COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools BSEA # 2605261
RULING ON SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS' MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS TO THE SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND SUPERINTENDENT AND ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT OF SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND CHIEF OF SUPPORT AND STUDENT SERVICES FOR THE SPRINGFIELD EMPOWERMENT ZONE AND ALL SUBPOENA[S] DUCES TECUM
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Springfield Public Schools' (Springfield or the District) Motion To Quash Subpoenas To The Springfield School Committee Members And Superintendent And Assistant Superintendent Of Springfield Public Schools And Chief Of Support And Student Services For The Springfield Empowerment Zone And All Subpoena[s] Duces Tecum (the Motion) filed on February 19, 2026, in which the District asserts that there is no legal basis for said subpoenas and that the subpoenas duces tecum are overly broad, ambiguous, unlimited in time and scope, unduly burdensome, and unlikely to lead to any admissible evidence. Specifically, on February 19, 2026, the Guardian Ad Litem's (GAL) requested that the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) issue subpoenas to appear at the hearing, currently scheduled for April 1, 2026, and subpoenas duces tecum to all members of the Springfield School Committee; Superintendent of Springfield Public Schools; Jose Escribano, Assistant Superintendent; Jeffrey Welch, Senior School Assignment Coordinator; Dr. Marisa McCarthy, Chief of Exceptional Learning and Related Services; Mary Ellen Pope, Special Education Supervisor; Kisha Morgan, Chief of Student Support and Services (Empowerment Zone); Linda Singer, Principal; and Kelli Phillips, ETL. The following documents were requested:[1]
"1. All emails, memoranda, and communications referencing:[2]
• [Student]
• SOC review
• School assignment
• Transportation decisions
• Safety concerns
2. Any School Committee communications discussing:
• SOC process application
• Assignment of students in DCF custody
• Alternative placements
3. Any internal memoranda or policy interpretations relating to:
• Intrastate transfer procedures
• Comparable placement analysis
• Consultation obligations."
In response to the Motion, GAL argued that the District affirmatively introduced and relied upon School Committee–approved Student Assignment and Foster Care policies in motions, affidavits, and arguments to support the District's position that school assignment decisions fall within general education authority and outside the Bureau's jurisdiction. By relying on these policies, the District made them substantive components of the evidentiary record. As a result, testimony concerning the policies and their implementation is directly relevant. The District cannot rely on School Committee authority to support its defense while simultaneously claiming that testimony from the governing body responsible for those policies is irrelevant. According to GAL, the issue is not the abstract language of the policies but how they were applied. In this case, the SOC process proceeded without participation from the court-appointed GAL or DCF, raising questions about how the policies were implemented. GAL further asserted that the District's argument that School Committee members lack relevant knowledge regarding the matter is disingenuous; several members were directly contacted and provided written notice regarding concerns about the SOC process and placement decisions. Moreover, the District had relied on an affidavit from Dr. Marisa McCarthy who did not attend any meetings relevant to Student; the District cannot elevate administrative testimony from individuals without firsthand involvement while dismissing testimony from the policymakers whose policies it has placed into evidence.
On March 11, 2026, the Springfield School Committee joined the Springfield Public Schools' Motion.
A hearing on the Motion took place on March 12, 2026, and was recorded by a court stenographer.
For the reasons set forth below, the District's Motion is hereby ALLOWED, in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The factual background and procedural history of this matter have been described in detail in my previous Rulings. I need not repeat them here, except to note that the issues in this hearing include whether Springfield failed to consult with GAL when providing a comparable setting for Student, and whether Springfield High School is comparable to Student's last accepted placement.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The BSEA's Authority to Issue and Quash Subpoenas
Both the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules) and the Formal Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, which also govern due process hearings at the BSEA, allow Hearing Officers to issue, vacate or modify subpoenas. Pursuant to BSEA Hearing Rule VII B:[3]
"Upon the written request of a party, the BSEA shall issue a subpoena to require a person to appear and testify and, if requested, to produce documents at the hearing. A party may also request that the subpoena duces tecum direct the documents subpoenaed from a non-party be delivered to the office of the party requesting the documents prior to the hearing date."
