claims “are now considered moot as a result of” the December 8, 2025 Decision. According to the District, pursuant to BSEA Hearing Rule XII(B), the December 8, 2025 Decision is final and not subject to further review. Further, because no actionable claim remains for the January 26, 2026, hearing, the Hearing Request should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Revere asserts that for the same reason, Parent’s Motion for Interim Relief must be denied, because granting such relief would both address issues already deemed moot and require the Hearing Officer to issue an order inconsistent with BSEA Hearing Rule XVII(C).
Parent responded by filing the Parent’s Opposition To District’s Motion To Dismiss And Reply In Support Of Motion For Interim Relief (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), asserting that the District was “attempt[ing] to transform a narrow pendency ruling into a global determination on the merits. The December 8, 2025 stay-put decision in BSEA No. 2604601 did not resolve the FAPE, transition, or procedural issues raised in this case, and the controversy remains live.” According to Parent, the December 8, 2025 Decision did not make any findings regarding the following issues:
- Whether “the relocation, as implemented,” provides the Student with a FAPE;
- Whether “documented regression renders a mid-year move inappropriate for this particular autistic student;”
- Whether Beachmont’s “actual implementation aligns with [Student’s] IEP-identified needs (consistency, predictability, stable routines)”; and
- Whether a zoning-based transfer, without individualized analysis, satisfies IDEA’s substantive and procedural requirements.”
In addition, Parent argues that “the [December 8, 2025] Decision contains no factual finding that Beachmont’s transition plan is adequate as implemented.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS:
The facts in this case were recently set out in the December 8, 2025 Decision wherein I found, in relative part, that:
“Parent’s[1] position, however, improperly conflate[s] site selection and educational placement. Here, the District has not proposed a change in placement; rather, it has proposed a change in location due to residential zoning. Beachmont can implement the accepted IEP and is not a significant change in the student’s program. As discussed supra, Student’s placement is in the IGNITE program, not the IGNITE program at Whelan, as Whelan is only the location for the IGNITE program, and another IGNITE program location capable of implementing Student’s IEP (Beachmont), located within Student’s current residential school zone, is available. As such, Parent is not entitled to Prior Written Notice, as defined by IDEA, nor to a role in the assignment process in relocating Student from Whelan to Beachmont. Specifically, the District has discretion over the location of classroom or building assignments where there is more than one classroom or building that fits the description for the appropriate educational program for Student. Such a change in location, rather than a change in placement, does not trigger the Prior Written Notice requirement of the IDEA, nor does it require Parental consent.[2] Here, no such procedural safeguards were triggered because the transfer from Whelan to Beachmont is a simple change in buildings with no significant changes in Student’s educational program…. Furthermore, potential transition concerns do not solely determine whether a move constitutes a change in placement, as transition difficulties alone do not constitute a fundamental change in, or elimination of, a basic element of the education program so as to qualify as a change in placement.”[3]
Although the issues in the matter filed by Parent (BSEA# 26-04600) have yet to be clarified in light of the December 8, 2025, Decision, the Hearing Request alleges stay-put and other procedural violations, including lack of Prior Written Notice for a change of placement, predetermination of placement, and denial of meaningful parental participation in the placement process.
As neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer’s understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing pursuant to Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules)Rule VII(D).
For the reasons articulated below, Parents’ Motion for Interim Relief is DENIED. Revere’s Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED.
LEGAL STANDARDS:
- Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVII A and B and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3)[4], a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[5] The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[6] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”[7]
- Jurisdiction of the BSEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[8] In Massachusetts, a parent or a school district, “may request mediation and/or a hearing at any time on any matter[9] concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities.”[10] Nevertheless, it is well established that matters that come before the BSEA must involve a live or current dispute between the Parties.[11] In addition, the BSEA “can only grant relief that is authorized by these statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services.”[12]
- Effect of BSEA Decision
Pursuant to BSEA Hearing Rule XII(B), the Hearing Officer’s decision is the final decision of the BSEA and is not subject to further agency review. Motions to reconsider or to re-open a hearing once a decision has been issued are not permitted. Furthermore, except as provided in Rule XIII, which does not apply in the instant matter (given my conclusion, infra, with regard to Parent’s Motion for Interim Relief), the Hearing Officer’s decision shall be implemented immediately.[13]
- Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The purpose of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to “prevent plaintiffs from splitting their claims by providing a strong incentive for them to plead all factually related allegations and attendant legal theories for recovery the first time they bring suit.”[14] These doctrines “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”[15]
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.[16] The three elements of res judicata are (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) “sufficient identicality” between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and (3) “sufficient identicality” between the parties in the two suits.[17] The First Circuit has held that “although a set of facts may give rise to multiple counts based on different legal theories, if the facts form a common nucleus that is identifiable as a transaction or series of related transactions, then those facts represent one cause of action.”[18] Moreover, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, once an issue of fact or law necessary to a judgment has been decided, that decision may preclude relitigating the issue in an appeal on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.[19] These doctrines both apply to a BSEA Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the merits of a special education dispute.[20]
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS:
In applying the above standards, I bear in mind that complaints filed by pro se parties, as in the instant matter, are to be construed liberally.[21] As explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the Court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.”[22] This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system [, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law.[23]
Nevertheless, in considering Parents’ Motion for Interim Relief and the District’s Motion to Dismiss, I am bound by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.[24] Therefore, the central question is whether any earlier claims which have been adjudicated and present claims are sufficiently identical to present claims such that they may not be relitigated (that is, whether any claims in the Motion for Interim Relief and/or the underlying case, BSEA# 26-04600,are sufficiently similar to claims asserted and adjudicated in BSEA# 26-04601 and therefore barred by res judicata).
