COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
BSEA# 26-07507
RULING ON THE DEPARTMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING REQUEST
On January 14, 2026, Parents filed a Hearing Request against the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (the Department or DESE)[1], asserting the
“ongoing denial of а Free Appropriate Public Education (‘FAPE’) to [Student] and DESE’s failure to ensure district compliance with IDEA and state law. [Student] is а nine-year-old student with dyslexia, а specific language impairment, а pervasive phonological processing disorder, and profound dysgraphia. Despite clear evidence of disability and substantial documentation provided to the [Dudley-Charlton Regional School District] and DESE, [Student] has not received the services, assessments, placement, or qualified instructors required to provide him with FAPE.”
Parents delineated the following claims:
A. Significant and Longstanding Failure to Provide Evidence-Based, Individualized Reading Instruction;
B. Failure to Evaluate in AII Areas of Suspected Disability (IDEA §300.304);
C. Failure to Provide Speech/Language and Writing Services;
D. Predetermination of Services and Placement;
E. DESE’s Failure to Ensure District Compliance;
F. Student Harm.
On January 16, 2026, DESE filed the Department’s Motion To Dismiss Hearing Request (Motion), asking the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) to dismiss Parents’ January 14, 2026 Hearing Request because it raises claims identical to those raised in a prior Hearing Request (BSEA No. 2605857) involving the same Student, and all such claims have already been dismissed via Rulings issued by Hearing Officer Amy Reichbach on January 7[2] and January 14[3], 2026. DESE further argued that, even if res judicata does not apply in the instant matter, Parents’ claims should still be dismissed for the same reasons articulated by DESE in its motions to dismiss in BSEA # 26-05857.
On January 20, 2026, Parents filed Parents’ Motion to Quash the Department’s Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, they assert that DESE’s Motion is
“procedurally improper, legally defective, and constitutes an impermissible attempt to expand the doctrine of res judicata beyond its lawful bounds in order to foreclose claims that were never adjudicated on the merits, were expressly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or arise from continuing and post-decision violations. Rather than addressing the substance of the Parents’ allegations, DESE’s filing seeks to preemptively terminate this proceeding through an overbroad and misleading characterization of prior rulings, misapplication of claim-preclusion doctrine, and selective omission of controlling IDEA principles governing ongoing violations, SEA accountability, and exhaustion.”
Because neither party has requested a hearing on the Motion, and as neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer’s understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing, pursuant to Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rule VII(D).
For the reasons set forth below, DESE’s Motion is ALLOWED.
FINDINGS OF FACT[4]:
- The Hearing Request filed by Parents in BSEA Matter No. 26-05857 on November 28, 2025 (November 2025 Complaint) against the Department alleged the following claims:
Claim A: The Dudley-Charlton Regional School District (the District) violated IDEA by failing to provide “evidence-based individualized reading instruction” to the Student.
Claim B: The District failed to evaluate the Student in all areas of suspected disability, in violation of the Individual Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B regulations at 34 CFR § 300.304.
Claim C: The District failed to provide specialized writing instruction, occupational therapy services targeting writing or motor planning, and an evidence-based writing program, despite the Student’s “severe dysgraphia.”
Claim D: The District “predetermined” the Student’s services before IEP [Individual Education Program] meetings, “in violation of IDEA procedural requirements.”
Claim E: The Department “did not ensure the District corrected violations, provided oversight, or required compliant services,” even after the Parents “repeatedly notified” the District and the Department of the District’s alleged noncompliance with IDEA; and although the Department “has the ultimate responsibility to ensure district compliance with IDEA” under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) [setting forth States’ supervisory responsibilities under IDEA], DESE “failed in this duty.”
Via an Amended Hearing Request in BSEA Matter No. 26-05857, Parents asserted the following additional three claims:
Claim A: The Department had actual and constructive notice of District IDEA violations;
Claim B: DESE, through Problem Resolution System (PRS), failed to maintain a legally sufficient monitoring and corrective action process, contributing to the ongoing denial of FAPE; and
Claim C: DESE failed to exercise its SEA authority after notice.
- Claims A through E of the November 2025 Complaint were dismissed with prejudice by the BSEA on January 7, 2026. Specifically, in the First Ruling, Hearing Officer Reichbach found that Parents’ Claims A through D failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against DESE and that Parents’ Claim E could not proceed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[5] Claims A through C of the Amended Hearing Request were dismissed with prejudice in the Second Ruling for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
- Claims A through F in the instant Hearing Request are identical to Claims A through F of the November 2025 Complaint.
LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION:
- Legal Standards:
Pursuant to Rule XVII A and B of the Hearing Rules and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3)[6], a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[7] The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[8] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”[9]
- Jurisdiction of the BSEA:
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[10] Similarly, M.G.L. c. 71B §2A, establishing the BSEA, authorizes the BSEA to resolve special education disputes concerning “…(i) any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, education program or educational placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a free and appropriate public education to the child arising under this chapter and regulations promulgated hereunder or under the [IDEA], 20 U.S.C. section 1400 et seq., and its regulations; or (ii) a student’s rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. section 794, and its regulations.” Matters that come before the BSEA must involve a live or current dispute between the Parties.[11] In addition, the BSEA “can only grant relief that is authorized by these statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services.”[12]
- Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel:
The purpose of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to “prevent plaintiffs from splitting their claims by providing a strong incentive for them to plead all factually related allegations and attendant legal theories for recovery the first time they bring suit.”[13] These doctrines “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”[14] Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from re-litigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.[15] The three elements of res judicata are (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) “sufficient identicality” between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and (3) “sufficient identicality” between the parties in the two suits.[16] Moreover, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, once an issue of fact or law necessary to a judgment has been decided, that decision may preclude re-litigating the issue in an appeal on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.[17] A final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding, not appealed from and as to which the appeal period has expired, precludes re-litigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.[18] Hence, these doctrines both apply to a BSEA Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the merits of a special education dispute.
- Application of Legal Standards:
According to Parents, DESE’s Motion “asks this Hearing Officer to [] declare future claims barred, convert jurisdictional dismissals into merits rulings, and foreclose statutory avenues expressly preserved under IDEA, including state-level complaint processes and federal oversight.” They contend that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that some factual overlap exists, res judicata does not apply to [] continuing violations, post-decision conduct, or ongoing failures to act after notice. The Hearing Request in this matter alleges continued denial of FAPE, continued reliance on defective evaluations, and ongoing harm to the Student after the prior rulings issued. Claim preclusion does not attach to facts or violations that had not yet occurred or were not fully ripened at the time of the earlier dismissal.” Parents further assert that “res judicata does not apply where [] the dismissal was tethered to jurisdictional limitations, the tribunal lacked authority to grant the requested relief, or the claims could not have been fully litigated.”[19] Parents’ arguments are unpersuasive.
Claims A through D, which are identical to Claims A through D of the November 2025 Complaint, were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; such dismissals are considered to be “on the merits,” and the doctrine of res judicata applies.[20] As such, these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
Parents’ Claim E, which is identical to Claim E of the November 2025 Complaint, could not proceed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A “dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not considered to be ‘on the merits,’ and therefore is without res judicata effect.”[21] Nevertheless, the First Circuit has found that “dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction precludes re[-]litigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdictional question.”[22] Thus, where the BSEA has determined that it lacks the legal authority to adjudicate a particular claim, that determination is binding on the parties and cannot be reargued in subsequent filings before the BSEA.
Here, Hearing Officer Reichbach’s dismissal of Claim E, while not a decision on the merits and without resolving the substantive rights of the parties, precludes re-litigation of the jurisdictional issue on the same claims before the BSEA.[23] Although a dismissal with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is procedural rather than substantive, it reflects the BSEA’s determination that it lacks authority to adjudicate the claim presented. Claim E in the instant Hearing Request is identical to that previously dismissed with prejudice, and no new facts have been alleged that would confer jurisdiction.[24] Hence, the dismissal bars re-litigation of that claim before the BSEA, though it does not preclude pursuit of the claim in a forum with proper jurisdiction.[25] Claim E must be dismissed with prejudice.
In addition, to the extent that Parents assert Claims A through Claim F against DESE based on its supervisory responsibility, I agree with the Department that these claims fail to state a claim for relief. Specifically, even if I take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor,”[26] as I am required to do, I cannot find that Parents have raised a claim upon which relief may be granted because the IDEA does not confer an individual right to enforce a State’s supervisory responsibilities over special education.[27] As such, these claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
ORDER:
DESE’s Motion is ALLOWED. The Hearing Request is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
So Ordered,
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Date: January 21, 2026
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
EFFECT OF FINAL BSEA ACTIONS AND RIGHTS OF APPEAL
Effect of BSEA Decision, Dismissal with Prejudice and Allowance of Motion for Summary Judgment
20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals be final and subject to no further agency review. Similarly, a Ruling Dismissing a Matter with Prejudice and a Ruling Allowing a Motion for Summary Judgment are final agency actions. If a ruling orders Dismissal with Prejudice of some, but not all claims in the hearing request, or if a ruling orders Summary Judgment with respect to some but not all claims, the ruling of Dismissal with Prejudice or Summary Judgment is final with respect to those claims only.
Accordingly, the Bureau cannot permit motions to reconsider or to re-open either a Bureau decision or the Rulings set forth above once they have issued. They are final subject only to judicial (court) review.
Except as set forth below, the final decision of the Bureau must be implemented immediately. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, s. 14(3), appeal of the decision does not operate as a stay. This means that the decision must be implemented immediately even if the other party files an appeal in court, and implementation cannot be delayed while the appeal is being decided. Rather, a party seeking to stay—that is, delay implementation of– the decision of the Bureau must request and obtain such stay from the court having jurisdiction over the party’s appeal.
Under the provisions of 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(j), “unless the State or local education agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement,” while a judicial appeal of the Bureau decision is pending, unless the child is seeking initial admission to a public school, in which case “with the consent of the parents, the child shall be placed in the public school program.”
