COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools
BSEA# 26-05261
RULING ON GUARDIAN AD LITEM’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF A RULING ISSUED ON DECEMBER 9, 2025
On December 9, 2025, I issued “Ruling on Guardian Ad Litem’s Multiple Motions and On Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment” (Ruling) in this matter, finding, in relevant part, that Guardian Ad Litem (GAL)
“submitted no evidence regarding the dates on which she requested Student’s Student Records, and the District indicates it has no record of such requests. Although GAL’s Motion to Compel may be premature, pursuant to the IDEA, Springfield should produce the requested records before the hearing on the merits scheduled for December 17, 2025, but no later than 45 days from when she filed her November 26, 2025 Motion to Compel.[1]”
Because it was premature, GAL’s Motion to Compel was DENIED at that time. The Ruling also found that
“there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding GAL’s assertions that Springfield failed to consult with her when providing a comparable setting for Student and that Springfield High School is not comparable to Student’s last accepted placement. Accordingly, neither Springfield nor GAL is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. However, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding GAL’s claim that Springfield denied Student services and/or tutoring. Accordingly, Springfield is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.”
GAL’s Cross-Motion for Judgment was DENIED in full, as was GAL’s Motion for Tutoring with prejudice. GAL’s Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions With Prior Sworn Testimony, And Misuse Of SOC Process was ALLOWED insofar as the impeachment evidence submitted by GAL was considered for purposes of the Ruling, but was otherwise DENIED in full.
On December 9, 2025, GAL filed Motion For Reconsideration Specifically Addressing Misframing of Issues, Misstatements of Fact, and Legal Errors in December 9, 2025 Ruling (Motion), asserting that the December 9, 2025 Ruling in this matter included “incorrect issue framing, material factual errors, misapplication of legal standards, [and] omission of critical evidence.” Specifically, GAL[2] alleged that the Ruling[3]:
- “Misfram[ed] the dispute as ‘General Education Assignment’” but that “[t]he SOC email recipients—all Special Education administrators—confirm this was not a general assignment” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 1).
- “Incorrectly” stated “that the GAL withheld the student from school” but the “GAL demanded immediate enrollment on Nov. 6 and Nov. 7.; Springfield refused to place him, citing SOC review; Springfield never provided enrollment access, schedule, teacher assignment, intake, or start date; [and] Springfield told the GAL the student ‘cannot start until SOC finishes’” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 2).
- Failed “to acknowledge Springfield’s removal of SOC email recipients,” which was “material because it: proves SOC occurred; proves SPED—not general education—made placement; contradicts Dr. []’s statements; contradicts Ms. []’s affidavit” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 3).
- “Ignor[ed] contradictions between Springfield’s affidavits and statements and the SOC email chain. [Specifically, the] ruling acknowledges ‘impeachment evidence was considered,’ but never addresses [that] Dr. [] denied SOC involvement until confronted with the email; Dr. [] claimed not to know who was on the SOC team—despite being ON THE SOC TEAM; []’s affidavit states SOC is general education—yet every SOC participant is SPED” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 4).
- Failed “to address prior sworn testimony from the Empowerment Zone (Ollie II, 2020)” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 5).
- Misapplied “the intrastate transfer standard. … [T]he legal standard for intrastate transfers still requires: Comparable setting; In consultation with the GAL. The ruling acknowledges ‘a genuine dispute exists as to whether consultation occurred,’ yet fails to incorporate the GAL’s evidence showing no consultation occurred, and in fact, Springfield affirmatively excluded the GAL and DCF” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 6).
- “Overlook[ed] the legal significance of improper SOC use. The ruling minimizes SOC by calling the process ‘perplexing’ but ultimately ‘immaterial.’ This is legally incorrect. SOC: is formally limited to students with felony charges or convictions; was applied to a child with no felony charge or conviction; is a SPED-directed process with secret decision-making; is used to send DCF-youth and students of color to alternative programs; displaced GAL and DCF from participation; resulted in immediate placement predetermination. This is not immaterial. It is the entire basis of the GAL’s discrimination, predetermination, and due-process claims” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 7).
- “Misappli[ed] [] the standard for tutoring and misinterpretation of causation. Thus, the ruling misapplies the law because the causation finding (‘voluntary absence’) is factually incorrect” (hereinafter, GAL Claim Number 8).