According to BSEA Hearing Rule VII C:
"A person receiving a subpoena may request that a Hearing Officer vacate or modify the subpoena. A Hearing Officer may do so upon a finding that the testimony or documents sought are not relevant to any matter in question or that the time or place specified for compliance or the breadth of the material sought imposes an undue burden on the person subpoenaed."[4]
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
Whether the subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum at issue should be quashed depends on whether the information sought is relevant to the issues for hearing. After reviewing Springfield's Motion in the context of the issues for hearing and the above-quoted legal standards, I find that the Motion must be ALLOWED, in part.
GAL asserts that the individuals named in her subpoena request, including those whose subpoenas the District seeks to quash, "possess direct knowledge regarding: [t]he Student of Concern (SOC) process; [a]ssignment decisions; [s]pecial education administrative involvement; [c]onsultation procedures; [t]ransportation and safety determinations; [and] [d]istrict policy implementation." According to GAL, the "requested testimony and documentation are necessary to: [c]larify decision-making authority; [e]stablish whether consultation occurred; [d]etermine whether placement decisions were administrative or policy-driven; [e]xamine safety implementation realities; [and] [d]evelop a complete evidentiary record[.] Without these subpoenas, the GAL will be prejudiced in presenting material facts central to the hearing."
I note at the outset that as set forth supra, the issues in this hearing are limited to whether Springfield failed to consult with GAL when providing a comparable setting for Student, and whether Springfield High School is comparable to Student's last accepted placement. I have already found in my December 9, 2025 Ruling on Multiple Motions that "the method by which the District determined comparable placement is largely immaterial because neither federal nor state regulations prescribe a specific process for determining a comparable placement for [intrastate] transfers, so long as the placement meets the comparability requirement. Although federal law requires consultation with parents, it imposes no particular manner for doing so, and state law is silent on the process entirely." As such, any testimony or documentation which GAL seeks regarding "[a]ssignment decisions; [s]pecial education administrative involvement; … [t]ransportation and safety determinations;… [d]istrict policy implementation… [; clarification of] decision-making authority; … [d]etermin[ation of] whether placement decisions were administrative or policy-driven; [e]xamin[ation of] safety implementation realities" are irrelevant to the issues before me.
Next, Springfield disputes that Ms. Morgan, Chief of the Student Support and Services for the Empowerment Zone, participated in any decision-making regarding Student. Student "has never been enrolled, nor received any services from a school within the Empowerment Zone Partnership (SEZP). Springfield High School, [Student's] assigned school, is not part of the SEZP. Ms. Morgan never evaluated [Student], provided any special education services for [Student], or attended any team meetings for [Student]. Ms. Morgan is not the administrator responsible for the provision of special education at Springfield Public Schools or and specifically, Springfield High School." GAL has not asserted any facts to the contrary, but, at the Motion Hearing, she argued that Ms. Morgan participated in the SOC meeting. Because the only issues before me relate to whether Student's placement meets the comparability requirement and whether consultation took place, Ms. Morgan's involvement in the SOC meeting is irrelevant. The District's Motion relative to Ms. Morgan is ALLOWED.
Similarly unpersuasive is GAL's argument that the testimony of the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent is necessary as they are responsible for supervising District staff members, including those involved in the decisions made regarding Student's placement. The supervisory role of the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent alone does not render their testimony relevant where they have no personal knowledge of Student or of his IEP and the program which he attended at South Hadley, especially where neither was responsible for consulting with GAL regarding placement comparability. The District's Motion relative to the Superintendent and the Assistant Superintendent is ALLOWED.