Stay-put requires that Student remain in her current educational placement pending the resolution of an educational dispute.[25] The December 8, 2025 Decision found that Student’s placement is in the IGNITE program, not the IGNITE program at Whelan, as Whelan is merely a location for the IGNITE program, and another IGNITE program location capable of implementing Student’s IEP (Beachmont), located within Student’s current residential school zone, is available. Therefore, Student shall attend the IGNITE program at Beachmont pending the resolution of any dispute.
I further note that Parent did not raise the issue of whether the District “transition plan” was adequate in her Hearing Request but note that Finding of Fact No. 18 in the December 8, 2025 Decision reflects that the Team discussed transition supports for Student’s move to Beachmont. Parent, however, indicated that she did not wish to engage in transition planning.
Parent’s Hearing Request also did not allege that Beachmont cannot implement Student’s accepted IEP, and the December 8, 2025 Decision specifically found otherwise (see Finding of Fact No. 8). Parent has further clarified they she is not making such an allegation in her Motion for Interim Relief, recognizing, correctly, that such an allegation would be tantamount to a request for reconsideration of a BSEA decision otherwise prohibited by Hearing Rule XII(B).
Moreover, the December 8, 2025 Decision addressed the procedural violations alleged in Parent’s Hearing Request, specifically those relative to stay-put violations, failure to provide Prior Written Notice, predetermination, and failure to allow Parent to participate in the decision-making process relative to school assignment. Specifically, the December 8, 2025 Decision determined that
“Parent is not entitled to Prior Written Notice, as defined by IDEA, nor to a role in the assignment process in relocating Student from Whelan to Beachmont. Specifically, the District has discretion over the location of classroom or building assignments where there is more than one classroom or building that fits the description for the appropriate educational program for Student. Such a change in location, rather than a change in placement, does not trigger the Prior Written Notice requirement of the IDEA, nor does it require Parental consent. Here, no such procedural safeguards were triggered because the transfer from Whelan to Beachmont is a simple change in buildings with no significant changes in Student’s educational program.” [26]
The December 8, 2025 Decision also addressed the issue Parents now define as “whether a zoning-based transfer, without individualized analysis, satisfies IDEA’s substantive and procedural requirements,” finding that, provided that Beachmont can implement the accepted IEP, it is not a significant change in her program.[27] It further addressed the issue of potential regression due to transition, finding that “while Parent’s concerns are wholly understandable, they are challenges that must be anticipated and addressed by the receiving school, particularly as the District has proposed an appropriate transition plan to support Student in the new setting.”[28]
Even accepting the allegations in Parent’s Hearing Request as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, [29] and construing her claims liberally due to her pro se status, I cannot conclude that Parent’s assertion that Beachmont cannot provide Student with a FAPE remains a viable claim or one that was not already addressed in the December 8, 2025 Decision. The Decision found that Beachmont was a location change, not a program change, and that it was capable of implementing Student’s IEP. Therefore, the IGNITE classroom at Beachmont can provide Students with a FAPE. If Beachmont ultimately does not implement Student’s IEP, that would constitute a different claim that Parent is not precluded from then pursuing.
As such, Parents’ Motion for Interim Relief must be DENIED, and the District’s Motion to Dismiss must be ALLOWED.
ORDER:
Parent’s Motion for Interim Relief is hereby DENIED. Revere’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED. The hearing scheduled for January 26, 2025, is hereby cancelled.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: December 9, 2025
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL
Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment
20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only.
Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.
Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay. This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided. Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.
Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.”
Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau. School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
Compliance
A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).
Rights of Appeal
Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).
An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).
Confidentiality
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.
Record of the Hearing
The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.
[1] Parent filed the Motion for Interim Relief together with her partner. As such, I refer to them here as “Parents.” The initial complaint was filed by Parent.
[2] See 603 CMR 28.07(1)(a).
[3] Internal quotations and citation omitted.
[4] Hearing Officers are bound by the BSEA Hearing Rules and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure, 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[5] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[6] Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[7] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[8] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[9] Limited exceptions exist that are not here applicable.
[10] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[11] See In Re: Student v. Bay Path Reg’l Vocational Tech. High Sch., BSEA # 18-05746 (Figueroa, 2018).
[12] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA #1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[13] See BSEA Hearing Rule XII(C).
[14] See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.2d 727, 736 (3rd Cir. 2009).
[15] Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
[16] Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005); In Re Sonus Networks, Inc., Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 499 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1 st Cir. 2007);
[17] Gonzalez-Pina v. Rodriguez, 407 F.3d 425, 429 (1 st Cir. 2005); Breneman v. U.S. ex rel. F.A.A., 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1 st Cir. 2004 ).
[18] Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Amertex Enters., Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1995).
[19] See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94.
[20] See Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 844 (“final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding … precludes relitigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction”).
[21] See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] See Gonzalez-Pina v. Rodriguez, 407 F.3d 425, 429 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Breneman v. U.S. ex rel. F.A.A., 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2004).
[25] See 34 CFR 300.518(a).
[26] Internal citations omitted.
[27] Internal quotations and citations omitted.
[28] Internal citations omitted. I further noted in the December 8, 2025 Decision that Parent has the option of maintaining Student at Whelan through the Non-Neighborhood Application Process.
[29] Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.