On December 17, 2025, GAL filed Supplemental Memorandum in support of the Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification[4]. In part, GAL reiterated that under IDEA, hearing officers may not reframe, narrow, or substitute the issues raised by a party and that her claims extended well beyond a mere school assignment dispute and included allegations of predetermination, exclusion from decision-making, misuse of the SOC process, discrimination against students in state custody, misrepresentations by District officials, and denial of access to education.
On December 18, 2025, Springfield filed Opposition To Motion To Reconsider, asserting that the Motion for Reconsideration fails to make any legal argument to support a reconsideration of the Ruling and offers a series of arguments with no factual foundation. Moreover, the Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration filed thereafter does not offer a legally ascertainable theory to support such a motion or any of the legal relief sought.
For the reasons articulated below, GAL’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD:
A motion for reconsideration may be allowed where a party alleges any manifest errors of law or fact, new information, or an intervening change in law that warrants reconsideration.[5]
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARD:
In this ruling, I rely on and incorporate by reference the December 9, 2025 Ruling and do not restate it here, unless necessary.
GAL’s argument that the Hearing Officer may not reframe, narrow, or substitute the issues raised by a party lacks merit. According to BSEA Hearing Rule IX(B), a hearing officer has a duty “to define issues.” Moreover, a BSEA hearing officer may address only issues within her jurisdiction, which is limited by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) to complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[6] As such, I have both the authority and the obligation to reframe and/or narrow issues raised by a party to a due process complaint. As explained in the Ruling, the matter may proceed on the following issues:
I further note that I have no jurisdiction over misuse of the SOC process, discriminatory segregation of students in state custody, and material misrepresentations by District officials. GAL’s claims relative to predetermination, exclusion of the GAL and DCF from decision-making, and access to education were addressed by the Ruling. Of the claims asserted, the only remaining issues over which I have jurisdiction are: 1) Whether Springfield failed to consult with her when providing a comparable setting for Student, and 2) Whether Springfield High School is comparable to Student’s last accepted placement.
I now address each of GAL’s specific claims below:
- GAL Claim Numbers 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 Do Not Warrant Reconsideration.
As noted above, the Ruling found that summary judgement was not warranted as to the assertions in the Hearing Request that Springfield failed to consult with GAL in the process of providing a comparable setting for Student and that Springfield High School (SHS) was not comparable to Student’s last accepted placement.
Contrary to GAL’s claims, the Ruling did not frame the issue as one of general education assignment. Rather, the issue was framed as a special education issue relative to comparable placement and consultation as required by state and federal law in the case of an intrastate transfer. The Ruling did not fail to incorporate the GAL’s evidence regarding lack of consultation nor ignore her claims of “contradictions”; rather, such evidence supported my conclusion that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the issue. Nor did the Ruling “overlook the legal significance of improper SOC use.” The Ruling made no findings as to the propriety of the SOC process because, in this matter, the material facts relating to whether the District provided Student with the correct process for an intrastate transfer student were whether consultation occurred and whether a comparable program was provided.
Moreover, GAL’s argument fails to address the legally relevant issue before me over which I have jurisdiction (i.e., whether or not the District complied with the intrastate transfer requirements in assigning Student to SHS). It also does not present any new information that GAL had not already included in her pleadings and addressed in the Ruling. GAL claims that the District removed unidentified “SOC email recipients.” However, she relies on documents she had previously produced and presents no new information; rather, GAL uses the same information to expand upon her prior argument. Although this Claim appears to allege that a special education process (which is how she characterizes the SOC process) occurred, presumably without her knowledge or participation, GAL also fails to cite to any law indicating it was required that she be part of this process. The Ruling directly addressed whether GAL was required to be part of the decision-making Team and concluded that the intrastate transfer process does not so require her involvement, provided that the required ‘consultation’ occurred.
As to these claims, GAL has failed to “allege[] any manifest errors of law or fact, new information or an intervening change in law.” [7] Thus, reconsideration is not warranted, and GAL’s Motion relative to GAL Claim Numbers 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 is DENIED.
- GAL Claim Number 5 Does Not Warrant Reconsideration.