Therefore, where the Bureau has ordered the public school to place the child in a new placement, and the parents or guardian agree with that order, the public school shall immediately implement the placement ordered by the Bureau. School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Otherwise, a party seeking to change the child’s placement while judicial proceedings are pending must ask the court having jurisdiction over the appeal to grant a preliminary injunction ordering such a change in placement. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
Compliance
A party contending that a Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision is not being implemented may file a motion with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals contending that the decision is not being implemented and setting out the areas of non-compliance. The Hearing Officer may convene a hearing at which the scope of the inquiry shall be limited to the facts on the issue of compliance, facts of such a nature as to excuse performance, and facts bearing on a remedy. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the Hearing Officer may fashion appropriate relief, including referral of the matter to the Legal Office of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or other office for appropriate enforcement action. 603 CMR 28.08(6)(b).
Rights of Appeal
Any party aggrieved by a final agency action by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may file a complaint for review in the state superior court of competent jurisdiction or in the District Court of the United States for Massachusetts. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2).
An appeal of a Bureau decision to state superior court or to federal district court must be filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the decision. 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).
Confidentiality
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the student involved in these proceedings, when an appeal is taken to superior court or to federal district court, the parties are strongly urged to file the complaint without identifying the true name of the parents or the child, and to move that all exhibits, including the transcript of the hearing before the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, be impounded by the court. See Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, 898 F.2d 1371 (8th. Cir. 1990). If the appealing party does not seek to impound the documents, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, through the Attorney General’s Office, may move to impound the documents.
Record of the Hearing
The Bureau of Special Education Appeals will provide an electronic verbatim record of the hearing to any party, free of charge, upon receipt of a written request. Pursuant to federal law, upon receipt of a written request from any party, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals will arrange for and provide a certified written transcription of the entire proceedings by a certified court reporter, free of charge.
[1] Parents did not name Dudley-Charlton Regional School District as a party in the matter.
[2] See In Re: Frank and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling On Massachusetts Department Of Elementary And Secondary Education’s Motion To Dismiss), BSEA# 26-05857 (Reichbach, January 7, 2026) (hereinafter, First Ruling).
[3] See In Re: Frank and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling On Massachusetts Department Of Elementary And Secondary Education’s Motion To Dismiss Amended Hearing Request), BSEA# 26-05857 (Reichbach, January 14, 2026) (hereinafter, Second Ruling).
[4] In this Ruling, I take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in [the Parents’] favor” as I am required to do. Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995). These facts are subject to revision in future rulings and Decision.
[5] Hearing Officer Reichbach noted in Footnote #2 of the First Ruling that “[i]n their Hearing Request, Parents allege harm to [Student] as Claim F.”
[6] Hearing Officers are bound by the BSEA Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules) and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure, 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[7] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[8] Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[9] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[10] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[11] See In Re: Student v. Bay Path Reg’l Vocational Tech. High Sch., BSEA # 18-05746 (Figueroa, 2018).
[12] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA #1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[13] See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.2d 727, 736 (3rd Cir. 2009).
[14] Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
[15] Id.
[16] Id.; see In Re Sonus Networks, Inc., Shareholder Derivative Litig., 499 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007); Kobrin v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005).
[17] See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
[18] See Diaz v. City of Somerville, 59 F.4th 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2023); see also See Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 844 (“final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding … precludes re[-]litigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction”).
[19] The bolded parts herein reflect Parents’ use of bold typeface in their pleading.
[20] See Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fid. Real Est. Co., LLC, 481 Mass. 13, 20 (2018) (“At least for res judicata purposes, however, a dismissal under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) is considered an adjudication on the merits”). This also applies to Claims A through C of the Amended Hearing Request which were dismissed with prejudice in the Second Ruling for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
[21] Muniz Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc., 229 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2000).
[22] Id. at 14–15.
[23] See Strahan v. Massachusetts Port Auth., No. 22-1261, 2023 WL 10947175, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (affirming dismissal of case “based on (i) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because issue preclusion foreclosed appellant from re[-]litigating the same standing issue, and (ii) failure to state a claim for relief. We affirm the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because we agree that appellant is precluded from re[-]litigating his lack of standing”); see also Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“A valid jurisdictional judgment has preclusive effect”).
[24] See Pace v. Town of Erving, 294 F. Supp. 3d 5, 9 (D. Mass. 2018) (“This means only that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction permits a second action on the same claim that corrects the deficiency found in the first action. This same rule also applies to dismissals that rest on matters closely related to jurisdiction, such as prior resort to an administrative agency. This is because jurisdictional dismissals ordinarily preclude any decision on the substance of the claims presented”).
[25] See Integrated Techs. Ltd. v. Biochem Immunosystems, (U.S.) Inc., 2 F.Supp.2d 97, 105 (D. Mass. 1998) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not adjudication on merits for claim preclusion purposes and, therefore, would not preclude plaintiff from reasserting first claim in a different forum).
[26] Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[27] See In re: Parent and Student v. Springfield Public Schools, Springfield School Committee (Including Melinda Phelps), DESE and Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane (Ruling On Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss), BSEA #2309351 (Mitchell, 2023) (“No private right of action for violations of Section 1412 of the IDEA exists under Section 1415 of the IDEA”).