GAL also asserted that if the District intends to rely on the School Committee Policy regarding the SOC process, she must be allowed to question School Committee members about their interpretation thereof. She stressed that even if School Committee members have no personal knowledge of Student, neither did Dr. McCarthy, and yet the District relied on her affidavit in prior filings.[5]
GAL also argues that it is well established that where a governmental entity relies upon policy to justify its actions, testimony concerning that policy and its implementation is appropriate. In support of her argument, GAL cites to Murphy v. Timberlane Regional School District, 22 F.3d 1186 (1st Cir. 1994). However, upon further review of Murphy, I cannot find that it stands for the proposition GAL alleges (that school officials or governing bodies may be called as witnesses merely because their policies or decisions are implicated in an IDEA proceeding). Rather, Murphy addressed the availability of relief under the IDEA. As such, Murphy does not support the broader procedural principle advanced by the GAL. Moreover, I can find no caselaw to support GAL's position.
GAL further asserts that when the District invoked School Committee authority in its defense, inquiry into the interpretation and implementation of those policies is directly relevant. However, I disagree that the District invoked School Committee authority as part of its defense. Rather, based on the procedural history, the District relied on School Committee policy to explain the sequence of events, not to argue that it has met the comparability standard or satisfied the consultation requirement under the IDEA. In addition, where GAL contends that the issue in the instant matter is not abstract policy language but rather its application, I note that School Committee members are not responsible for the implementation of their policies; as such, their intent in crafting policies is irrelevant to their execution. In short, I have no reason to believe that any member of the School Committee of Springfield has any personal knowledge regarding Student's programming in South Hadley, his proposed programming at Springfield, or the consultation, if any, which took place in determining a comparable placement for Student. As such, their testimony is irrelevant and unnecessary, and the District's Motion relative to Springfield School Committee members is ALLOWED.[6]
The District's Motion also seeks to quash the subpoenas duces tecum sought by GAL on the grounds that the requests are broad, unlimited in time and scope, not specific regarding Student, have a minimal connection to the case at bar, and are unduly burdensome. Springfield conceded that the "only request that makes remote sense is the request for emails pertaining to [Student]. These can be sought through discovery."
The District's Motion is ALLOWED as to the following portions of GAL's subpoenas duces tecum as relating to each subpoenaed witness:
"1. All emails, memoranda, and communications referencing:
• SOC review
• School assignment
• Transportation decisions
• Safety concerns
2. Any School Committee communications discussing:
• SOC process application
• Assignment of students in DCF custody
• Alternative placements."
These documents are irrelevant to the limited issues before me. However, to the extent that the individuals named in GAL's February 19, 2026, request have any "emails, memoranda, and communications referencing [Student]" and/or "[a]ny internal memoranda or policy interpretations relating to: [i]ntrastate transfer procedures; [c]omparable placement analysis; [c]onsultation obligations [relating to intrastate transfer students]," these may have relevant information and must be provided to GAL.
ORDER
Springfield's Motion to Quash is hereby ALLOWED, in part. Specifically, the Motion is allowed as to Springfield's request to quash the subpoenas for members of the School Committee of Springfield, the Superintendent of Schools, the Assistant Superintendent of Schools, and the Chief of the Student Support and Services for the Empowerment Zone. To the extent that the individuals named in the subpoenas duces tecum have any "emails, memoranda, and communications referencing [Student]," these must be provided to GAL by close of business on March 20, 2026. Similarly, "[a]ny internal memoranda or policy interpretations relating to: [i]ntrastate transfer procedures; [c]omparable placement analysis; [c]onsultation obligations [relating to intrastate transfer students]," these must also be provided to GAL by same date. All other requests embedded in the subpoenas duces tecum are hereby quashed pursuant to the District's Motion.
So ordered,
By the Hearing Officer,
s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Date: March 13, 2026
Footnotes
[1] GAL made her request on the evening of February 18, 2026. As such, it is deemed to have been filed on the next business day, February 19.
[2] These are copied verbatim from GAL's request.
[3] See 801 CMR 1.01(10)(g) and BSEA Hearing Rules VII B and C.
[4] See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3).
[5] I note that the district relied on Dr. McCarthy's Affidavit as an exhibit in support of its November 26, 2025, Motion for Summary Decision. Such reliance is reasonable pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, on which BSEA Hearing Officers often rely for guidance in determining whether to grant summary judgment. Said Rules provide that summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
[6] I also note that the 2017 School Committee which approved the SOC policy at issue is no longer the acting School Committee.