Claim Number 5 appears to seek a definitive finding of fact concerning alleged “prior sworn testimony” from a previous BSEA matter identified by GAL as “Ollie II”[8]. However, contrary to GAL’s claim, the Ruling specifically considered this evidence, and it was in fact reviewed and addressed as part of the Ruling[9]. Thus, as with Claim Number 3, since Claim Number 5 also seeks to “relitigate and/or rehash matters already litigated and decided”[10] in the Ruling, reconsideration on this issue is DENIED.
- GAL Claim Numbers 2 and 8 Do Not Warrant Reconsideration.
GAL asserts that the Hearing Officer “incorrectly” stated “that the GAL withheld the student from school.” She contends instead that she “demanded immediate enrollment on Nov. 6 and Nov. 7; Springfield refused to place him, citing SOC review; Springfield never provided enrollment access, schedule, teacher assignment, intake, or start date; [and] Springfield told the GAL the student ‘cannot start until SOC finishes.’”
However, based on the facts available and presented by the Parties for consideration in the Ruling, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor, as I was required to do[11], the record established that Student was assigned to Springfield High School, at the latest, on November 10, 2025. GAL disagreed with that assignment and, as of the issuance of the Ruling, Student had still not attended school. Nothing in GAL’s Motion presents any new information with regard to these facts.
The Ruling concluded that
“[a]s no genuine issue of material fact exists that GAL has voluntarily withheld Student from school and has not submitted a tutoring request in compliance with 603 CMR 28.03(3)(c), then, as a matter of law, Springfield has not violated the IDEA by failing to provide out-of-school services or tutoring during Student’s voluntary absence. Accordingly, summary judgment in Springfield’s favor on this claim is warranted. Springfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is ALLOWED. GAL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. For the same reasons, GAL’s Motion for Tutoring is also DENIED with prejudice.”
Because GAL failed to “allege[] any manifest errors of law or fact, new information or an intervening change in law” but instead merely attempts to “rehash and/or relitigate” issues already addressed in the Ruling, reconsideration is not warranted.[12]
ORDER:
GAL’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
As stated in my prior Ruling, the hearing currently scheduled for January 2, 2026, shall proceed on the following issues: 1) Whether Springfield failed to consult with her when providing a comparable setting for Student, and 2) Whether Springfield High School is comparable to Student’s last accepted placement.
So Ordered by the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: December 19, 2025
[1] Internal citations omitted.
[2] As noted in the Ruling, GAL is an experienced Advocate who practices frequently before the BSEA.
[3] I number GAL’s claims in the order in which she asserts them in her Motion for the purpose of this Ruling for ease of reference.
[4] This Motion, which reiterated the points raised by Motion For Reconsideration Of A Ruling Issued On December 9, 2025, also included a response to the District’s opposition to recording and stenographic preservation. Said request was addressed in my December 18, 2025 Ruling On Guardian Ad Litem’s Request To Record Prehearing Conference.
[5] See In Re: Student & Braintree Public Schools (Ruling on Parent’s Requests), BSEA# 25-11326 (Mitchell, 2025) (citing to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 and to Villanueva-Mendez v. Nieves Vazquez, 360 F.Supp.2d 320, 323 (D. Mass. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (“… a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to relitigate and/or rehash matters already litigated and decided by the Court. These motions are entertained by Courts if they seek to correct manifest errors of law or fact, present newly discovered evidence, or when there is an intervening change in law”)).
[6] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[7] Villanueva-Mendez, 360 F.Supp.2d at 323.
[8] This was a matter involving a different student other than Student.
[9] Reference is made to the discussions and conclusions in the Ruling pertaining to GAL’s Motion Regarding Impeachment Evidence, District Credibility Failures, Contradictions With Prior Sworn Testimony, And Misuse Of SOC Process filed on December 5, 2025 that contained the “prior sworn testimony” involved in Claim Number 5, specifically footnotes 19, 37, 52 and page 20.
[10] Villanueva-Mendez, 360 F.Supp.2d at 323.
[11] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see In Re: Westwood Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol County Agricultural Sch., BSEA # 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006). As the Ruling addressed cross-motions for summary judgment both parties at various stages received the inferential benefit to the extent that I was considering the other party’s summary judgment request.
[12] Villanueva-Mendez, 360 F.Supp.2d at 323.